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ABSTRACT 
Rose, Mike. A History of Employer Liability and Workers' Compensation Laws in 
Newfoundland From 1887 to 1993 and An Overview of Factors Which Influenced Policy 
Choices. August 2008 
This paper examines factors which have influenced the development of employer liability 
and workers' compensation policy in Newfoundland since 1887. Various influences are 
considered such as the role of government policy, individuals, interest groups, institutions 
and processes, ideology, political parties, international and interprovincial emulation 
factors, and fiscal/economic matters. In addition to public policy development analysis, 
the paper's scope of review serves as an historic overview of the system and its 
development is reviewed against many of the major developments in the province over 
these years. 
By copying the Canadian workers' compensation system, as it did after 1949, 
Newfoundland adopted the terms of a bargain struck by Canadian employers and labour 
as early as 1914. The bargain is that labour (individual workers) surrendered the right to 
sue their employers for damages caused by workplace injuries in exchange for guaranteed 
compensation payments from an employer-funded program whether or not the employer 
or worker was at fault. The result is a no-fault workers' compensation system, the 
development of which is the subject under review. 
The paper may be of interest to academics, analysts, and decision makers interested in the 
Newfoundland workers' compensation experience, or serve as a comparative source for 
related public policy research. 
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Chapter One 
The Historical Context (British, German and Canadian Influences) 
This paper reviews the major policy determinants which have affected the 
development of workers' compensation laws in Newfoundland from colonial to modem 
times. Broad, often complex, economic, social, institutional and political factors have 
influenced the direction of the law and while occasional major policy shifts do occur, it is 
determined that workers' compensation in Newfoundland is a policy field normally 
subject to incremental change. By simple definition, incrementalism "as a political pattern" 1 
is change by small steps. In patiicular, the paper considers the incremental nature of policy 
development in the context of Newfoundland as British colony to 1949 and as Canadian 
Province after Confederation. That context involves obvious influential roles played by 
Britain and Canada regarding their workers' compensation policy choices and influences, yet 
on an island territory with its own distinctive legal history reflecting social, economic and 
political history. The paper reveals that the path of policy development is not readily 
categorized or neatly explained solely in terms of one influencing variable or another, 
although at certain points in time it may be possible to isolate distinctive influences. 
Instead, the incremental nature of policy development is influenced by a mix of factors 
including: historical; ideological; legal and institutional; and economic, social, and 
political responses to industrialization and modernization. 
This work unfolds in a number of distinct steps. It seeks to create and preserve a 
complete historic record of the development of compensation law in Newfoundland. The 
evolution ofNewfoundland's laws governing compensation for injury at work is carefully 
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traced from the narrowly defined Employers' Liability Act of 1887 to the more broadly 
principled, post-1949 Workers' Compensation Acts and system. Second, it discusses the 
most important factors influencing policy choices in workers' compensation over more 
than a century and how those factors changed over time. Factors such as ideology, rate of 
economic and social development, interest group participation, political leadership, and 
institutional processes are considered. Thirdly, where necessary, it connects the legal 
history to the political and industrial history of the island, its changing political regimes 
and leaders, and various industrial champions. This close analysis of political history not 
only provides a clearer picture of the factors influencing the system at given points in 
time, it allows one to assess and appreciate the persistence of policy choices over time. 
Furthermore, the detailed rmmjng analysis of evolving, recurring, and new influencing 
factors - and the policy actors associated with them at given points in time - pe1mits 
clearer assessment of the suite of factors affecting change at given points in time. 
The history of workers' compensation laws in Newfoundland is sharply divided into two 
distinct periods: pre-1949 and post-1949.2 Prior to 1949 the laws of Newfoundland are 
based entirely on England's employer liability laws and after 1949 they are based entirely 
on Canadian workers' compensation law. It is important to note, however, that the 
Canadian system was heavily influenced by the German model. Therefore, as a means to 
illustrate the social, legal, and philosoprucal genesis of the laws adopted by 
Newfoundland, the first part of this chapter provides an overview of the rustory of 
development of workers' compensation laws in England and Gem1any, followed by an 
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analysis of the early Canadian history. 
Tracing the evolution ofEnglish common law is instructive because it explains the origin 
and development of key legal concepts and doctrines which continue to underlie 
compensation law philosophy. The English history also effectively demonstrates the 
importance of changing ideologies upon the law, e.g., the influence of 181h century 
philosophies such as the rights of man, self-determination, liberty, utilitarianism, and the 
perfectibility of man. Similarly, the German history effectively illustrates the evolving 
interplay between the interests of labour, capital, and governments in workers' 
compensation policy development. These are basic forces which recur throughout this 
work; many of the group and class dynamics experienced in Getmany parallel those of 
Newfoundland, particularly illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven. For example, 
Bismarck's resort to a corporatist approach in the 1880s echoes over a century later when 
changes are made in the governance structures of the Newfoundland workers' 
compensation system to ensure greater involvement of employers and labour. 
Finally, the English and Gennan historical juxtaposition provides the thought-provoking 
and illustrative concept of how, by the 1980s, various concerns and complaints with the 
Newfoundland system (Chapter Seven) can be philosophically attributed to inherent 
tensions associated with administering a German-rooted, mass adjudication and collective 
liability system in an English-rooted, common law, Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms environment. Ultimately, it is important to give full treatment to the English 
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and Gennan expenences because they provide the basis on which western workers' 
compensation systems developed: 
There are two main types of compensation laws. By one of them the 
employer is individually liable for the payment of it, and that is the British 
system. By the other, which may be called the German system, the 
liability is not individual but collective, the industries being divided into 
groups, and the employers in the industries in each group being 
collectively liable for the payment of the compensation to the workmen 
employed in those industries practically a system of compulsory mutual 
insurance under the management of the state. The laws of other countries 
are of one or other of these types, or modified forms of them and in most, 
if not all of them, in which the principle of individual liability obtains, 
employers are required to insure against it.3 
The British Influence 
The experience and laws of England, in particular from the 1830s onward, directly 
affected the fom1 and substance of workers' compensation law in Newfoundland prior to 
1949. Clear and unequivocal evidence of this occurs in 1908 when Newfoundland's first 
Workmen's Compensation Act was introduced in the Newfoundland House of Assembly. 
Not only was it explicitly stated that the Newfoundland law was based entirely on the law 
of England, a detailed history of the development of the English laws was presented to 
the House. It was indicated that unfair English common law related to injured workers 
was not improved upon in England until 1880.4 
To understand the nature of the 1880 improvements in England it is useful to briefly 
consider English legal history regarding compensation for injury. While the roots of 
English workers' compensation laws are traceable to the 1880s,5 the concept of 
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compensating for injury with money predates can be traced as early as 597 a.d., when, 
under King Ethelbe1i, visiting missionaries garnered the protection of the king who 
declared that if anyone injured the missionaries he would have to pay "a two-fold 
compensation and 50 shillings to the king. "6 Early laws were exact and stark, and the 
societies and economies they governed were peasant, rural and unsophisticated, but 
providing specific amounts of compensation for personal injury was an ancient concept.7 
By 1215, with the signing of the Magna Carta, the basic concepts of fairness, natural 
justice or due process were put in place setting the stage for a century of rapid change and 
development of legal precedent affecting government and law. This was the beginning of 
the English Common Law system.8 The 400 year period following the Magna Carta is 
characterized as one during which changing economic relationships resulted in a broader role 
for the courts related to private law (affecting individuals). Harding states, "a whole new 
legal system was being constructed in the way that legal systems usually are, by continual 
experiment in the arbitration of disputes arising from new social arrangements."9 
By the eighteenth century social arrangements developed at an even quicker pace with 
the advent of the industrial revolution. Technologies improved and factory systems were 
created causing working populations to shift from farms to factories, from rural to urban 
settings. 10 Medieval feudal relationships faded and workers increasingly sought 
protection and benefits through other means such as Parliament, common law courts, 
friendly societies, guilds and, eventually, trade umons. Fair outcomes for commoners, 
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however, did not come easily. Social class inequalities and prevailing ideological beliefs 
and philosophies increasingly limited their options. For example, in the year 1800 the 
English Parliament actually banned trade unions because they fought employers for 
higher wages. That was interpreted as being against the common good. On the other 
hand, friendly societies were encouraged as Jess threatening impediments to commerce 
offering worker's representation and mutual benefits.11 
As for ideological influences, prevailing belief systems were highly influenced right across 
Europe following the ideals of the great revolutions of France (1789) and America 
(1776). This was the age of Enlightenment when the maturing philosophies of Rousseau, 
Voltaire, Paine and others focused attention on such ideals as the rights of man, self-
determination, liberty, and the perfectibility of man. Among the stream of progressive 
thinkers was, for exan1ple, Englishman Jeremy Bentham, famous for promoting the 
utilitarian concept of the greatest good for the greatest number. Bentham had strongly 
lobbied for a wide variety of social and political reforms for many years prior to his death 
in 1832.12 A significant number of progressive social issues occurred in England between 
1800 and 1832.13 This ideological trend also resulted in the passage of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834 which stressed self-help, self-reliance, individualism, and 
liberation. 
This belief system did not assist injured and struggling working class individuals because 
there is solid evidence that the courts of law were not immune from the prevalent laissez-
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faire economic and social thoughts. For example, prior to the 1830s an injured worker may 
have been awarded compensation by a court based on an employer's responsibility for the 
injury.14 The generally accepted master's vicarious liability doctrine said that an employer 
was vicariously liable for wrongs committed by one of his employees.15 Unfortunately for the 
interests of workers, that legal view of the world changed in the 1830s when an exception to 
the general rule of master's vicarious liability was created. In a case known as Priestly v. 
Fowler the judge concluded that a butcher (the employer) was not liable for the negligence of 
his employee who had overloaded a wagon causing another employee to be injured. 
Generally known as the fellow-servant role the reasoning held that an employer would not be 
liable if a coworker caused the injury.16 
That negative trend in conunon law did not stop with the f ellow-servant role. There were 
two other significant lines of defense available for employers who wished to escape 
liability for injuries suffered by their workmen. Closely associated with reasoning 
employed in Priestly v. Fowler, that an employer would not be liable if a coworker 
caused the injury, was the voluntary assumption of risk doctrine. Under that concept 
employers would successfully argue that employees were completely free to decide 
against carrying out dangerous activities and would, as much or more than the employer, 
be in a position to determine what activities were dangerous. So, in the event of injury to 
the employee, the employer would escape liability. 17 The third line of defense for 
employers was the concept of contributory negligence. Under this form of legal defense 
employers avoided all liability if some degree of negligence on the part of the employee 
could be shown, even if direct negligence on the part of an employer was also evident. 
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These laws were not beneficial for the interests of injured workers. As Larson suggests, it 
is a paradox that at a time when the number of injuries and risks to workmen were 
increasing, there were fewer and fewer common law remedies. 18 As the industrial 
revolution matured there were increasing numbers of maimed urban workers and the 
emergence of a new social phenomena for English society: a class of chronically disabled 
injured workers and the families they had previously been able to support through their 
labour. In effect, the fellow-servant, voluntary assumption of risk, and contributory 
negligence rules were fundamentally unfair to individual injured workers who would be 
left with little or no compensation. The emergence of this social fact and eventual 
recognition of the need to respond more equitably were fundamental determinants of the 
original workers' compensation laws. However, improvements in the laws governing 
individual rights arising out of accidents at work did not occur quickly after 1830. 
It was not until well into the nineteenth century that English Parliaments created laws to 
protect the interests of the worker population. In what Harding describes as a more 
"socialistic atmosphere" 19, in 1880 the English Parliament introduced the first major 
improvement in the Jaws regarding work-related injury by way of the Employers ' 
Liability Act. This Act restricted the availability of the f ellow-servant defense for 
employers.20 It was a good first step, but not entirely satisfactory from the workers' point 
of view. In addition to the "exceptions, qualifications, and pitfalls in the Act itself'21 , the 
law was rapidly weakened by a series of court rulings which held as valid an employer 
and worker contract waiving the worker's rights under the Act.22 The general deficiencies 
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prompted an increasingly powerful trade umon movement to vo1ce its concern that 
workers were being left destitute as a result of their work injuries.23 
The eventual response to mounting concerns in England was the implementation of its 
first Workers' Compensation Act in 1897. This was a significant piece of legislation 
which provided a right to compensation for injured workers or their dependants for 
injuries 'arising out of and in the course of their employment'. In principle, this 
represented a major departure from the English common law tradition in which an 
employer's fault or negligence had to be proven before it would be held liable for injuries 
sustained by one of its' workers. The Act treated workers as being automatically entitled 
to compensation from their employer when they suffered a work injury. In practical terms 
though, the Act was not as generous to injured workers. The amount of compensation 
payable to an injured worker was limited to half of their wages because it was the 
accepted belief that the worker must share half the risk for industrial activities. 
Employers were not required to purchase insurance against the risk of injury to their 
workers (although many did), which in effect meant that many workers did not have 
security ofbenefi ts in the event of injury. 24 
Additionally, although employers were responsible for work injuries, entitlement under 
the Workers' Compensation Act was not the only remedy for injured workers. There 
remained an option for workers to execute their natural/legal right to sue an employer in 
court for full compensation (instead of half wages under the Act). Furthermore, the 1897 
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Act did not create any change with respect to the general administration these matters. 
While the general intent was to create a system which provided swift and secure 
compensation, it remained a conflict-oriented, adversarial system featuring workers, 
employers, insurers and courts. In the final analysis the 1897 Act did not enjoy 
widespread support and was the target of many amendments. From 1897 to the 1940s this 
workers' compensation policy was maintained in England through an unhappy alliance 
between the unions and employers. 25 
Chapter Two outlines how the British expenence significantly influenced the first 
workplace injury law in Newfoundland. In fact, it is accurate to say Newfoundland 
directly copied the British experience in 1887. 
The German Influence 
Because of its direct influence on Canadian, and ultimately Newfoundland, workers' 
compensation laws it is important to examine the German experience of the 1870 -1889 
period. During those years the first comprehensive German workers' compensation 
system was develop in the Reichstag (legislature) with much guidance from Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck. The motivation of the German leadership to deal with those matters 
was, in essence, no different from those which led to the laws of England, Canada, or 
Newfoundland. Like England, Germany was subject to ideological influences pem1eating 
Europe society as well as other fundamental shaping forces such as industrial 
development and growing numbers of disabled urban workers. Nothing in the 
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expenences of these other countries, however, compares with Bismarck's ultimate 
political objectives related to the development of the workers' compensation program. 
By the 1870s social unrest in Germany had grown to such an extent that various working 
and middle class groups were threatening the status quo?6 The working class, whose 
interests were represented by the socialist movement, was repressed for little else than 
seeking better working conditions and measures to reduce mass poverty. Anti-socialist 
laws were passed in 1878 and again in 1881.27 These laws were not entirely successful. 
By 1884 there remained a key group of social democratic leaders within the Reichstag. 
Among Bismarck's goals for social legislation after 1878 was to diminish labour's 
reliance on the social democratic movement. More importantly perhaps, one of 
Bismarck's overriding political objectives was the strengthening and further development 
of Germany as a nation state, as opposed to independent German states; demonstrating 
that the state was capable of looking after labour's needs was an indicator of nation state 
development. Consequently, by 1889 Germany would pass a medical insurance act 
(1883), an accident insurance act (1884), and an old age and disability act (1889).28 
Progressive laws for the injured worker were not new in Germany. For example, as early 
as 1838 in Prussia a law was passed which made railroads liable, under certain 
circumstances, for injuries sustained by their employees. Larson cites the German 
philosopher Johann Fitche as being responsible for expounding the idea that "the 
misfortunes, disabilities, and accidents of individuals are ultimately social and not 
individual in origin, and that the state ... therefore ... (should be responsible).29 As well, 
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Germany enacted an accident liability statute in 1871 which required an injured worker to 
prove that the employer was at fault . In 1878 a stricter employer liability bill was 
introduced by social democrats which would have reversed the onus of proof and made it 
mandatory for employers to report a11 accidents. While employers would be required to 
arrange private insurance coverages, premiums were to be shared between the employer, 
workers and regional poor relief associations. That bill was defeated, however, largely 
due to the influence of Bismarck, who wanted a system which featured greater 
involvement of the Reich (or state). Given general political unrest and the threat of 
instability, Bismarck felt it was important for Germans to see benefits of state 
involvement in their lives.30 
In his quest for information, Bismarck relied on the views of successful industrialists 
more than those of his bureaucrats.31 While many of these employers were genuinely 
interested in improving conditions, there is no doubt that they did not want to be overly 
generous; in return for better social progran1s, employers also expected increased 
productivity, loyalty, no unions and no strikes. In 1879 mining industrialist Louis Barre 
wrote to his commerce colleagues, "If industry now demonstrates a willingness to 
sacrifice it will receive the sympathy of the imperial government in the stmggle against 
an extension of the law on employers' liability for job-related accidents."32 While 
employers were treated as a key interest group, it is certain that their motivations varied. 
There does not appear to have been much of a role for labour in planning the system, but 
their position and interests were directly considered. As Gall describes it, the political 
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objective of the social insurance acts was to reconcile the working class with the state.33 
Satisfying the demands of labour (and reconciling them with the state) was certainly not a 
minor objective, and on July 6, 1884, Bismarck appeared to get what he wanted with the 
passage of the Accident Insurance Act. Under the new workers' compensation scheme all 
premiums were to be paid by the employer.34 Furthem1ore, the system would be 
administered by employer associations based on industry with supervisory oversight 
provided by an Imperial Insurance Office which would be financed by the Reich. 
Two important and distinctive characteristics of this German system were its no-fault and 
exclusive remedy features. Under the no-fault insurance model injured workers were 
automatically entitled to benefits when injured without having to prove that the injuty was 
their fault, the fault of the employer or anyone else. Exclusive remedy meant that injured 
workers had no other recourse, i.e., no recourse to the courts, for damages against the 
employer. The system involved a trade-off for employers who in return for full premium 
payment would be free of the uncertainties of court-based liabilities and for workers who in 
return for surrendering the legal right to sue their employer would be assured prompt and 
predictable compensation in the event of disability. These critical quid pro quo pioneeting 
initiatives have had a significant effect on the development of workers' compensation systems 
throughout much of the Western world ever since.35 
While the German accident insurance system was seminal, Bismarck generally viewed it 
and the other social insurance plans as a failure. 36 He would have preferred the passage of 
an Act which called upon the Reich, i.e., the nation state, to make premiums payments 
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along with the employers. That would have been, in Bismarck's view, a significant 
demonstration of state affiliation and concern for labour's interests (although a significant 
degree of state involvement was achieved through the role of the Imperial Insurance 
Office). But his major and longer term disappointment may not be immediately obvious; 
there were, from Bismarck's perspective, much deeper motivations behind the creation of 
the employer associations which would administer the accident insurance system. 
Bismarck's political motives were far more complex than simply wishing to deflate the 
socialist leadership by championing one of their causes. He was keenly aware that the 
gathering social forces were threatening the state and social order which had been his to 
preserve. His ultimate plan was to integrate the alienated groups into the political order 
by means of corporative structures through which their concems may be aired, thus 
avoiding social tension and disintegration.37 In 1883, he commented that: 
Accident insurance in itself is for me a secondary consideration. My chief 
consideration is to use this opportunity to attain corporative associations 
that must be extended gradually to include all productive classes of the 
population .. .. we will establish the basis for a future representative body 
that will become an important participant in the legislative process either 
as a substitute for, or as a parallel to, the Reichstag, even if it must be 
raised to this status by means of a coup d'etat. 38 
In that regard, Bismarck's grand wish never materialized but it is a fascinating 
perspective on the origins of these critical workers' compensation laws. The impetus for 
the creation of Germany's broadly-based social insurance system, including its unique 
form of workers' compensation, was largely political. Bismarck was not primarily 
motivated by benevolence or the virtues of socialism when he promoted the remedial 
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legislation; arguably he was more interested in maintaining the existing order in a 
troubled society. Bismark's political maneuvering to pre-empt the rise of the radical 
socialist parties has of course been noticed by the left. The Marxist analysis of the 
creation of workers' compensation programming sees them as anti-socialist in origin.39 
Understanding German workers' compensation history is necessary for any analysis of 
the history and development of these laws in Canada, and subsequently Newfoundland. 
Ultimately, the German scheme, with its quid pro quo arrangements may be referred to as 
modern workers' compensation law, as opposed to the British Workmen's Compensation 
Act which was actually a renamed employer liability act. Ironically, there are extremely 
limited numbers of references to the German system in the Newfoundland history. Prior 
to 1949 no direct references to the German model are found suggesting, for example, that 
it is a program to be copied (except indirectly to the extent that adoption of Canadian 
laws is advocated). Where references occur, mainly after 1949, they are indirect historical 
notes usually as background to the roots of the Canadian system.40 More precisely, it is 
correct to say that there is no German influence on the development of laws in 
Newfoundland prior to 1949, but that after 1949 the German influence on Newfoundland 
laws is signjficant, though indirect and to the extent that Canadian law was heavily 
influenced by Germany. 
As discussed earlier, the German history effectively illustrates the critical interplay 
between the interests of labour, capital, and governments in workers' compensation 
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policy development; as will be seen in later chapters (Chapters Six and Seven), many of 
the group and class dynamics experienced in Germany parallel those of Newfoundland. 
Bismarck's resort to a corporatist approach echoes over a century later when changes are 
made in the governance structures of the Newfoundland workers' compensation system to 
ensure greater involvement of employers and labour. Finally, it is interesting how, by the 
1980s, various concerns and complaints with the Newfoundland system (Chapter Seven) 
can be philosophically attributed to inherent tensions associated with administering a 
German-rooted, mass adjudication and collective liability system in an English-rooted, 
common law, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms environment. 
The Canadian Influence 
Like England and Germany, the development of workers' compensation Jaws in Canada 
was a necessary byproduct of a developing industrial economy. Unlike England and 
Germany, however, Canada was not a unitary state, so it is important to remember that its 
response to the issues would be characterized by its federal nature. There was never any 
serious debate in Canada about the administration of the Workers' Compensation Acts 
falling anywhere but under provincial jurisdiction. These matters have always been 
interpreted as an "issue of Property and Civil Rights in the Province" or as "Matters of a 
merely local or private Nature in the province" which are, of course, contained in Section 
92 of the original British North America Act (now renamed the Constitution Act, 1 982). 
These are generally referred to as the province's enumerated powers under that Act and 
may be contrasted with the federal government's "general" powers under Section 91 of 
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the British North America Act. 41 After 1867, industrialization was heavily promoted in 
Canada through tariff protection and other measures, especially so following the re-
election of the Sir John A. MacDonald government in 1878. As factory systems evolved 
and dependence on staple, resource-based industries lessened in the decades following 
1878, marked migration from the country to the cities occurred. 42 In 1908, J. W. 
Woodsworth observed: 
Canada is leaving the country for the city .... The population of Ontario 
more than doubled from 1851 to 1901 , but the population of Toronto 
increased over six times during the same period. The population of 
Quebec was almost twice as large in 1901 as in 1851, but that of Montreal 
was over four and one-half times as large. Manitoba is an agricultural 
Province, and yet one-~uarter of the entire population is resident in the 
city ofWinnipeg alone.4 
The changing economy and shifting population patterns established a new socioeconomic 
environn1ent - industrialization and urbanization - with new sets of problems including 
increasing numbers of workplace injuries. By 1910 it was clear that Canada's English-
style employer liability acts were inadequate mechanisms for compensating injured 
workers. That year the Ontario government appointed a commissioner, Chief Justice 
W.R. Meredith, to conduct an enquiry into the matter of workers' compensation laws.44 
Meredith undertook an international comparative approach and found that most countries 
used either the "British system" or the "German system". He concluded that "a 
compensation law framed on the main lines of the German law with the modifications I 
have embodied in my draft bill is better suited to the circumstances and conditions of this 
Province than the British compensation law, or the compensation law of any other 
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country. "45 The main feature of the German system that Meredith strongly favoured and 
incorporated in his recommendations was its collective liability system of premium 
collection. Regarding the importance of assured, cost-shared premium collection, i.e., 
collective liability, he believed adherence to this principle would provide security of 
payment for workers; suggesting possible uncertainty of payment, he interestingly 
described Ontario as a "comparatively new country" with many small, not entirely stable 
industries. Meredith's expressed personal belief was that " ... the true aim of a 
compensation law is to provide for the injured workman and his dependants and to 
prevent their becoming a charge upon their relatives or friends, or upon the community at 
large."46 Finally, another German-like feature adapted by Meredith was inclusion of a 
specialized, autonomous and non-political Board, i.e., state appointed and run. He felt 
comfortable doing so because similar railway and hydro-electric boards were already 
functioning very well, i.e., free from political partisanship, in Ontario and Canada. 
As a direct result of Meredith's recommendation, a Canadian collective liability (as 
opposed to individual employer liability) workers' compensation law was implemented in 
the province of Ontario on January 1, 1915.47 The Ontario Act embodied key aspects of 
the Germany program which have endured as defining principles of the Canadian 
approach. Meredith emulated the no-fault, collective liability, and exclusive remedy 
features of the "German model," where injured workers are automatically entitled to 
compensation - through an employer funded system - without having to prove that 
anyone was at fault. In return for funding the system employers gained immunity from 
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legal action. This quid pro quo arrangement was not a simple variation of employer 
liability Jaws, nor did it flow from common Jaw tradition; it was a unique solution to 
social and economic change. Like the German system, Meredith also placed the 
administration of the Canadian workers' compensation system squarely in the hands of a 
quasi-judicial administrative agency known as the Workers' Compensation Board. 
Meredith's report was seminal resulting in a unjque "Canadian model" of workers' 
compensation which has survived ever since. By 1919, six Canadian provinces had 
adopted the model with the others following relatively quickly, an exception being P.E.I. 
wruch did not adopt the system until 1949.48 (That PEl was one of the last provinces to 
adopt may be attributed to its small, rural , non-industrial economy, whereas the system 
was largely an industrial model.) 
Introductory Summary 
Generally, this work undertakes close review of the period from 1887 to 1993. The start 
date was somewhat obvious as it marks the passage of the first relevant legislation (see 
Chapter Two). The choice to conclude the analysis in 1993 was based upon several 
factors. In particular, very significant policy and institutional changes occurred during the 
10-year period leading up to 1993, thereby making it a natmal temporal milestone and 
point of depat1ure (see Chapters Six and Seven). It was also a time of great dissatisfaction 
when virtually all major stakeholders experienced significat1tly decreased levels of 
satisfaction with system performance, and when the high expectations of the 1980s were 
shattered. Furthermore, by choosing 1993, it also provided more than 100 yeru·s of history 
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for assessment- an adequate length of time to identify possible policy development paths, 
patterns, and trends, and to draw credible conclusions about them. Finally, the role of 
Newfoundland's history- particularly legal, institutional, economic, social, and political-
cannot be avoided as a cumulative contributor in the shaping of workers' compensation 
policy. 
Whatever level of success may be achieved by the analysis contained in subsequent 
chapters, it is hoped the work may benefit those with an interest or stake in understanding 
the current status, or in predicting possible future development trends, of compensation 
law in Newfoundland. Some aspects of the compendium of historic facts and political 
observations contained in this work may be unique or new, though most are not. To the 
extent that new analysis is provided, the paper may serve as supplemental documentation 
for future researchers. 
Substantively, from a public policy perspective and as the conclusion regarding 
incrementalism in the opening paragraph suggests, the paper attempts to interpret the 
nature of policy development within the workers' compensation sphere in Newfoundland. 
How and why policy tends to evolve slowly is exan1ined, as are the circumstances which 
provoke rare major changes. It is important, for example, to track the accumulation of 
small changes over time, e.g., insurance coverage, benefit increases, institutional change, 
etc., because many small changes can create major effects, even though they appear as 
discrete, minor policy choices at given points in time. It is interesting, for exan1ple, to 
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note how Bismarck's choice of a dedicated, state agency to administer the system in the 
1880s - perhaps for reasons related to strengthening of the nation state, as much or more 
as for good administration - figures prominently in Meredith's recommendations for the 
Canadian system in 1915 and, as we shall see, as the path forward in the Newfoundland 
history post-1949. Thus, linkage of policy and political/industrial history of the island is 
offered throughout this work as a means of identifying and assessing the influence of 
various interrelated factors over time. As the British policy theorist Richard Rose writes: 
Whereas politicians can live from election to election, government is 
continuing. The inheritance of public policy is the cumulative sum of many 
actions taken by many governments, each carried forward by the force of 
political inertia. The greater the momentum behind a programme, the harder it 
is to slow down, redirect or stop it.49 
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Chapter Two 
The Influence and Persistence of British Legal Tradition (1887-1920) 
This chapter explores how work injury compensation law first appeared m 
Newfoundland in 1887 and, in patiicular, how it emulated British experience. It goes on 
to assess how developments in Newfoundland's political, industrial and workplace 
environments, especially the emergence of unionism, conhibuted to amendments in the 
first decades of the twentieth century. Even though Newfoundland struggled for colonial 
independence it remained underdeveloped with a narrow, predominantly non-wage-based 
economy throughout most of the nineteenth century. The paucity of workplace laws may 
be explained by the absence of an industrial base outside of the fishery. The chapter 
analyzes events up to approximately 1920- j ust after the end ofthe First World War. 
Prior to joining Canada the general and political history of Newfoundland is inextricably 
linked to and in many ways defined by England. Trade, settlement, general economic and 
governance matters were squarely under English control or direct influence throughout 
this era. To determine why English law persisted in a colony which, otherwise, sought a 
unique identity and economic independence, the chapter concludes by offering a 
theoretical lens which suggests that current laws and policies are often heavily influenced 
by historical example and experience. Specifically, path dependency theory suggests that 
the weight of tradition and past practices may promote incremental change processes, and 
that dramatic systemic changes do not usually occur easily. ' Or, put another way, "path 
dependence (means) ... that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs 
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of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of 
certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice."2 
Thought of in this light, the chapter's theoretical conclusions provide a foundation for 
understanding how key historical policy decisions often have enduring influence upon 
workers' compensation policy choice. With respect to the overall finding of the paper 
regarding the nature of incremental change, it is also revealing to note that path 
dependent change - economic or social - is typically gradual. 3 This is a model of thought 
which may be carried through subsequent chapters. 
From its inception as British colony very few laws were adopted in Newfoundland to deal 
with employer-employee relationship or workplace conditions. In fact, there was a 
veritable absence of workplace laws which, as suggested, is explained by the fact that 
there was little or no industrial base outside of the fishery. Newfoundland's fish-based 
economy remained underdeveloped supporting a small year-round population throughout 
the 1700s, but it remained fim1ly under the control of England. In fact, to ensure it 
remained the supreme authority in Newfoundland the British Parliament passed the 
Palliser's Act4 in 1775 to promote British dominance through a series of measures 
designed to establish benefits for fishennen associated with British operations. This was 
Newfoundland's first legislation dealing with workplace relationships covering such 
matters as the necessity of establishing written contracts between fishermen and the 
masters of vessels. Palliser's Act stated that there must be a written agreement between 
masters and fishermen concerning wages and the conditions of employment. Regarding 
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the concept of wages, however, it indicated that payment of "wages" could be in the fmm 
offish and oi1.5 
Regarding the Newfoundland fishing industry, it is well-known that the old English 
system of "truck" - payment of goods instead of cash wages - flourished through the 
nineteenth century (and, in indeed, persisted into the twentieth century).6 That state of 
social and economic imbalance - a primary work force without a wage-based economy -
was unlikely to spawn beneficent workplace protection laws; there was no incentive to 
create a wage replacement compensation system. Besides, any effort to advance social 
benefits through improvement in the laws of Newfoundland would have met resistance 
through the influence of laissez-faire doctrine through the nineteenth century. "Repeatedly 
(from 1832 to 1870) debates in the Newfoundland Legislature and newspaper editorials and 
comments reflected views of those who were, at best, only reluctantly sympathetic to the 
needs of the poor. "7 
Early refotmers such as William Carson and Patrick Mon·is successful advocated 
parliamentary and legal refmms in the 1820s.8 Britain granted Newfoundland limited 
democratic Representative Government in 1832 and there was an elected House of 
Assembly, but the executive government was controlled by England. Deeper British culture 
and traditions were reflected by an English-style Supreme Court in 1826 and the application 
ofEnglish Law and Practice in Newfoundland by statute in 1837.9 Because this made English 
criminal law applicable in Newfoundland in all cases not covered by local law, it in effect 
outlawed trade unionism by relying on British crimes of conspiracy which prevented workers 
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from organizing for the purpose of advocating better working conditions or wages. 10 The fate 
of workers did not improve after Newfoundland was granted Responsible Government in 
1855. In 1858 the British parliament passed the Master and Servants Act11 which provided 
more favourable terms and conditions to employers than to workers. In tem1s of influence, 
the reach of British Jaw continued to extend itself into Newfoundland either directly through 
legislation such as the Master and Servants Act, or indirectly through Newfoundland 
legislation mirroring British statutes. 12 
Generally, the nature of work in Newfoundland prior to and after 1855 was mainly 
associated with the staple fishing industry. Dependence on the fishery resulted in a risky 
environment in which unpredictable supply and demand patterns created economic 
volatility. The economy was subjected to further stress as Newfoundland's population 
rapidly increased -the population was approximately 75,000 in 1836 but by 1874 it more 
than doubled to approximately 161,300. (See Figure 1, next page.) With an increasing 
population, the narrow, fish-based economy could not generate an inadequate supply of 
jobs and income to support it. 13 
Once Newfoundlanders rejected Confederation with Canada in the election of November 
1869 the objective of successive governments was industrial diversification. That thrust was 
particularly pronounced after 1878 when the English-born but St. John's-trained lawyer, 
William Whiteway became Prime Minister; he is best remembered for his "policy of 
progress." This theme suited the prevailing nationalistic attitude among the population which 
clearly saw its future as an independent nation. Moreover, the dream of an east-west island 
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economy funneled into the St. John's metropol was politically popular under Whiteway. 14 A 
peculiar, but defining fact of Newfoundland history since 1832 at least, was St. John's 
dominance as the political and economic centre where the population was most diverse and 
heavily concentrated. 
Figure 1 
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Whiteway's interest in railway building reflected a concern for economic diversification 
which would "free Newfoundland from its retarding dependence on one unpredictable 
staple'" 5 - the fishery. An unstable fishery and economy was not in the interest of the 
commercial elite of St. John's, so the concept of a cross-island rai lway artery was highly 
attractive and spurred by the potential for mineral and other natural resource development in 
the interior of the island. Of course, the development of a railway link would have presented 
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advantages for Newfoundlanders in outlying regions as well. While Whiteway's ambition 
resulted in the passage of a significant number of laws supporting economic development, 
such as shipbuilding, agriculture and manufacturing, by 1885 the progress he offered had not 
materialized and, in particular, the promised railway was only half complete and in 
receivership. 16 
That general failme was among the reasons Whiteway lost the 1885 election to the new 
Reforn1 Party led by Robert Thorburn. Thorburn's Refonn Party was not interested in 
railway development but favoured other local public works projects such as road building 
as a means of addressing immediate economic concerns. By 1887, for example, the state 
of the Newfoundland economy was such that immediate governmental action was 
required. The February 1887, Speech from the Throne illustrates the desperate state ofthe 
economy. Successive fisheries - cod, seal, herring and salmon - had failed and "a large 
proportion of the population of the Eastern and Northern Coasts of the island had failed 
to secure the means of subsistence for the coming winter." Although guided by "a desire 
to avoid, wherever possible, the evils of gratuitous relief," 17 that year government had to 
established relief (make-work) projects. Attempts to diversify the economy by promoting 
agricultural operations reported only fair success. This was a low point for the 
Newfoundland economy which, despite the best efforts of recent government initiatives, 
remained vulnerable. It had failed to grow much beyond its primary resource dependence 
and non-wage-based character. 
Page 31 , Chapter 2 
In light of this limited industrial diversification, the predominance of a non-wage-based 
economy, and the economic downturn of 1887, it is somewhat surprising that measures 
for providing compensation for workplace injury were underiaken that year. In fact, 1887 
saw one of Newfoundland's most beneficial workplace laws in over two hundred years 
proposed. In the reply to the February 1887 Speech from the Throne, the Thorburn 
government stated its intentions: 
We are glad ... that mining operations have substantially increased, and give 
indications of development in future. The enthusiastic labour of Murray, 
Howley, and others, have shown Newfoundland to be possessed of great 
deposits of copper, coal, and other minerals; and we feel assured that when 
means of speedy communication and easy transportation have been provided, 
the development of these resources will materially benefit the whole people 
of this Colony. And in view of the numbers who are likely to be engaged in 
the prosecution of this industry, we shall be glad to give prompt attention to 
the placing of measures on the Statute-Book which will afford to operative 
miners protection from injury to life and limb whilst engaged in their 
avocations. 18 
1887 Introduction of Employers' Liability Act 
On March 2, 1887, a Bill "to extend and regulate the liability of employers to make 
compensation for personal injuries suffered by workmen in their service" was introduced in 
the Newfoundland House of Assembly The bill was called the Employers ' Liability Act and it 
was passed into law on April 26, 1887. It made employers liable under certain circumstances 
for injuries caused to their workmen in the course of employment. However, compensation 
could only be obtained by a Jaw suit against the employer and the worker's action could be 
easily defeated. While compensation was not guaranteed, it was generous when compared to 
the total absence of worker protection in Newfoundland up to that point. It is worihwhile to 
examine why the Employers' Liability Act was introduced in 1887. 
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Unlike England and Germany, the introduction of this kind of law in Newfoundland 
cannot be explained on the basis of political pragmatism as a result of dramatically 
increased industrial injuries secondary to a robust economy. There was, in fact, little or 
no industry and railway development was in disarray. Inevitably, many workers would 
have been injured in railway construction prior to 1887 and general awareness of the 
circumstances of individual cases may have contributed to an acknowledgment of the 
desirability of an Employers' Liability Act. No anecdotal or statistical evidence is found to 
indicate whether key individuals, groups, or politicians promoted or supported the 
implementation of the Employers' Liability Act in 1887 on the basis of rai I way 
construction injury cases. [Newfoundland railway workers would eventually play a 
significant role in the development of workers' compensation legislation (1936 -1949), 
but there was no union in 1887. Interestingly, it was railway development that led to the 
first liability acts in Gennany in 1832.] 
Furthermore, no evidence is found to suggest that other individuals or groups were 
directly pressuring goverrunent to implement an Employers' Liability Act. There was, for 
example, no organized labour movement in Newfoundland at the time and the majority of 
the Newfoundland workforce, approximately 82 percent, were fishem1en .19 While there 
were a few small, non-political unions in St. John's by this time, labour simply was not 
organized or relevant in Newfoundland politics in 1887. Somewhat tangentially, it is 
interesting to note that the matter of labour relations was being seriously discussed and 
evaluated in Canada at this time. A Royal Commission on the Relations of Capital and 
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Labour in Canada was appointed in December 1886, for the purpose of "inquiring into 
and reporting upon the subject of Labour, its relations to Capital, the hours of labour, the 
earnings of labouring men and women, and the means of promotion of their material, 
social, intellectual and moral prosperity, etc." The final report was not issued until 
1889.20 While there may have been indirect influences related to the Canadian activities, 
no records are found to substantiate a direct influence upon the Newfoundland decision in 
1887. 
To the extent that the Newfoundland workforce was slowly changing, however, it was 
happening almost exclusively within the more populous and diverse St. John's.21 
Interestingly, the 1887 Employers' Liability Act bill was introduced by Edward P. Morris, 
a 28 year-old lawyer, elected to the House as the representative of the predominantly 
working-class district of St. John's West. Morris was a rare local talent who had 
progressed from common roots to law and politics. It is likely that individual government 
members from St. John's were influenced by or attracted to the interests of labour 
surfacing in St. John's. Morris, an ambitious political renegade, wou ld have been 
especially eager to align himself with a potentially popular bill to advance his own 
political interests. 22 As for the interests of labour, it would be at least another 10 years 
before organized labour became a reality and any kind of reasonable political factor in 
Newfoundland.23 On the whole, however, government was not reacting to organized or 
widespread political pressure when it introduced this legislation in 1887. 
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In retrospect, there are likely two interrelated factors which best explain why the 1887 
bill was introduced. First, and in line with government's general desire to promote 
economic development, was the plainly stated reason to "afford protection to operative 
miners" who become injured in the course of their work. The legislation was presented in 
speculative terms as govemment anticipated the further development of a mining industry 
and the need to attract and support skilled labour. It was not based on a demonstrated 
history of milling injuries or experience because by 1887 Newfoundland had neither, 
although there was the major push toward railway development. Although potential 
industrial development and labour demand was fmiher dependent upon the 
implementation ofbetter communication and transportation linkages, it is noteworthy that 
government chose to proceed as it did. In addition to attracting labour the govemment 
may have been also interested in retaining its already growing supply; between 1869 and 
1884 the population had increased by 35 percent. Given the trend toward economic 
development, therefore, Newfoundland's Employers' Liability Act of 1887 appears to 
have been more about anticipating and fostering future economic development than it 
was a political response to an immediate and obvious social demand. 
The second related and significant factor which helps explain the appearance of the 1887 
law is emulation. A largely identical Employers' Liability Act had been introduced in 
England in 1880. Clearly, Newfoundland copied the example set by England. As 
discussed, one significant reason for wishing to do so may have been the desire to support 
economic development by remaining competitive with other countries such as England 
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(where labour would be drawn from) and Canada (where labour would be drawn to).24 It 
would have been disadvantageous for economic development, for example, if potential 
labourers felt they did not have the same level of coverage in Newfoundland as in 
England or Canada? 5 To some degree this was a case of the standard being set by 
England and Newfoundland feeling compelled to follow. Another important factor was 
Newfoundland's deference to British laws and customs based on historical and cultural 
attachment. To a very large extent Newfoundland was defined and therefore limited to a 
set of definitive experiences directly related England. From the beginning, English laws 
were applied directly to the colony, and Newfoundland's constitutional and legal systems 
were an exact copy from England; arguably, Newfoundland was a figurative 
psychological, if not structural, hostage to its history. No evidence is found to suggest 
that any other alternatives, such as the German laws, were ever considered, but it is 
unlikely that laws other than English laws would have been considered. 
The Employers' Liability Act was not amended during the remaining years of the nineteenth 
century, but a changing economy would come to play a direct role in shaping future 
legislative change. There was a significant change in the profile ofNewfoundland's economy. 
The number of fishermen as a percentage of the entire work force dropped significantly 
between 1884 and 1891 , from 82 percent to 64 percent, respectively. Although industrial 
diversification came slowly, the changing composition of the work force had ramifications 
for labour, particularly increasing levels of unionization. Between 1886 and 1899, at least 18 
new, small (non-fishery) trade unions were formed and there were over 50 labour strikes 
arising out of a variety of issues. Strikes for higher wages and improved working conditions 
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were common and employee vigilance was not restricted to unionized workers. For example, 
non-unionized Bell Island miners vigorously fought for improved working conditions and 
pay after the new iron ore mine opened 1895.26 Because only rudimentary laws only had been 
adopted in Newfoundland safeguarding workers' interests m employer-employee 
relationships, it is not surprising that trade unionism would be recognized as a viable option 
for the average worker, or that non-unionized protests would occur. Further to that point, 
Newfoundland labour relations in that era has been described as "survival of the fittest. "27 As 
a show of growing confidence, numbers, and potential, Newfoundland's first Labour Day 
parade was held on July 15, 1897.28 
As such, the 1890s were tumultuous for Newfoundland with a lack of labour and economic 
stability. Its quest for economic development went unfulfilled as the island economy 
remained underdeveloped and, largely, depressed. The dream of a cross-island railway was 
not fully realized. By 1893 its banks had failed. With British and Canadian support ruled out, 
Newfoundland became reliant on other external sources of capital. In 1898 the recently 
elected Conservative government led by James S. Winter made its attempt to bring economic 
and labour stability to Newfoundland by entering a detailed contract with Canadian financier, 
Robert Reid. Among other things, the 1898 railway deal gave Reid major land holdings for 
operating the railway for the govemment until 1945 when the railway would become the 
property of Reid's successors for $1 million. The complex agreement allowed Reid to operate 
a coastal steamship and the Gulf of St. Lawrence ferry (in return for government subsidies); 
to take over government telegraph services; to purchase the St. John's dry dock; to build a St. 
John's street railway and to supply electricity to St. John's.29 The 1898 agreement enabled the 
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completion of the railway, but was so controversial that it led to the defeat of the Tory 
government in 1900 and the rise ofRobert Bond and his Liberals. 
Born in St. John's in 1857 and trained as a lawyer, Bond entered politics at age 25 beginning 
a lifelong commitment to Newfoundland politics. A strong nationalist, Bond viewed the Reid 
contract as a sell-out for which a variety of colony-wide monopoly rights had been virtually 
gjven away.30 He successfully engineered the passage of a motion of no confidence in the 
Winter administration in the House of Assembly in March 1900, after engaging the support 
of key politicians who had originally supported the 1898 deal, notably Edward Morris and his 
followers. Morris, interested in preserving job creation opportunities for the province, 
changed his mind when Bond modified his call for a total repeal of the law in favour of 
modifications. Wjth Morris' supp011 and widespread public resentment of the Reid deal, 
Bond's Liberal Party went on to win 32 of the 36 seats in the House of Assembly in the 
November 1900 election. Recalling that Reid had provided significant financia l backing for 
the Conservative party in the election,31 Bond later wrote: 
Now in the year 1900 a corporate body having large and varied business 
interests, the Reid Newfoundland Company, endeavoured at the polls to 
obtain control of the Government of this Colony. I led a party in 
opposition to defeat them, defeated their design, and kept them in their 
proper place, during my tenn in office of nine years.32 
Industrial Relations Turning Point: The First Amendments 
Bond and Reid quickly agreed on modifications to the 1898 contract, but Reid continued 
as Newfoundland's pre-eminent capitalist operating the railway, steamship services, the 
St. John's dry-dock and St. John's tran1way. In fact, it was Reid's corporate strength and 
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practices that would lead to the first amendments to the Employers' Liability Act in 1902.33 
There were two substantive amendments in 1902, each one highlighting the nature of 
change in the Newfoundland economy going into the 1900s. The first amendment was 
designed specifically to defeat regressive employer practices; indeed, it may be a 
demonstration of the Bond government acting to keep Reid in his "proper place." The 
amendment in question outlawed employers', particularly Reid ' s,34 practice of demanding 
that their workers sign a preliminary contract of employment which diminished or 
forfeited their rights under the Employers' Liability Act in the event of injury. The 1902 
amendment made it illegal for workers to waive their rights under the Employers ' 
Liability Act or for an employer to use the terms of any contract of employment as a 
defense to an action taken under the Act. These were general practices known as 
"contracting out," meaning that by way of a written agreement a worker and employer 
could indicate their willingness to contract or opt out of Employer Liability Act rights and 
liabilities in favour of private terms or agreements. The requirement for the amendment 
appears to demonstrate Reid's company dislike for potential liabilities created for it under the 
Act, and it also provides a glimpse of Reid's attitude toward labour. As a matter of fact, Reid 
successfully fought to keep unions out of the railway operation until the railway worker's 
union, Newfoundland Industrial Workers Association, was formed in 191 7.35 Although there 
was no union in place in 1902, it is clear that the Bond administration was willing to 
implement laws supportive of labour; it suggests growing influence for labour in the political 
arena. 
Prior to the Bond administration there were very few government initiatives which 
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overtly supported the interests of labour. A clue as to why government's attitude may 
have changed in that regard can be, in part, detected by considering the basis of the other 
major amendment in 1902. In short, the second major amendment in 1902 ensured that 
subcontractors would be liable for injuries to workmen. In legal terms, it may not have 
been a startling conclusion that a subcontractor should be so liable, but what is significant 
is that the need for such a stipulation in Newfoundland was now identified. In other 
words, by 1902 the economy had progressed to the stage where larger industrial projects, 
in which subcontracting would be used, now exist. 
The emergence of Reid and Bond at the beginning of the 1900s neatly demarcates a 
definitive tmning point in Newfoundland industrial politics. Although the contentious 
Reid contract was amended, his various industrial endeavours helped fulfill the industrial 
diversification that Newfoundland politicians had been seeking for at least 30 years. In 
fact, the Reid projects were in addition to the Bell Island mining operations which had 
been operating since 1895 and other major developments like the large newsprint mill in 
Grand Falls which carne on stream in 1905. In short, these various industrial 
developments and the secondary support industries they spawned created a more 
complex, evolving economy and the Employers' Liability Act was amended as a result. 
As the economy grew, however, there were new implications and tensions associated 
with the relationships between labour, capital and government. 36 For example, in the 25 
years between 1890 and 1915, the number of labour strikes in Newfoundland, 
predominantly St. John's, increased significantly (a total of 215). 37 Unionization was not 
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always successful, however, but after 1900 maJor strikes occurred involving non-
unionized Bell Island miners (1900), non-unionized sealers in St. Jolm's (1902) which 
featured concerns for safety, and, soon after its formation, a strike by the Longshoremen 
Protective Union dock workers in St. John's (1903).38 Failure to unite Bell Island miners 
and the Reid railway workers is attributed to Canadian-based employers adamantly 
opposed to unionization.39 To summarize, after experiencing a period of growth after 
1900 the economic, industrial, and political environment in Newfoundland is more 
complex with evidence from 1902 demonstrating the strong influence of labour interests 
on government policy decisions regarding the liability law for workplace injury. These 
facts would mix and grow to eventually place the concerns of labour squarely into the 
political sphere and, ultimately, influence further change in the Employers' Liability Act. 
By 1907, the activities of 49-year old Edward Morris demonstrate that Newfoundland 
politics was clearly being influenced by issues of concern to labour. Since introducing the 
original Employers' Liability Act in 1887 Morris was often visibly on the side of labour 
which is neither surprising nor lacking in credibility given his working class roots. 
Furthermore, he was a key minister in the Bond government, with a province-wide power 
base, ever since his 1900 decision to support Bond on the railway question.40 Ironically, 
this political power base assisted him in 1907 when he sought to destabilize the Bond 
government. In calculated fashion Morris defected from the Bond government in August 
1907 alleging disagreement concerning the rate of pay for certain labourers. Morris' 
departure did not threaten Bond's numerical majority position in the House, but it gave 
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Morris the independence he needed to attack Bond in the anticipated 1908 elections. As 
well, the reason cited for his departure would have bought Morris more favour with the 
working class.41 
Five months later the influence of Morris was evident when the Bond government 
introduced comprehensive and progressive changes to the Employers' Liability Act. On 
January 28, 1908, Bond's Minister of Justice, J.M. Kent, move the second reading of a 
Bill entitled An Act with Respect to Compensation for Workmen for Injuries Suffered in 
the course of their Employment42 indicating that everyone would readily agree that this 
was a matter of great importance. The importance stemmed from previously limited 
remedies for injured workers in the event of workplace injury. Kent outlined the 
deficiencies of the 1880 English Employers' Liability Act. He noted that while the 
Priestly v. Fowler doctrine had been modified, and employers were liable for injuries 
sustained by their workmen in more instances, the situation remained problematic. Kent 
says (in second reading), "It soon became manifest ... that this modification did not go far 
enough and worked very little better than the old common Law. "43 In the February 7, 
1908 edition of the Evening Telegram, Kent made it very clear that the new Act was 
modeled directly on the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 ofEngland which improved 
the 1880 Employers' Liability Act. While speaking of labour relations generally, and the 
Employer's Liability Act specifically, Kent said there was no subject in the law of the 
colony which caused such frequent controversy as the governance of labour relations and 
particularly, employer liability for personal injuries suffered by workmen in the course of 
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their employment.44 
The Act offered improvements. There was to be clearer direction related to the 
calculation of lost earnings; swift appeal directly to the Supreme Court in the event of 
dispute between a worker and employer; reduction of litigation through elimination of 
employers' defense on the grounds of contributory negligence; government monitoring of 
the benefits offered by employers with private insurance schemes45 ; and, finally, a 
requirement for employers to report annual injury statistics and compensation payment to 
the Colonial Secretary. Although this Act was named the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and replaced the Employers' Liability Act (in name), it remained in substance a narrow 
employers' liability act. Injured workers would continue to deal with individually liable 
employers and, as applicable, their insurers and the courts. Another shortcoming was that 
the Act only covered dangerous industries such as railways, factories, quarries or major 
construction projects46 which left many trades and occupations such as fishermen, 
loggers, tradesmen, retail clerks, and general labourers, totally unprotected. 
While labour achieved modest gains in 1908, there was clearly no appetite for major 
legislative change toward their interests. In addition to limiting coverage to dangerous 
industries, there is other evidence that suggests the interests of employers were carefully 
considered as well. Perhaps tellingly, Kent introduced the Act by saying that it had been 
greatly improved in England and now it was time for the colony to follow "as far as our 
circumstances would permit. "47 From a practical standpoint this meant that the scope of 
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coverage and the amount of compensation payable under the Act would be limited. In 
fact, the most contentious and controversial issue debated was whether the lump sum 
amount payable to dependants in the case of death should be increased. Ultimately, 
government maintained the low benefit ceiling they had proposed. The basis for their 
reasoning was that it had been established under the English Act and, even ifwages were 
often hjgher in Newfoundland, the English standard must have been well considered and 
should apply. Interestingly, the English experience was relied upon as an excuse for not 
increasing benefits payable under the Act.48 In the same breath, the interests of capitalists 
were cited as a reason for limiting benefits payable. To the extent that benefit 
improvements may be granted in good economic times it is worth noting that the 
Newfoundland economy was doing fairly well at the time. As a broad measure of 
success, for example, in the same session as the new Act was introduced the govenunent 
announced a budget surplus of $125,000 for the 1907-08 fiscal year.49 This suggests that 
drawing upon the British experience as an excuse not to increase benefits may have been 
an important influence at a time when strong arguments for benefit improvements may 
have existed. 
Overall, however, the legislation did mark an advance for the interests of labour. Even 
Morris agreed with the intent of the legislation, although qualifying his enthusiasm by 
stating that he "would like to see fishennen and others covered as we11."50 Morris 
rationalized the need for the new law on the basis that "during the last two or three years 
in this Colony conditions had been such as to justify the legislature in the introduction of 
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the most advanced legislation that can be found." 51 While Morris does not elaborate on 
what he means by "conditions" over the last two to three years, he most certainly is 
referring to the improving economy and appearance of more diverse labour groups. 
Interestingly, Morris, the political maverick, worried aloud in January 1908 that he might 
be accused of "sinister motives"52 by supporting the government legislation. Evidently, he 
wanted to openly support the interests of labour while, at the same time, not be viewed as 
opportunistic. 
On the other hand, the government itself may have expected political advantage through 
the inh·oduction of such progressive labour legislation going into an election. Bond's 
reasons for introducing the 1908 Act appear to have been self serving. In addition to a 
directly appeal to the labour vote, Bond may have viewed the introduction of this specific 
legislation as a means of outmaneuvering Morris immediately prior to the election. 53 
Bond had good cause to be worried about Morris, just as Morris had reason for a certain 
coyness about being suspected of sinister motives. In January 1908 Morris was covertly 
organizing a new political party - the People's Party - to launch a direct attack on Bond. 
Morris resigned from the Bond govermnent citing disagreement with a relatively minor 
decision which had gone against the interest of labour. He then launched his People's 
Party in St. John's at the same time as the arrival of thousands of sealers in March 1908. 
A clear underlying theme of Morris' politics was a demonstrated concern for the common 
people and his party platform aimed to provide something for everyone.54 After two 
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elections and a constitutional crisis, Morris went on to defeat Bond and become Prime 
Minister in 1909.55 Despite his common roots and progressive history, Morris' ability as 
Prime Minister to actually serve the interests of labour was seriously limited by the 
coalition of diverse interests that helped him win government.56 Not the least of those 
interests which assisted him oust Bond was Reid, proving once again the fan1ous quip 
that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 
Coaker: Emergence of Organized Labour 
The next amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act occuned in 1914. The roots of 
this amendment go back to the year 1908 and the founding of the Fishermen's Protective 
Union (FPU). Its founder, William Coaker, displayed an uncommon interest in politics and 
significant leadership abilities from an early age. As well as attending House of Assembly 
debates while in school he also instigated and organized strikes. The son of a St. John's 
labourer, at age fourteen he left school for a clerical position in a branch store of a St. John's 
firm on the north coast. There he quickly to the position of manager and, by age 19, owner. 
He was forced into farming after losing ownership of the store following the 1894 bank 
crash. His interest in the plight of local fishermen and unionism grew.57 
The rise of Coaker and his union are eminent examples of the emergence and growmg 
strength of organized labour in Newfoundland in the first decades of the century. McDonald 
explains how Coaker captured the essence of the class struggle for fishermen: 
Fishermen were exploited by a manifestly unjust economic system, that 
deprived them of their fair rewards by placing so much arbitrary power in 
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the hands of the merchants. The commercial class along with the 
government was attacked for its failure to come to grips with the problems 
of fish quality and international marketing and for failing to improve the 
working conditions ofloggers and sealers. 58 
Coaker's success was remarkable; at its peak in 1914 his union had a membership of over 
21,000.59 A central role of the FPU was active participation in politics, but it was to 
operate on a well-defined political philosophy established by Coaker. The FPU 
representatives would try to be elected to the House of Assembly but only in sufficient 
numbers "to secure the balance of power between the Government and the Opposition 
Parties."60 The essence of this strategy was that the union, with all of the advantages of 
the balance of power and none of the trouble of actually goveming, would support those 
willing to do the most for their causes. In essence, it was a fom1 of political blackmail 
which proved more theoretical than real. 61 
In that regard, after initially courting him at about the time of the 1909 election, Coaker 
had a falling out with Prime Minister Morris by 1911. By the time of the 1913 elections 
(which Morris won again) Coaker had aligned himself with Sir Robert Bond in what was 
a strained Liberal-Union relationship.62 Although Morris and his People's Party retained 
govenm1ent, Coaker and the elected Unionist members emerged as an effective 
opposition force. The Unionists elicited favourable editorial comment in the Evening 
Telegran1: 
One of the features of the present session is the way the FPU members 
have held up their end of the plank ... bold and fearless in debate, and 
though they have been handicapped from a lack of knowledge of the 
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practices of the House they have not been deterred from giving expression 
to the political and social faith that is within them .... In time, with a fu ller 
knowledge of public questions, the Union men will do good service to the 
commuruty and we shall watch their careers with interest.63 
Coaker and the FPU opposition members can be credited for the 1914 amendment to the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. That year, Coaker successfully argued to have the scope 
of coverage enlarged under the Act to cover loggers. That would have been welcomed 
and relevant for thousands of FPU members many of whom traditionally alternated 
between being seasonal fishem1en and loggers.64 However, this was essentially an 
incremental and somewhat opportunistic expansion of coverage. It paid no attention to all 
other Newfoundland workers. 65 
On the other hand, the 1914 amendment would not have been possible without the 
consent of the Morris government. It is quite likely that MotTis would have readily 
supported the 1914 amendment legislation as a measure for which his government wou ld 
claim credit. In tem1s of cost or offending other interest to which Morris may have been 
beholden, this was a relatively minor amendment catering to special interests. 
Furthennore, Morris may have agreed to share legislative success with Coaker and the 
FPU members' on the basis of that their rise to prominence served as a legitimate political 
threat. It is useful to recall tactics employed by Morris in 1913, which may be viewed as 
his reaction to the growing FPU threat. As Bond attempted to undennine him in 1908 
with the passage of workers' compensation legislation, Mon·is attempted to trump his 
emerging rivals (Coaker and the FPU) with The Marine Disaster Act in 1913. That Act 
Page 48, Chapter 2 
provided a $100.00 lump sum to provide short-term assistance for the families of 
fishem1en and seaman lost at sea. 66 This Act was a clear appeal to the FPU base. At the 
time, for example, Morris cited the many marine tragedies off Newfoundland and 
wondered why better programs did not exist to help the victims of accidents and why was 
it that the plight of surviving dependants, for example, are only recognized when there 
are disasters, i.e., multiple deaths. 67 
Despite the FPU's extraordinary history and significant membership, workmen's 
compensation legislation was not a major preoccupation for Coaker and the FPU 
membership. There was only limited, narrow success with respect to the 1914 
an1endments68 even though there were in excess of 30,000 trade union members in 
Newfoundland.69 For all its successes, the FPU remained a regionalized party which did 
not infiltrate St. Jolm's or represent the interests of all Newfoundland workers.70 
Independent fishing activities provided no basis for an employer-employee relationship 
on which to base a liability claim. Therefore, there is no evidence between 1900 and 1949 
that policy-makers considered including fishermen under the liability laws. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine how it possibly could have been administered in that era.71 The only 
form of insurance available at that time for fishennen was the contributory disaster fund 
maintained by the FPU. It provided benefits to the dependants of members lost at sea.72 
While the FPU may have been a social and political force in Newfoundland for some 
years after 1908, there certainly are reasons why improvement of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act may not have been a priority issue (beyond gaining coverage for 
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loggers in 1914). 
Building on the trend toward unionism manifested by Coaker's early example, labour 
became a presence during the First World War years as Newfoundland's economy 
prospered.73 In 1917, after years of discouragement from their employer, Reid Company 
workers successfully unionized. They formed the Newfoundland Industrial Workers 
Association (NIW A) which was a unique trade organization for the times.74 Unlike the 
narrowly defined FPU, NIW A membership cut across various trades and was more 
national in scope setting up branches in various towns and regions ofthe colony. Like the 
FPU, it also intended to play an active political role. Not only did it act as a legislative 
lobby - it called for a Department of Labour in 1917 - but the NIW A went on to 
unsuccessfully contest elections in 1919.75 NIWA was not efficiently organized, 
however, and eventually faded from existence through the 1920s. 76 
The significance of the rise and prominence of labour in Newfoundland was heightened 
by world events after November 11, 1918 when the First World War ended with the 
signing of the Annistice (initiated in part because German leaders feared a conm1Unist 
take-over). It was the rare edition of the St. John's Evening Telegram or Daily News in 
1918 or 1919 that didn't contain articles or editorials debating the rise and threat of 
bolshevism.77 While Newfow1dland labour was committed to refotm within the capitalist 
system - peaceful democratic participation, supporting labour-friendly political parties, 
building working class consciousness, organized protests, legal strikes, etc.78 there was 
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much evidence of sensational and radical unionism, especially in nearby Canada. While 
violent protests or revolt did not occur in Newfoundland it is evident from the discussions 
in the local papers that general threat was taken seriously. For example, the debate at the 
January 3, 1919 Newfoundland Board of Trade meeting reflects the tentative mood 
among business leaders in post-war Newfoundland. One member indicated that labour 
was the most important, unavoidable problem facing employers and recommended a joint 
labour-business organization to improve the general failure to communicate between 
labour and capital.79 Another proposal at the same meeting was that government should 
take over management of the Permanent Marine Disaster Fund80 and levy a tax on the 
shipping community to fund it rather than being dependent on charity. While this 
suggestion that government administer a narrow, employer-paid insurance system very 
closely mirrors the German collective workers' compensation model (aspects of which 
were adopted in Canada in 1915, see Chapter 3), no evidence is found to suggest that this 
model was seriously considered in Newfoundland at that time. It is worth noting that the 
general concept of a collective liability insurance system was in the air, so to speak, in 
Newfoundland at that time. Most likely, post-war uncertainty and possible fears of labour 
revolt provoked these employer comments. Another factor affecting compensation policy in 
1919 was the concern for treating returning soldiers fairly. As indicated in the January 1919 
Board ofTrade meeting: 
We must live up to our obligations and discharge our duties ... What are 
our duties? They are: Our Spiritual Duties; Our National duties; and our 
duties to those who delivered us from the perils that threatened us .... 
(soldiers) have borne burden of war and they must be looked after ... they 
must be reinstated in their old positions.81 
Page 51, Chapter 2 
These various factors were among the influences in the next legislative amendments to 
the Workmen's Compensation Act which occurred in June 1919.82 In fact, there were two 
amendments in 1919: the first raised the weekly maximum compensable rate from $5 to 
$10 and the second established a statutory minimum compensation rate for injured 
workers under the age of 21. The second ensured 100 percent earnings for totally 
disabled young workers who earned less than $5.00 per week. 
Practically, the amendments guaranteed better insurance protection for workers, 
especially young workers (many of whom were ex-soldiers) in the event of work injury. 
Although incremental in nature, these amendments served symbolic as well as practical 
purposes. Generally, in 1919 there was more sympathy than normal extended to the 
average worker and, in particular, extended to the many decommissioned soldiers looking to 
re-enter the workforce. In symbolic terms, therefore, the government may have wished to be 
seen responding to a post-war duty. The symbolic value of this legislation may have been 
particularly important because it was introduced just five months before a general election. (It 
will be recalled that in 1908 the Act was amended months before the general election.) In 
fact, politicians and party leaders sought the support and favour of war veterans and their 
newly formed Returning Soldiers Association in 1919.83 
Yet another reason politicians appear to have been especially sensitive in the spring of 
1919 was that the direction of party politics was quite uncertain. By that time it was 
realized that the World War I coalition party structures had outlived their usefulness, a 
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realization which set off an intricate process of lobbying and politicking at all levels 
throughout the province. The process was particularly intense and complicated by the 
Spring of 1919. 84 The People's Party, which led the coalition National Party through the 
War, slowly disintegrated after Edward Morris retired in 1918 and finally fell after a non-
confidence vote in May 1919.85 A newly constituted government led by Sir Michael 
Cashin, a wealthy Catholic, was cobbled together following the confusion of May 1919. 
With an election expected in November 1919, Cashin renamed his party Liberal-
Conservative hoping to develop the broadest possible profile for the party. Although 
Cashin's group did represent a broad coalition on interests across the province, it was 
clearly biased toward the interests ofbusiness.86 
Meanwhile, as a result of the political maneuvering, Coaker- like Morris in 1908- was in 
opposition in June 1919 and a threat to Cashin's hope for election in November. Of 
course, it was the Cashin government - not the left-leaning Coaker opposition - that 
introduced the favourable workmen's compensation act amendments that June. In 
addition to the practical and symbolic reasons mentioned above for the passage of the 
June 1919 amendments, it was also in governments' interest for a number of other 
reasons. It would have been advantageous being able to cite the passage of pro-worker 
legislation going into an election featuring strong labour representation from Coaker and 
his allies, plus the three St. John's NIW A candidates. 87 Given Cashin's relatively broad 
base of support, it would have been possible to pass such legislation without the risk of 
being accused of overtly pandering to labour, especially considering that Cashin's group 
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may not have been closely associated with the concerns of labour. Also, the amendment 
reflected the notion of higher wage protection and minimum standards for workers in a 
manner that would not have been too costly, in comparison to other conceivable options 
under the workmen's compensation or other legislation of general application such as 
minimun1 wage or labour standards. 88 As reflected in the Board ofTrade comments, these 
minor amendments were likely acceptable to an employer community who, shaken by 
aggressive trends in post-war labour commw1ities, would benefit if Newfoundland labour 
felt fairly treated and did not resort to radicalism. Furthermore, by 1919 the 
Newfoundland wartime economy was booming with four years of increasing 
goverru11ental revenue and balanced budgets. 89 Newfoundland's financial status in 1919, 
along with the post-war spirit certainly provided an appropriate climate for government to 
improve benefits for injured workers. Coincidentally, the 1908 legislative improvements 
also came at a time when the Newfoundland government's fiscal status was positive. 
Possibly these amendments would not have been as acceptable, to goverrunent or 
employers, if it were possible to predict the economic turmoil which awaited 
Newfoundland through the next decade. 90 
By September 1919, Coaker had strengthened his hand remarkably by joining forces with 
the ambitious and skillful Richard Squires. Born in Harbour Grace, Squires was a 38-year 
old lawyer who, after joining the law firm of Edward Morris in 1902, successfully run for 
election as a People's Party candidate in 1909. Although defeated in the 1913 election, 
Squires went on to serve in the National Goverrunent as well as gaining controlling 
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interest in a St. John's newspaper in 1916. His opportunity to seek the office of Prime 
Minister came with the departure of Edward Morris from active politics in 1918 and the 
subsequent fall of the National Government in May 1919. In November 1919, just two 
months after forming the alliance with Coaker, Squires defeated the Cashin forces and 
became Prime Minister as leader of the newly named Liberal-Reform Party. 91 
Like the Bond government of 1908, Cashin lost the election just months after introducing 
favourable workmen's compensation legislation. While this may appear as the begirming 
of a pattern of electoral defeat following political opportunism, there were to be no 
similar occurrences associated with workers' compensation legislation in future years. 
There certainly were few opportunities for the Squires-Coaker coalition to advance 
progressive social legislation at the beginning of the 1920s. Less than two years after 
being elected there was evidence that Newfoundland's post-war economy was fragile as 
government recorded a significant annual deficit marked by increasing public debt and 
lower governmental revenues.92 And, while the Liberal-Reformers finished a relatively 
successful first term by easily winning the May 1923 election, Squires was forced from 
office within months of the victory in the wake of political scandal.93 This suddenly pre-
empted Squires' political career and marked the beginning-of-the-end of Coaker' s 
political career and his zest for unionism. By 1925 Coaker's FPU had lost its 
significance,94 and there were few obvious individuals or groups with a natural interest or 
bias toward promoting improvements in the employer liability law. 
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Chapter Summary 
By way of review, up to 1920 there is no doubt that the development of work injury 
liability laws in Newfoundland is defined by English tradition and experience. The 
Employer Liability Act of 1887 was copied from England and introduced in 
Newfoundland as a means to support economic growth even though, at the time, it was 
underdeveloped with a narrow, predominantly non-wage-based economy. In fact, 
Newfoundland continued to rely on the English law as its economy changed after 1900. 
The 1908 Act, for example, was unequivocally copied from England. On a practical level 
it is not surprising that Newfoundland would have emulated the English laws given their 
close history and the availability of English experience. Yet the persistence of the 
borrowed Jaw in a colony which struggled for a unique identity and independence, 
economically at least, is more of a theoretical matter. 
It was only natural, as the original policy determinant, that the British experience would 
provide the policy context and direction for Newfoundland. Once the law was copied and 
enacted, however, it would have been easier merely to an1end the existing law and allow 
the framework, structures, processes and learned experience which grew up around it to 
continue without major interruption. This is a simple yet compelling proposition which 
suggests, for example, that the English law inevitably continued to influence the direction 
of future laws once it was introduced to Newfoundland in 1887. In this regard, we can 
generally cite the weight of tradition and culture as a policy detenninant. It becomes 
difficult to break away from an inherited psychological mould; in other words, 
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Newfoundlanders felt that the best way to handle any problem was as it was handled in 
the old country. These somewhat simplified analyses are best elaborated under the 
concept known as path dependence. Generally, tllis means that events which have 
happened in the past, e.g., policy choices in law or institutions, will affect and possibly 
detem1ine future choice.95 In that regard, history may be viewed as a constraint on change 
options. It is as if Newfoundland legislators may be lulled as hostages to their own 
experience making it, in modem terms, difficult for them to think or act outside of a 
predefined policy box. 
Drawing on economic theory of returns, Pierson's more prec1se definition of path 
dependency includes grounding in the dynan1ics of "increasing retums."96 Under the 
increasing returns theory the likelihood that a law, institution or process will be changed 
steadily decreases the longer it remains is in place. In this regard, as Pierson notes, social 
processes characteristically involve "increasing returns" which may be described as "self-
reinforcing or positive feedback processes."97 This approach is significant because it 
suggests that the social costs of switching from one policy alternative to another 
generally increase over time. This may, in some cases, account for incremental change. 
The increasing returns concept may also be helpful in helping us analyze the factors 
which lead to systemic change or path divergence - not only what happens, but when it 
happens. Authors such as Mahoney, in search of a clearer definition of the concept, 
dissect the principle of increasing returns as a core aspect of path dependency in more 
precise terms. He discusses models of 'reactive sequences' and ' event chains ', for 
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example, in the effort to demonstrate that "each event in (a) sequence is both a reaction to 
antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events."98 In the social sciences, these 
refined ideas may allow one to identify and explain social factors associated with 
'breakpoints' in history when change or path divergence occurs. Path dependency issues 
will be revisited in subsequent chapters. 
Viewed from a basic path dependency perspective, the post-1887 result for the Employer 
Liability Act in Newfoundland was strict adherence to the British model. There was no 
path divergence or breakpoints during the period reviewed in this chapter, i.e., 25 years 
before the first amendments. Perhaps this degree of legislative durability is explained in 
part by the increasing returns premise; as a positive tool to support industrial 
development the law would have likely involved benefited workers, employers, and 
government - to the extent that the system replaced an inferior one and the historic record 
does not reveal any advocacy for a new system through these years. Meanwhile, the first 
amendments to the Act (I 902) were driven by an ideological rift between employers -
e.g., Reid, favouring the possibility of limiting workers' rights - and those who insisted 
that workers' rights be protected. It may be deduced that advancement of a mere 
amendment to resolve this disagreement was a beneficial outcome versus large-scale 
systemic overhaul; as such, increasing returns accrued . Meanwhile, that episode 
demonstrated some degree of growing influence of labour at about that time. 
Nevertheless, the interest of capitalists prevailed in the 1908 amendments which limited 
worker benefits. Yet modest coverage gains were realized for some workers in 1908 and 
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1914 amendments, and largely symbolic changes to the Act in 1919 supported retuming 
soldiers. This brief initial history suggests that after the introduction of the Act in 1887, it 
was essentially locked in on a path dependent trajectory which involved minor 
amendments only influenced by ideological biases and preferences, labour relation issues, 
increasing trade unionism, union politicization, economic growth, diversifying 
workforce, and social class issues. 
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Chapter Three 
Early Signs of Favour for Canadian Model (1920-1934) 
The period following the end of the First World War up to 1934 was largely 
inactive in terms of amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act of Newfoundland. 
But this chapter begins by exploring developments in Canada where, just prior to the 
commencement of the First World War, a unique workers' compensation law was 
adopted. Canada rejected fault-based British employer liability laws in favour of a no-
fault, collective liability system along the lines of the German solution. Although the 
unfolding Canadian model significantly influenced activities in Newfoundland over the 
long term, there were few short-tenn effects. There is, for example, no direct evidence 
found to show that the Canadian experience affected events in Newfoundland before the 
1920s. A brief narrative is provided, however, to show how two young Newfow1dlanders, 
Joseph R. (Joey) Smallwood and William (Billy) Browne, advocated the adoption of the 
Canadian system in Newfoundland in the mid-1920s. Their endeavors and relative 
success, including certain incremental policy changes with which they were associated in 
1926, is reviewed. While they did not succeed in having the Canadian system adopted in 
1926, the ability of Smallwood and Browne to raise the profile of the issue on 
government's agenda demonstrates the importance that personalities can have in policy 
development processes. Overall, however, the prospects for dramatic program change 
were low in Newfoundland throughout the post-war to 1934 era due to an unsettled 
combination of political, fiscal and economic concerns. The chapter considers how these 
forces tended to mitigated against the interests and influence of organized labour through 
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the 1920s, thus diminishing the strength of Labour's voice before government. It ends by 
considering why it is not surprising that few, incremental policy changes only 
materialized during this period. 
As discussed in Chapter One, following an Ontario Royal Commission, a collective 
liability workers' compensation law was implemented in the province of Ontario on 
January 1, 1915. 1 The Ontario Act resulted in elimination of Employer Liability laws, 
such as in Newfoundland, in favour of a no-fault system where injured workers are 
automatically entitled to compensation via an employer funded program. There is, 
however, no evidence to show that individuals, organizations or governments advocated 
the adoption of the Ontario, or Canadian, model in Newfoundland before the mid-1920s. 
The first documented attempt to introduce the Canadian system in Newfoundland occurs 
in the mid-1920s. Although the Canadian system was not adopted, the Newfoundland 
Workmen's Compensation Act was amended in 1926 to provide increased benefits for 
death and pem1anent injury. And, for the first time, it made employers totally liable for 
all medical aid expenses of injured workers. 2 These were the most significant legislative 
changes since 1908. But it is the process leading up to the 1926 amendments, not the 
amendments themselves, that provides insight into the nature of policy development at 
that time. The story involves two main characters: Joey Smallwood, the eventual long-
time Premier, and William (Billy) Browne, who would enjoy a long, diverse political and 
judicial career. Their common interest in the development of progressive workmen's 
compensation laws was remarkable and both may be credited with laying the groundwork 
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for the eventual adoption of the Canadian model in Newfoundland.3 
Born in 1900, Smallwood grew up in a poor, working class St. John's family and had no 
formal education beyond high school (which he left early). It has been generally said that 
he was not especially successful in his mulbple careers prior to 1949. His first political 
activity occurred when he actively supported the three NIW A candidates in the 1919 
election. Between 1920 and 1925 Smallwood lived mainly in New York City, writing and 
campaigning for pro-labour causes. In 1925 he returned to Newfoundland pern1anently 
and acted as a union organizer and journalist. In fact, in 1925 he led the fom1ation of the 
first Newfoundland Federation of Labour. Although that organization did not survive past 
1926, its appearance confirmed the continuing desire for a united labour front; it also 
gave Smallwood (as the first elected president) a major profile in Newfoundland with 
respect to labour representation.4 Years later, Smallwood recalled his early interest in 
workmen's compensation: 
Many years ago, I became interested in the whole subject of Workmen's 
Compensation. I don't remember what made me particularly interested in 
it, but interested I did become to the extent that I wrote to virtually every 
Government in the world asking them to send me a copy of their 
Workmen's Compensation Act, each of them. I received them. I was living 
at the time in the City of New York, and there, over a period of about 
twelve months, I gathered together what I say now was a very remarkable 
collection of the Labour Laws of all lands of the earth, in all kinds of 
languages. In conversation with Professors John R. Commons5 and John 
B. Andrews ... Co-Directors of the American Association for Labour 
Legislation, that very famous Organization which wrote two-thirds (if not 
more) of the Labour Laws of the United States of An1erica for the 
American Federation of Labour and other Trade Union Movements, told 
me in their offices that my collection of Workmen's Compensation Acts of 
the Countries and States and provinces of the world was more complete 
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than their own. When I returned to Newfoundland I made a strenuous 
effort to get a civilized Workmen's Compensation Act brought before the 
House of Assembly ofNewfoundland.6 
Billy Browne was born in 1897 in St. John's and was raised in a very stable, industrious 
environment. After completing his first degree at the University of Toronto he finished 
Jaw school at the University of Oxford where he was Newfoundland's Rhodes Scholar for 
1919. He was called to the London and Newfow1dland Bars in 1922.7 Browne wasted no 
time in becoming involved in Newfoundland politics. In June 1924, he was elected as the 
junior member of a team running in the three-candidate district of St. John's West on 
behalf of the Liberal-Conservative Party. 8 The Liberal-Conservative Party was able to 
win the election by defeating the Liberal Reform party which suffered greatly due to 
uncertainty surrounding the resignation of its leader, Richard Squires. 9 
As a young government backbencher, Browne demonstrated strong interest in workmen's 
compensation when he visited the Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation Board for general 
discussions in 1924. 10 By 1926 he had drafted a workmen's compensation act for 
presentation when the House of Assembly sat again in March 1926. Browne relied 
heavily on the Nova Scotia Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 because he felt 
conditions there, such as economic make-up, were similar to Newfoundland. 11 
Unfortunately, considering Browne's enthusiasm, it is unlikely that the leadership of the 
Liberal-Conservative Party shared his strong interest in progressive workmen's 
compensation legislation. The party itself had been assembled somewhat haphazardly, 
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largely as a negative reaction to the Squires scandals, and, according to Browne, when it 
came into power in 1924 it was not prepared to govern. In fact, the Liberal-Conservative 
Party is described an alliance comprised mainly of St. Jolm's businessmen, whose 
subsequent policies reflected the interests of its mercantile membership. The party leader, 
Walter Monroe, remained as Prime Minister until August 1928 when he resigned. 12 
Browne states he was "unable to find in Monroe's attitude towards public life and toward 
governrnent generally, any philosophy, any purpose, any aim; he seemed to depend on 
chance all the time." 13 
Although the party was not established along any clear philosophical lines, it did not take 
long for a pattern to emerge. Eventually, Monroe would be described as "a perfect 
representative of St. John's social and commercial elite" 14, and his government as: 
... a true merchant party of the nineteenth century type, an ad hoc group 
created, dominated, and financed by the Water Street interests, whose 
preoccupations it unmistakenly reflected in its policies. 15 
Perhaps the clearest indication of its bias toward the social and commercial e lite occurred 
in 1925 when it repealed the Income Tax Act which had been introduced in 1919. The tax 
only an1ounted to about 4 percent of the provincial budget, but the symbolic value was 
great because it was paid by the wealthier people. Browne himself states, "revocation (of 
the Income Tax Act) confirmed the opinions of those who declared that the Government 
was the instrument of the wealthy merchants." 16 Reflection on the government record 
from 1924 to 1926 certainly suggests that the Monroe government may not be 
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characterized as pro-labour. 17 Ironically, in 1926 it was the Monroe government that 
significantly raised Workmen's Compensation benefit levels for all. injured workers for 
the first time since 1908. To try and understand why that may have occurred it IS 
necessary to further consider the forces which united Smallwood and Browne in 1926. 
Between 1921 and 1927, the Newfoundland government and the operator of the Bell 
Island iron ore mines, British Empire Steel Corporation (BESCO), were embroiled in 
ongoing contractual disagreements associated mainly with the level of export excise taxes 
levied by govemment. At the centre of the dispute was a 1921 contract negotiated 
between the Squires government and the company. As bargaining leverage to support its 
continuing demand to renegotiate the contract, particularly its demand to pay lower taxes, 
the company advised government that it would not be able to operate or employ as many 
workers if it had to pay taxes too. 18 Also linked to and revolving around the matter of 
mine operating costs and the fundamental excise tax issue were thomy labour relations 
issues, such as the combined threat from workers' of forming a union and higher wage 
demands in 1924. That year, BESCO threatened to close the mine and the umon 
organizers backed down - there would not be a union at the mine until the 1940s. 19 
BESCO and the govemment focused on another round of negotiations to amend the 1921 
contract early in 1926, marked in particular by a letter from the President of BESCO to 
Monroe in which the company promised to increase miner's wages.20 At about that time, 
shortly before or after, Smallwood was called upon by the Bell Island miners to represent 
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them before government. Smallwood recalls meeting with Monroe and being told that 
although governrnent was not proud of the new contract proposed by BESCO, they felt it 
was the best one available. Monroe sought union approval before bringing the matter 
back to the Houses of Assembly. In return for union support, however, Smallwood made 
a series of demands, one of which was a new Workmen's Compensation Act.21 
Smallwood recalls being assured that a new Workmen's Compensation Act would be 
tabled in the upcoming March 1926 sitting of the House. 22 Smallwood says that a few 
weeks after this meeting he was asked to work with Browne (the young government 
backbencher) on the draft legislation. In addition, during this period Smallwood publicly 
agitated for legislative change through his work as an editorialist with the Daily Globe. 
Meanwhile, Browne was working on his 'Newfoundland' version ofthe 1915 Nova Scotia 
Act. Browne's Act mirrored the Canadian principles of no-fault insurance and collective 
liability exactly, and provided for the establishment of a Workmen's Compensation Board 
to administer the program. It even broadened the scope of coverage significantly to 
include the recognition of industrial diseases and to extend coverage to employed 
fishermen and seaman.23 The statute was referred to governrnent and referenced in the 
March 3, 1926 Throne Speech. That day Browne rose to second the motion: 
This matter is a question of social legislation. The Act that we have on the 
Statute Book today was passed in 1908, and we are not so far behind other 
countries in tllis respect. However, the amounts given in compensation are 
utterly inadequate. This Country has made a great deal of progress during 
that time, and what surprises me is that we have had governments that 
claimed to represent the mass of the people more than any other 
government has done, and no change has been made to any extent in this 
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matter of compensation. I feel sure that the Government can count on the 
support of all the Members of the House to produce an Act which will be 
original and serviceable and which will be a lasting benefit to all those 
engaged in the industries ofthis Country.24 
Factors Weighing Against Change 
So the stage was set in 1926 for Newfoundland to adopt the Canadian model of 
workmen's compensation. Monroe's government appeared very senous when an 
impressive Joint Select Committee of the House - including Browne, three other MHA's, 
the Minister of Justice, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, plus five members from 
Legislative Council - was appointed to study the proposed legislation. Browne's Act was 
destined to be a legislative landmark and a dramatic leap forward . The Joint Select 
Committee, however, never met and Browne's original Act was not passed. Instead, a 
scaled down version, albeit one with slightly improved benefit levels, was passed in early 
June. Exactly why the government stalled on this issue and, ultimately, reduced the 
number and significance of legislative amendments is open to debate. 
For exan1ple, while the House was is session - March to May 1926 - Browne reports 
being ignored whenever he inquired about when the Joint Select Committee was expected 
to meet. He appears to have been treated as an annoyance by the Minister of Justice who 
said" .. . he was very busy, had so many things to do, day and night, etc."25 The nature of 
Monroe's role in this is unclear, but two divergent possibilities arise: one, Monroe 
ruthlessly decided to renege on his legislative promise to Smallwood and decided to put 
off Browne through his Minister of Justice; or, two, Monroe made a promise he couldn't 
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keep and, in fact, was not really in control of the government agenda. Some version of 
the second scenario is most plausible considering the various descriptions of Monroe's 
attitude and approach to government. Furthermore, it is likely that a larger Workmen's 
Compensation Bill was not heartily supported (if at all) by many government members 
considering their legislative record and bias toward the interests of capital. In any event, 
by the end of May 1926, the Monroe govemment fell into serious political trouble when 
it was left with a majority of one seat after a senior Minister resigned from Cabinet taking 
four other government members with him. Browne writes: "(the original Act) was not 
passed in the 1926 session because the (Minister of Justice) asked me to defer it as we 
only had a majority of one in the House of Assembly and Govemment was anxious to get 
the House c1osed."26 Instead of the larger Bill, he was advised to draft essential 
improvements which could be put through the House quickly. 
Browne speculates in his memoirs that his larger Bill would have passed easily if 
governrnent had brought it fo1ward and that the opposition members all appeared to 
support the Bill. He does not, however, directly discuss the true level of support for the 
Bill within his own party.27 In fact, that is a crucial consideration given the Monroe 
governrnent slim majority of one and the strong bias of its members toward the interests 
of capital, not labour. 
Another major factor not considered by Browne is the significance of the early 1926 
promise made to Smallwood and the Bell Island miners by governrnent: a progressive 
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workmen's compensation act in return for union support in closing the BESCO contract 
negotiations. In fact, by May 10, 1926 (at least), contract negotiation with BESCO was 
not a priority with government because BESCO was no longer interested in a long-tem1 
contract.28 It is, perhaps, not coincidental that the Monroe government's .level of interest 
in the Workmen's Compensation Act fell off dramatically once the BESCO matter was 
resolved. In fact, the series of events could be interpreted to suggest that the government 
never intended to pass the larger Bill , but introduced it to keep Smallwood and the unions 
happy. In retrospect, Browne may have been very lucky to get through the minor 
amendments that he did, most notably: an increase in the maximum benefit for pern1anent 
disability or death from $1,500 to $3,000 (interestingly, just as Morris had argued for in 
1908); modest increases in the weekly maximum allowable compensation rate; and, for 
the first time, a provision making employers liable for medical and surgical aid costs.29 
The end result, in fact, was incremental change only to the existing British model Act. 
The efforts of Browne and Smallwood did not result in the adoption of the Canadian 
model in 1926, but their pioneering interest is a remarkable feature of the history. Their 
personal interest and detetmination were important factors leading to the introduction of 
the Canadian model into Newfoundland politics. But given their locations outside the hub 
of government power they were not, through strength of personality alone, able to 
decisively influence the course of events. After 1926 Browne never formally raised the 
Workers' Compensation matter again in the House in 1927 or 1928, nor did he play a 
direct role in the future development of the legislation. Given Smallwood's eventual role 
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m Newfoundland's history it is especially interesting to consider his contribution. 
Smallwood indicates that the next time he seriously promoted a progressive Act was 
between 1930 and 1932 when he gained the interest of Richard Squires (back for a 
second time as Prime Minister) and persuaded him that Newfoundland ought to have a 
new Workmen's Compensation Act. Although it appears some preliminary work may 
have been done at that time nothing substantive materialized.30 
In retrospect, it is not surprising that there were no changes in workmen's compensation 
legislation in the early 1930s, or for that matter that there were only minor changes 
through the 1920s. Generally, Newfoundland of the 1920s and 1930s was characterized 
by poor economic fundamentals, depressions, political scandals, increasing debt and 
looming prospects (and eventual realization of) bankruptcy.31 While govenunent 
overspending did not characterize Newfoundland through the 1920s, the narrowly based 
island economy slipped into an irreversible downward economic spiral through the 1920s 
and into the 1930s, marked by ballooning public debt. 32 Additionally, throughout the 
1920s there was a general ideological tendency to curb social costs.33 While hopes for 
industrial development were revitalized in the late 1920s with major developments such 
as the new pulp and paper mill in Comer Brook and a new mining operation in Buchans, 
domestic and international economic forces and fiscal realities conspired to bring 
Newfoundland to its knees economically and politically by 1933. That unfortunate era 
culminated in 1934 when the Amulree Royal Commission prescribed the suspension of 
responsible government as the cure for Newfoundland's failing economic and political 
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systems.34 Newfoundland relinquished its democratic independence in February 1934 and 
would be governed by a Commission of Government (British appointees) until choosing 
to join Canada in 1949.35 Basically, consecutive governments were consumed with 
significant macroeconomic and other dominant domestic issues, so it is reasonable to 
assume that the concerns of local labour leaders (like Smallwood) or groups were not 
really treated as priorities. 
Another factor which explains why there were so few legislative changes after the First 
World War is the fact that the strength of organized labour was diminished. By the mid-
1920s organized labour, to the extent that it could still be called organized, had 
diminished into insignificance. The Newfoundland Industrial Workers Association's 
(NIW A) bold initiative to establish a national umbrella union faded after 192036 and by 
1925 the Fishermen's Protective Union (FPU) lost its significance.37 Smallwood's effort 
to form the Newfoundland Federation of Labour did not last. Practical forces which 
mitigated against the interests and influence of organized labour through the 1920s, 
therefore, were diminished union membership and leadership. In fact, the union 
movement fizzled so that by the mid-1930s there remained possibly as few as 7,000 
Newfoundland members of trade unions (with the majority of those in large, secure 
unions such as mine and paper mill workers), compared to in excess of 30,000 members 
in 191 3.38 Overall labour appears to have suffered from an uncontrollable cycle of 
declining influence: dominance of fiscal, economic, and other political concerns, plus 
declining union membership, equaled loss of political influence. The influence of the 
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labour movement appears to have actually peaked in the 1908 to 1919 period when fiscal 
concerns were minimal and union membership numbers high, but diminished into the 
1920s and 1930s as fiscal concerns increased and union membership numbers declined. 
Chapter Summary 
In summary, the years between the end of the First World War and the arrival of 
Commission of Government in 1934 were not active ones in terms of amendments to the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Although Canada unveiled a progressive new model in 
1915 it was not embraced when promoted in 1926 by Smallwood and Browne. 
Smallwood and Browne were promised big change, but Monroe was not able or willing 
to deliver on that promise. On the other hand, the Monroe govemment was willing to 
accept a number of less dramatic legislative improvements. It appears that the clash of 
political promise and competing dominant interests resulted in incremental policy change 
only in 1926. The following commentary is suggestive of the dynamics which resulted in 
the incremental amendments of 1926: 
incremental politics ... reduces the stakes in each political controversy, 
thus encouraging losers to bear their losses without disrupting the political 
system .... poor as it is, incremental politics ordinarily offers the best 
chance of introducing into the political system those changes and those 
change-rroducing intermediate changes that a discontented citizen might 
desire.3 
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Chapter Four 
Growing Influence of Organized Labour and the Move to Canada 
(1934-1948) 
This chapter reviews events in the 1934 to 1949 Commission of Government era. 
During this era Newfoundland advanced from desperation and loss of political 
independence in 1934, to an economic boom during the Second World War, followed by 
a lengthy process through which political independence was regained. Reversing 
economic, social and political fortune is important policy determinant during these years 
and it is intriguing to note how policy changes occur in step with an improving economy. 
For example, it will be shown that progressive activities do not commence after 1934 
until the fiscal situation improved - illustrating fiscal health as an important policy 
determinant. The chapter will review other factors which influenced policy development, 
in particular how the Commission of Government was unprepared to deal with new and 
significant labour relations concerns in the late 1930s. A critical development during 
these years is the rebirth of the organized labour movement in Newfoundland. The 
chapter demonstrates the degree of influence of a reinvigorated labour movement upon 
the actions the Commission of Government. Decisions of the Commission of 
Government resulted in the retention of the narrow British employer liability laws, in 
spite of labours' advocacy for significant change. Instead the Commission of Government 
created a bureaucratic position, known as the Labour Relations Officer, which would be 
responsible for workers' compensation (among a range of other labour relation issues). 
Additional policy determinants considered in the chapter include minor effects from 
bureaucratization associated with the new Labour Relations Officer position, and the 
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considerably more influential matter of the process leading up to Newfoundland's 
decision to join Canada. While these years are not noteworthy for substantive change in 
the workers' compensation system, a review of relevant events demonstrates the 
persistence of incremental policy change. 
Without a doubt the priority issue for the Commission of Government in 1934 related to 
restoring economic and political stability in Newfoundland. Improving the workers' 
compensation was likely near the bottom of the Commission's list of priorities. The 
Commission of Government did make one minor amendment to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act in 1935. 1 It stated that failure of a worker to file a claim within six 
months from the date of injury did not automatically bar their right to compensation if it 
was otherwise a just claim. While not insignificant, especially in tetms of the individual 
case, this amendment would have cost the colony virtually nothing (except that liabilities 
may be extended in rare cases where just delays occurred). No evidence is found to show 
why this amendment was initiated or approved, but it may have been a case where the 
Commission wished to be seen doing something quickly in response to concerns raised 
by labour representatives. It would have been a classic case of "incremental politics"2: 
reducing the stakes in political controversy - where the losers (labour) would have been 
encouraged to bear their losses - without disrupting the priority work before the 
Commission of Government. This would have been an easy transaction because the 
Commission would not have been confronted by a strong labour lobby in 1934 or 1935. 
In fact, as shown in the last chapter, by 1934 there was no organized labour movement in 
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the province. Any lobbying for government action on issues of concern to labour would 
likely have come from one of the larger industrial unions. While there was no broad 
based national labour movement in Newfoundland at the time there clearly were labour 
advocates. Furthermore, by the mid-1930s an environment conducive to the resurgence of 
unionism developed rapidly when the significantly depressed economy created desperate 
working conditions. (Ironically, it had been a failing economy through the 1920s which 
contributed to the demise of organized labour.) By 1936, bad working conditions and low 
wages in Newfoundland, as well as the influence of trade union activism in the United 
States and Canada, prompted a return to union activism in Newfoundland. In particular, 
no group of workers were as negatively affected by the pressures of the depression years 
as were Newfoundland Joggers. As a result, by 1936 a new union - the Newfoundland 
Lumbermen's Association - was formed representing 12,000 loggers. In one year the 
number of organized workers in Newfoundland more than doubled.3 
The reawakening of union activism in 1936 is a significant development with respect to 
the evolution of workmen's compensation because it marked the entry of organizations 
and individuals which would eventually change the face of the compensation system in 
Newfoundland. In this regard, a landmark event occurred during 1936 when 
Newfoundland trade union leaders met to discuss the possibility of a federation of labour 
which would act on behalf of the entire working class. The 1936 meeting led to the 
formation of the Newfoundland Federation of Labour with stated goals which included 
legislative lobbying and influencing public opinion in favour of organized labour. 
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Delegates at the founding meeting in 1936 adopted ten policy resolutions, one of which 
called for improvements in the Workmen's Compensation Act.4 The Federation not only 
lasted, but would come to play a critical role in influencing the development of the 
workers' compensation system in Newfoundland, particularly during the decisive years 
following Confederation. It is noteworthy, however, that the Federation decided against 
direct political participation by way of creating their own party or fielding candidates in 
general elections. That was a marked departure from the fom1er approaches of Coaker, 
the FPU and NIW A. Instead their preferred route for political activism was to lobby 
government for favoured legislation in return for support at the polls. 
Among the small number of leaders who attended the inaugural meeting of the 
Federation in 1936 were Charlie Ballam and Irving Fogwill. These names would figure 
prominently in the development of workmen's compensation policy. Ballam, a union 
organizer out of the Comer Brook mill eventually served as President of the 
Newfoundland Federation of Labour. In 1949 he entered active politics, as a Smallwood 
Liberal, and was named as Newfoundland's first post-Confederation Labour Minister, a 
position he held until 1966. Fogwill was a railway unionist out of the NIWA tradition. 
Particularly literate and a socialist, he was assigned by Smallwood to study the matter of 
Workmen's Compensation in 1950 and, eventually, was named Chairman of 
Newfoundland's post-confederation Workmen's' Compensation Board where he remained 
until March 1967.5 
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Withjn a year Federation membersrup tripled and in 1938 the first Labour Day parade 
since 1908 took place in the City of St. Jolm's .6 This new organization, with credible 
leadership, took the Commission of Government by surprise. It was not equipped to deal 
with a growing Newfoundland labour movement and the complaints of new groups like 
the NLA and the Federation of Labour. By 1938 the Commission of Government 
recognjzed the need to pay greater attention to industrial relations questions but realized 
that it was not structured to adequately manage the issues. As a result, in 1938 the 
Commission of Government arranged for London to appoint a qualified individual to 
conduct an evaluation of labour relations in Newfoundland. Thomas K. Liddell, a 
conciliation officer from the British Ministry of Labour, was selected and he completed 
his Industrial Survey of Newfoundland in 1940.7 
Liddell found that employers were not very well organized when it came to dealing with 
labour relations issues. Up to 1939 only one employer organization - The Employers' 
Association - was in place to represent employers' interests (but not very successfully) 
when it came to negotiating wage agreements between its members and labour. In fact, 
the narrow focus of employers at that time was establishing predictable processes for 
wage negotiations and resolving associated disputes.8 
On the other hand, Liddell described the Newfoundland Federation of Labour as a more 
focused entity: 
The aims of (the Federation) are undoubtedly in the direction of legislation 
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... The Federation has ... already set its hand to the production of 
resolutions for submission to the Government. Some of these have little or 
no bearing on industrial affairs, but among these which have such a 
bearing are resolutions dealing with pension, minimum wages, Workmen's 
Compensation, Trade Unions and other kindred subjects.9 
Specifically regarding Workmen's Compensation, Liddell noted the general desire for 
unions to have the scope of workmen's' compensation coverage and benefits increased. In 
response to the concerns raised by labour, Liddell's report includes excerpts from the 
English, Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Newfoundland Acts, but with little or no commentary. 
The lack of comparative analysis is readily apparent and, in essence, Liddell simply 
dismisses labours' requests for improved benefits such as those found under the Canadian 
Acts. Given that in less than 10 years Newfoundland would become part of Canada, and 
considering the 1926 efforts to bring in an Act based on Nova Scotia, Liddell's biased 
comments in favour of retaining English law in Newfoundland is interesting from an 
historic perspective. Here was a plainly stated preference for the maintenance of British 
law in Newfoundland, by a British civil servant, revealing overt Imperial influence on the 
direction ofthe law. Liddell writes: 
Each of these Canadian Acts is entirely different in its construction and 
procedure from the English Acts and the adoption of a system based upon 
Canadian practice would be awkward and somewhat out of place because, 
up to the present, the law of Newfoundland has followed the Jaw of 
England and a revision of policy would mean the turning over to Canadian 
Law and precedent. ... A further point which has to be kept in mind on this 
subject is the extreme difficulty of comparing wages and working 
conditions in Canada. 10 
Essentially nothing happened regarding the Workmen's Compensation Act immediately 
following the release of the Liddell report in 1940. Similarly there was inaction regarding 
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the Newfoundland Federation of Labour's 1939 resolution recommending the creation of 
a Labour Department.'' Liddell did not agree that it was necessary to create a department, 
but he did recommend the creation of a section in one of the departments to deal 
exclusively with labour matters. While the Liddell report may have provided current 
grassroots feedback and some recommendations, its main virtue in the eyes of the 
Commissioners may have been that it bought them time. That is because, ultimately, the 
Commission's basic problems remained; they lacked the resources and direction to be 
able to resolve Newfoundland's difficulties. Fortunately for the Commission of 
Government, the advent of the Second World War improved economic conditions in 
Newfoundland immensely. In fact, the revenues and focus provided by the war effort is 
credited with saving the Commission ofGovernment. 12 
By 1942, Newfoundland was three years into its Second World War effort. And, just as it 
had during the First World War, the North Atlantic island prospered. An economic boom, 
mainly due to the new American military presence, resulted in government revenue 
reaching an all-time high in 1942. This change of fortune allowed the Commission 
Government to reinvest in certain public services and begin to assert some direction with 
respect to domestic policy. (Although some government surplus funds were spent in 
Newfoundland, most of the surplus was transferred to Britain). 13 In particular, the 
Commission of Government follow-up on Liddell's recommendation and created the post 
of Labour Relations Officer, under the Commissioner for Public Utilities, in June 1942.14 
Although the primary responsibility of the Labour Relations Officer was to develop and 
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maintain good relations between employers and workmen in the various industries of 
Newfoundland, the role of the office grew quickly to cover all aspects of labour 
relations. 15 Most of the correspondence recorded by the Labour Relations Officer after 
1942 carne from trade unions. A telling comment concerning the availability of 
information regarding the Workmen's Compensation Act went as follows: 
For the information and guidance of workmen this office has consolidated 
the Workmen's Compensation Act and amendments thereto and issued the 
complete Act, as amended, in stenciled form through the various Unions. 
Formerly the Acts were not available otherwise than in the Consolidated 
Statutes of 1916 and the yearly Acts since 1918. 16 
This comment suggests that prior to the 1940s the average workman would have been in 
a very ignorant and deprived situation when it came to having information concerning 
workmen's compensation. Likely, workmen would have been vulnerable, subject to 
rumour and possibly unscrupulous employers, when it carne to their rights under the 
workmen's compensation act. Workers might have been easily dissuaded from pursuing 
workmen's compensation claims by being told that coverage didn't exist or that they had 
opted out of coverage. Although these were the kinds of fears which the 1902 and 1908 
legislation were meant to eliminate, it is clear that by 1944 there was a very low level of 
awareness regarding the Act; copies of the Act simply were not available. In fact, it was 
well known that it depended largely on the employer what, if anything, a worker would 
get following a work injury prior to 1949.17 
The creation of focused bureaucratic capacity, m the form of the Labour Relations 
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Officer, meant that someone within government was devoted to the matter of industrial 
issues, as had been the wish of labour groups in the Liddell process. Quite likely, the 
Commission of Government welcomed the additional support, particularly as a buffer 
between local labour interests and the Commission. This may be deduced based on the 
previously poor record of managing domestic matters demonstrated by the professional 
English bureaucrats assigned as lead Commissioners. 18 The Commission remained 
challenged because labour relations issues did not diminish or suddenly get any easier to 
manage in the mid-1940s. Although the Newfoundland economy had improved, the 
immediate post-war period is also characterized by rapid growth in organized labour and 
labour relations volatility. That culminated, in June 1948, with a railway workers' strike 
that virtually crippled the island economy and caused the Commission grave 
difficulties.19 By 1947, membership in unions had increased to over 42,000.20 
The creation of additional bureaucratic capacity also meant that as early as 1944 the 
Labour Relations Officer reports spending a considerable amount of time comparing the 
existing labour laws of Newfoundland and other countries, particularly England and 
Canada. In particular, the Labour Relations Officer reports in 1944 that he was preparing 
a draft Workmen's Compensation Act which would be circulated to employers and 
workmen for their comment prior to enactment.21 Interestingly, for the first time in 
Newfoundland the policy development process was driven by the Labour Relations 
Officer (a civil servant), not Commissioners or politicians.22 Also, this is the first 
evidence of a conscious and serious policy consultation process regarding the Workmen's 
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Compensation Act involving the two key interest groups: employers and workers. 
In fact, in 1947 the Commission of Government asked for public feedback when it 
published its proposed Workmen's Compensation Act amendments in the local 
newspapers. Prior to the consultation process, however, the Labour Relations Officer 
provides an odd, though intriguing comment which portrays organized labour in 
Newfoundland as being underdeveloped and unsophisticated: 
Much of the existing legislation in other countries which tends to assure to 
workmen freedom from want, was either prepared by labour organizations 
or thoroughly examined by them before enactment. In this country labour 
has not reached the stage of organization which one finds in such countries 
as England and it is not in the position to put forward for consideration 
carefully considered schemes applicable to industry in general. 23 
There are a couple of points to be made here. First, there is the direct matter of the 
Labour Relations Officer's comments which do not give much credit to the fact that 
unions had been involved in serious workers' compensation law proposals since at least 
the 1920s. Perhaps the Officer's comments were based on activities within his limited 
framework or experience, or maybe he was unduly influenced by his British superiors 
who may not have had a high regard for the local unions compared to those in England. 
A more important point, though, is that there may not have been an opportunity for 
consultation were it not for the existence of the Labour Relations Officer. Joey 
Smallwood, who certainly could not have been considered unsophisticated or unable to 
effectively propose a "carefully considered" proposal when it came to Workmen's 
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Compensation, was among those who responded to the Commission's consultation. 
Smallwood recalls indicating to the Commission that their proposed Workmen's 
Compensation Act was merely an improved employer liability act and, as such, 
misnamed.24 The proposed Act, Smallwood argued, was merely a continuation of the 
British-styled employer liability acts in force since 1887 and, as such, left workers open 
to the unpredictability of employer attitudes and the vagaries and expense of court 
processes. Even if the Act did contain certain improvements such as a schedule 
recognizing certain industrial diseases as being work related (a schedule similar to that 
originally recommended by Browne and Smallwood in 1926), it did not contain any 
significant changes in quantum of benefit levels paid to injured workers or their 
dependants, a consistently unfulfilled desire of labour since 1908. The Commission of 
Government proposal, Smallwood reminds, amounted to merely incremental changes in 
what labour perceived to be a fundamentally second-rate law. A clear opinion to be sure, 
but one which was enabled through a new form of consultative interaction involving the 
Commission of Government, the Labour Relations Office, and interested individuals and 
groups. 
Meanwhile, as directed by the British gover111llent, Newfoundlanders were preoccupied 
with the much larger issue of national self-detem1ination since December 1945. 
Delegates were elected to attend an ongoing National Convention through which possible 
forms of government for the future of Newfoundland would be debated and 
recommended. Among the delegates elected in June 1946 - the first vote in 
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Newfoundland since 1932 -was Joey Smallwood who decidedly promoted the idea that 
Newfoundland should join Canada. Smallwood led a small group of delegates committed 
to the Confederation concept, but was outnumbered by a larger merchant and 
professional group of delegates who preferred a return to responsible government. 
Although those delegates blocked Smallwood's attempt to have Confederation with 
Canada appear as a choice before the Newfoundland electorate, the British government 
intervened following dissolution of the National Convention in January 1947 to ensure it 
was considered. Following two referenda in June and July, 1948, Newfoundlanders opted 
to join Canada by a small margin of victory; Terms of Union negotiations were underway 
with Canada by the fall of 1948.25 
Just over a month after what was undoubtedly the most significant vote in Newfoundland 
history the Commission of Government implemented its own Workmen's Compensation 
Act on September 2, 1948.26 Not only was this anticlimactic in historic terms, the 
amendments were incremental and the law itself remained a mere employers' liability act. 
As for the Commission's anticlimactic timing, there appears to have been little to be 
gained by the introduction of the minor amendments. It could not, for example, have 
served as an inducement to affect the referenda in any way because the decision to join 
Canada was already made. It is noteworthy though that the Act was implemented in the 
middle of the highly disruptive 1948 railway strike which, having begun in June, would 
not end until November. While the strike itself was about wages, the introduction of 
beneficial, even if limited, labour legislation would have provided the Commission of 
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Government with an opportunity to appear to be responding to labour issues and 
concerns.
27 But the amendments did not reflect the wishes oflabour or the general advice 
of Smallwood for fundamental systemic change. Ironically, considering his many years 
of advocating for improvements in Workmen's Compensation laws, Newfoundland's 
decision to join Canada destined Smallwood (as the eventual Premier of Newfoundland) 
to be ideally positioned to directly affect the course of the law. Perhaps the Commission 
of Government was satisfied to postpone a major overhaul of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act knowing that new leaders of the Canadian-province-to-be would 
emerge to do so, thereby demonstrating the benefits of confederation and strengthening 
the transition from colony to province. In any case, the Commission of Government's 
1948 Act was the last to reflect English influence in the style and substance of workers' 
compensation laws in Newfoundland. 
Chapter Summary 
As will be reinforced in the next chapter, the emergence of the Newfoundland Federation 
of Labour in the Conunission of Government era is an important factor in the evolution 
of workers' compensation laws. And, as Liddell found, no effective countervailing group 
representing the interests of employers emerged during these years. After 1936, the 
influence of the revitalized labour movement contributed to the requirement for the 
Liddell study and the creation of the Labour Relations Office. While substantive 
amendments to the compensation law were not realized through these years, for the first 
time a formalized consultation process was introduced inviting participation from labour 
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and employers. From a policy development perspective the environment was starting to 
become somewhat more complex involving bureaucracy and key interest groups, as well 
central decision makers. 
As discussed at the end of Chapter Two, path dependency is an effective theoretical 
model for assessing the development of compensation laws in Newfoundland. It suggests 
the English law inevitably continued to influence the direction of future laws once it was 
introduced to Newfoundland in 1887. And, so it did up for 61 years up to 1948. Another 
simple but clear factor influencing path dependency is illush·ated by Rose 's 1990 
comment that "politicians are heirs before they are choosers."28 This chapter shows that 
not only was the Commission of Government a program inheritor, but also given its 
caretaker status it is not surprising there were no major changes in the workers' 
compensation system between 1934 and 1948. This experience also support's Rose's 
observations that a durable (one not easily replaced) program is less likely to be 
significantly changed.29 Whether it was failure or inability of the English Commissioners 
to identify acceptable program alternatives, or whether they were simply dealing with 
larger questions of economic and political stability in Newfoundland, the unique 
Commission of Government years obviously influenced path dependency regarding this 
legislation. 
Pushing the susceptibility to path dependency argument further Pierson focuses on the 
potency of increasing returns in political processes. He points to political processes 
factors such as collective activity in politics, the central role of change-resistant 
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institutions, political power imbalances, and ambiguous political processes as being 
promoting increasing returns. 30 In this regard, the 1934 to 1948 period hits all four 
factors. Generally speaking, any systemic workers compensation decision of significance 
is collective in nature since it will likely affect the interests of workers and employers. As 
for change-resistance, the basic law had been in place since 1887 and without any 
obvious reasonable replacement the likelihood of change was very low. As for power 
imbalances, it was clear through this period that labour was unable to gain the ear of the 
Commission of Government. The rebirth of the organized labour movement in 
Newfoundland in the 1930s caused disruption because the Commission of Government 
(perhaps dealing with broader priorities) was unable or unprepared to deal with local 
labour relation concerns. That breakdown eventually resulted in the need for the Liddell 
process and, eventually, the creation of the Labour Relations Office. In turn, with the 
involvement of the buffering Labour Relations Officer, the process of resolving labour 
relations matters such as workers' compensation policy development was further refined 
to include public consultation in 1947. While employers were totally silent during this 
time period this does not mean they were powerless - as Pierson notes power may 
sometimes be hidden from view. Employers may very well have been silent because the 
existing system had provided enough positive feedback over the decades, or increased 
returns, that continued slow evolution of the system was in their interests. These 
examples demonstrate how the Commission of Government eventually managed to 
process local concerns at the institutional and political level in a manageable fashion, 
thereby creating acceptable alternatives for incremental decision making. Finally, to cap 
Page 96, Chapter 4 
----------------------------------------------
off the political processes factors that contribute to increasing returns, these examples 
also point to the prevailing and associated levels of political ambiguity associated with 
the growing policy environment. 
It is also important to note the broadening of an institutional dimension. The environment 
was becoming more complex involving not only the law, courts, employers, and 
individual workers, but it now featured bureaucracy (albeit small), key interest groups, 
and emerging public consultation processes. A useful theoretical approach for assessing 
political change over time - with implications for increasing returns - is known as 
"historical institutionalism"3 1 and it argues that state and societal institutions can have an 
important and independent role in shaping political conflicts and policy choices. It 
advocates the study of political processes over time with, as the name implies, special 
reference to fundamental institutions, e.g., formal rules (laws), policy structures (courts, 
public agencies, bureaucracy), and norms (teamed and accepted practices).32 In 
particular, it advocates understanding of how political processes unfold over time and 
"often emphasizes critical moments in politics, distinctive developmental sequences, and 
the rigidities that make it difficult for social actors to escape from established paths."33 
The opportunity arises, therefore, to employ the historical institutionalism lens to assess 
when and why path dependencies continue - as they clearly did with the 1887 law until 
1948 - or when and perhaps why path dependencies get altered at critical moments in 
politics, such as 'breakpoints' in history when change or path divergence occurs. As we 
shall see in upcoming Chapters, distinctive breakpoints do occur but not often. 
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Chapter Five 
Adoption of Canadian Model: Birth of the "WCB" (1949- 1972) 
The entry of Newfoundland into Canada in 1949 marked the beginning of a major 
shift in workers' compensation policy in Newfoundland. This chapter analyzes events 
from 1949 to 1972. It will consider how and why Canada's newest province altered 
course significantly in 1949 by deciding to adopt the Canadian workers' compensation 
system. That decision represented a personal victory for Joey Smallwood and a huge 
success for organized labour. Both had advocated adoption of the Canadian system as 
early as the 1920s. Of course, 1949 marked the beginning of a 23-year period of 
Newfoundland history which would be dominated by the political dynasty of Joey 
Smallwood, the province's first Premier, and his Liberal party. The chapter considers how 
implementation of the new system was an important early success for Smallwood which -
to the extent that it mollified the political activism of labour - contributed to a 
strengthening of Smallwood's grip on power through the 1950s. The new policy direction 
was also a major victory for organized labour in Newfoundland. The chapter analyzes the 
instnm1ental role played by the labour movement in the evolution of the new system and 
briefly considers why the introduction of the new system was largely a non-event for 
employers. It also reviews general developments in the policy environment from 1949 to 
1972 and assesses changes in the degree of influence of the major partners, i.e., 
government, labour, and employers, upon the system. Changing dynamics between the 
groups, particularly labour and govemment, is considered against an important new 
institutional element in the policy environment, namely the Workers' Compensation 
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Board (WCB). The emergence and effects of the WCB as the central bureaucratic agency 
which administered the new system is examined. The chapter concludes with an 
assessment of Smallwood's loss of power in 1972 and the implications of that defeat on 
the future direction of workers' compensation policy in the province. 
True to the original mission carved out for itself in 1936, the Newfoundland Federation 
of Labour actively lobbied for its preferred pieces of labour legislation before, leading up 
to and after March 31, 1949. And, prior to Newfoundland's first general election as a 
Canadian province on May 27, 1949, the Federation's legislative committee sought the 
endorsement of its policies from the potential political leaders. The Conservative party 
leader refused to meet with the Federation, but the new Liberal party leader, Smallwood, 
openly accepted the Federation's proposals. Smallwood promised that, if elected, his 
Liberal government would enact, among other things, a new Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 1 Of course, improvements in workmen's compensation legislation had been a goal of 
Smallwood's for many years (see Chapter Three), so the promise to implement a new Act 
would have suited him ideologically. Plus, it may have been an easy promise for 
Smallwood to make considering that all Canadian provinces (including P.E.I. in 1949) 
had adopted the "Canadian model" and it was reasonable to think that Newfoundland 
would follow suit. With the assistance of labour, Smallwood swept the 1949 election by 
taking 22 of the available 28 seats in the legislature (with the conservative leader, who 
refused to meet with the Federation, among the losers).2 
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Among Smallwood's first actions as Premier was the appointment of a Labour Advisory 
Board with a mandate to review all labour relations laws across Canada and to adapt 
Newfoundland's laws where advisable. With respect to the Workmen's Compensation Act 
there is no indication that adapting to Canadian standards would be inadvisable, as 
suggested a decade earlier by Liddell. Also, it is well-known that Smallwood pursued an 
aggressive industrial diversification and modernization strategy for Newfoundland in the 
years after Confederation,3 so it is likely that adoption of the Canadian industrial model 
for workers ' compensation was an attractive option. In any case, by the end of 1949 the 
Labour Advisory Board presented government with a draft Workmen's Compensation 
Act based squarely on the· Canadian model.4 The Smallwood government acted quickly 
and the necessary legislation was passed into law in House of Assembly in the spring of 
1950.5 That session offered instructive second reading speeches from Smallwood and his 
new Minister of Labour, Charlie Ballam (the former labour leader). Ballam provided a 
succinct list of drawbacks associated with the pre-1949, British-styled employer liability 
laws and, in doing so, a predisposition towards the interests of labour: 
In the first place, there probably are many cases in which a workman does 
not realize that he has a right to Compensation and, therefore, does not 
claim or get any Compensation. 
In the second place, the workman, even if he knows his rights, is put 
through a great deal of trouble, legal and otherwise, in order to get 
Compensation, and sometimes, I have no doubt, the thought of facing 
Court Action is enough to put him off from seeking his rights. 
In the third place, the amount of Compensation under our present 
legislation is not very high, and when legal costs are involved, the net 
amount that arises from his claim may be entirely inadequate. 
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In the fourth place, a workman with an injury causing temporary or partial 
disability may be very reluctant to make any claim because it might 
prejudice his chances of getting fwiher employment with the same 
employer. 
In the fifth place, the employer may not have enough funds to pay the 
compensation Claim in which case the injured workman is in a won·y 
plight indeed. 6 
The Smallwood government was unable to put the new law into effect immediately. The 
legislation was a significant departure from the laws in effect prior to 1949. Not only did 
it propose covering more workers and providing higher benefits, there were major 
transitional challenges, not the least of which was the requirement to create a new 
administrative agency, i.e., the Board, to administer the proposed workmen's 
compensation program. In fact, a special Workmen's Compensation Committee7 was 
appointed to oversee the creation of the new agency and the overall development of the 
system following the passage of the Act. The Committee began its work on August 1, 
1950, and submitted its final report to government in January 1951, indicating a readiness 
to start the new system. Included with that final report was a set of 15 statutory 
an1endments which were, in their view, necessary or advisable before the implementation 
of the new system. Although the amendments were mainly of a housekeeping variety, the 
Committee added a schedule of Regulations and extensive changes to section 39 which 
governed the critical areas of quantun1 and entitlement criteria for compensation benefits 
covering temporary and pennanent disability, as well as dependency benefits. 8 The 
Smallwood Liberals had no difficulty accepting the changes and, ultimately, 
Newfoundland's new workmen's compensation system came into effect on April 1, 1951.9 
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It is not surprising that Newfoundland adopted the Canadian system after 1949. It might 
have been a predictable outcome simply on the basis of meeting Canadian standards 
because by 1951 the Workmen's Compensation Board system had been adopted across 
Canada. In that regard, the Labour Advisory Committee had specific instructions to 
review the laws of Canada. Furthennore, it cannot be overlooked that Smallwood, the 
new Premier, was a long-time advocate ofthe Canadian system. In retrospect, however, it 
is critical not to underestimate the influence of organized labour on the new workmen's 
compensation policy choice - it was, in fact, an election promise to them. Not only did 
the legislative achievements of the Liberal government in 1950 and 1951 reflect the long-
standing desires of the Newfoundland labour movement, key members from the 
Newfoundland Federation of Labour played integral roles in the development of the new 
labour laws, particularly the workmen's compensation act. To begin with, the Labour 
Advisory Board which recommended the Canadian model was dominated by unionists, in 
particular Federation of Labour unionists who had made improvements to the workmen's 
compensation act a major issue since their resurgence in the 1930s. 10 Magnifying that 
influence is the fact that the Labour Advisory Board reported to the Minister of Labour 
(Ballam) who was a founding member and past-president of the Federation of Labour. 
Furthennore, another founding member of the Federation - Irving Fogwill - was named 
Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Committee and, as such, was largely 
responsible for the establishment of the new Workmen's Compensation Board system. 
Additionally, Fogwill was appointed Chairman ofthe Workmen's Compensation Board in 
1951, and as an indication of the stability the system would enjoy in its initial years, he 
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held that position until 1967. Just as impressive is the fact he reported to the same 
Minister, Charlie BaHam, until 1966. 
Stability certainly was the order of the day throughout the 1950s for the workmen's 
compensation system, due in part to the success of the new bureaucratic agency at its 
centre - the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB). 1 1 The WCB was run by a 
government-appointed Chairman and two Comrnissioners 12 whose sole occupation was 
the effective administration of the Act. The presence of full-time curators to constantly 
oversee and review the operation of the Act was a major difference compared to the pre-
1949 laws. From 1951, the WCB had the authority to hire its own staff and by 1958 it 
was an organization of approximately 35 employees. 13 
A clear consequence of the WCB's bureaucratic specialization was increased capacity for 
policy analysis. While no major systemic policy changes occurred through the 1950s, 
there was a quickening in the pace of legislative amendments compared to pre-1949 
which may be directly attributable to the presence of the full-time WCB analysts. 
Between 1952 and 1959, for example, there were six more legislative amendments (seven 
if one counts the consolidation act of 1952). 14 The 1952 amendment increased the 
"waiting period" to four days. Waiting period is the length of time an injured worker was 
expected to go without income before being entitled to benefits. On its face that 
amendment appears contrary to the interests of labour. But it was actually somewhat of 
an improvement because when the Act was passed in 1951 there was a combination three 
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and six day waiting period formula. Workers had to go three days without income before 
they could receive compensation, but they would receive retroactive compensation to the 
date of disability if they were off longer than six days. While the new amendment 
increased the initial wait by one day, it reduced the length of time necessary to receive 
full retroactive compensation by two. There may or may not have been a relationship, but 
it is interesting to note for comparative purposes that the neighbouring province of Prince 
Edward Island reduced its waiting period from seven days down to four days in April 
1952. The Nova Scotia Act was amended in 1953 lowering its waiting period to five 
days. 15 Also of note, but an anomaly in the Canadian context, the province of Alberta 
eliminated its waiting period in 1952.16 In the interest of Newfoundland workers, the 
1956 amendment increased the compensation benefit rate from 66 2/3 percent to 75 
percent of gross income. 17 This followed a clear Canadian trend of increasing benefit 
levels in this range. 18 And, one of the sections amended in 1958 introduced modest 
vocational rehabilitation service provisions for injured workers. 19 These various 
amendments serve as evidence of the continuing influence of labour upon policy choices, 
since all of these were quite favourable amendments for their side. 
Labour's Surprising Loss of Influence 
Surprisingly, however, organized labour grew weaker m Newfoundland following 
Confederation. It did not grow stronger as one might have expected based on its 
resurgence, growth and political influence in the years prior to and immediately after 
1949. The reasons for labour's decline in influence vary, but appear to have been rooted 
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in loss of initiative. Contributing factors included the loss of prestige as the once national 
Federation of Labour settled into its role as a provincial body; the attention of large 
unions shifted to their national or international affiliates; grassroots organizing drives 
were no longer necessary because most groups in the province that could be organized 
already were; and, paradoxically, the fact that the business of unionism became more 
complicated after 1949 as a result of various labour legislation for which it had 
advocated.2° From a workmen's compensation perspective, for example, the unionists had 
clearly reached a pinnacle in 1951 with the passage of legislation it had craved for 
decades. Then there were basic improvements in the legislation during the 1950s. To the 
successful unionists it may have appeared unnecessary to maintain a struggle for major 
improvement or, alternatively, unnecessary to rely on the union given the beneficence of 
governments since Confederation. 
Another factor which may have contributed to this overall loss of initiative is that key 
unionists, such as Ballam and Fogwill, went into politics or government service following 
Confederation. Such involvement likely had the double effect of exacerbating the loss of 
leadership and elevating a sense of complacency. Unions might have perceived the 
emergence of Ballam and Fogwill as having their own representatives in govenunent as 
they entered these comfortable years. In the ten years between 1946 and 1956, the 
number of people in unions fell by ten percent, but the largest difference during these 
years was the decline in interest and enthusiasm.2 1 
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Unfortunately for the unions it was no time for weakness. A loggers strike occurred in 
March 1959 and became a major crisis. Organized labour, particularly the Federation, 
battled against Smallwood and the owners of the Grand Falls paper mill in the infamous 
International Woodworkers Association [IWA] strike of 1959.22 While room does not 
permit a detailed account, it was a defining moment in the relationship between unions 
and the Smallwood government. In short, Smallwood's legislative actions - which 
outlawed the IWA attempt to establish a new loggers union - branded him anti-union, and 
his government's relationship with labour following the IW A sttike becan1e highly 
strained. The union forces would not easily recover from their defeat in 1959, but the 
event shook the unions from their post-Confederation complacency and served as a 
turning point from which the Federation, in particular, was forced to reassess its long-
held policy of non-direct political involvement. The major rift between government and 
labour was so pronounced that the unions boycotted many government processes and 
there was to be no real attempt at fence mending until the Smallwood government was 
finally defeated in 1972.23 In the aftermath of the IW A strike Federation of Labour union 
membership fell precipitously from 22,328 in 1958 to nearly half that number in 1965, it 
lowest point in 30 years. 24 
While the influence of the WCB and labour is notable after 1949, the same cannot be said 
for the degree of influence of employers in relation to the system. Employers were 
traditionally unorganized, as discovered by Liddell in 1940, and it was no different after 
Confederation. On the other hand, employers were given little or no reason to be 
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interested or concerned with the new system when it was introduced in 1950. In fact, 
employers were totally discouraged from developing an interest in the functions of 
workmen's compensation and were told to pay premiums and do nothing else. If 
employers were not organized enough to represent their general interest before Liddell in 
1940, they certainly were not encouraged to do so based on Smallwood's advice in 1950: 
All the employer has to do with the Workmen's Compensation is pay the 
costs, and nothing else. He doesn't pay the individual costs to an 
individual worker; he doesn't pay the individual costs to the dependants of 
a worker who has been killed. What he does do is contribute regularly into 
a fund which the Act sets up. He doesn't detennine the size of the fund . He 
doesn't have anything whatever to do with the fund. He has no jurisdiction 
over the fund; no responsibility for it; no control over it. His only 
connection with the fund as an employer is to pay in to it at certain stated 
intervals so much for each individual employee in his employ. The 
employer's connection with this legislation begins and ends with the 
payment by him into the fund on behalf of each individual employee of 
the amow1t assessed upon him by the Workmen's Compensation Board.25 
And the amount assessed upon employers was known as the assessment rate. Employers 
paid an annual assessment rate based on the size of their payroll and level of risk -
derived from demonstrated claims cost experience - in their industry. The average 
assessment rate paid by Newfoundland employers in 1952 was $2.04 per $100 of payroll. 
This was a deliberately high rate for the first year of operation because expected costs 
could not be predicted with absolute certainty.26 But assessment rates were quickly 
lowered to $1.63 in 1953; employers enjoyed these low rates for the following decades. 
In retrospect, the relative financial stability, along with general admonitions from the 
politicians to stay out, merely reinforced an already established pattern of employer non-
involvement in the work injury insurance system in Newfow1dland; a pattem that would 
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persist until the early 1980s.27 
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By 1958, there was a slowly changing attitude in government toward the system. 
Attention focused on the administrative practices of the WCB when the number of Board 
employees came into question. Smallwood didn't argue against the Board's competence, 
but he felt government had certain rights related to the administration of the Board which 
was nothing less than "a creature of the Government."28 That year another amendment 
gave the Smallwood government a right to hire three key managers (in addition to the 
Chairman and two Commissioners). No doubt this move provided government greater 
influence at the Board. In retrospect, the deeper infiltration of government into the affairs 
of the Board may have represented government's reaction to the fact that the Board had 
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operated so independently since 1951. It is intriguing to note that it had been Smallwood 
himself who preached the virtues of a strong, independent Board when it was established 
in 1950.29 But, the comments of the Attomey General in the House of Assembly very 
succinctly capture the new questioning attitude of the Smallwood government regarding 
the WCB in June 1959: 
Up to now, they have been a little municipality, a little kingdom of their 
own. Nobody knows what they are doing. Everybody has confidence in 
the Board. There is no question of a lack of confidence. Everybody has 
confidence in them, but any Board after a while is apt to get slack. 30 
Creation of the Statutory Review Process 
In 1959 the most significant amendment of the past decade occun·ed. 31 That amendment 
provided for the appointment, at least once every five years, of an independent review 
committee of at least three members to review, consider, report and make 
recommendations to Cabinet regarding all matters respecting the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, Regulations and overall system administration. In fact, this 
amendment copied the unique Saskatchewan approach; Ballam stated that government 
was aware that a statutory review process was followed elsewhere in Canada and there is 
no doubt that the amendment mirrored Saskatchewan's 1945 amendment.32 A critical 
feature of the review committee is that its membership would equally represent the 
interests of employers (contributors) and workers (beneficiaries). Since 1959, the terms 
"Statutory Review Committee" and "statutory review process" have been applied to 
describe these regularly scheduled evaluative processes. The review committee reports 
contain non-binding recommendations only and government makes all final judgments 
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and decisions concerning what, if any, changes it will accept. 
The idea of periodically reviewing WCB operations was not unique to Saskatchewan and 
Newfoundland. By 1959, in fact, there was somewhat of a Canadian trend of 
governments reviewing their WCB. But the other provinces had employed periodic Royal 
Commissions to review their systems, including Ontario (1913, 1932, 1950), and British 
Columbia (1942, 1952). Furthermore, Royal Commission reports were delivered in 
Manitoba and Nova Scotia in 1958.33 The most common perspective regarding the 
benefits of formalized reviews of WCB operations is expressed in the (extremely well-
written and researched) report of British Columbia's third Royal Commission: 
The WCB is no different from other administrative bodies which are 
possessed of more or less absolute power. Unless someone is "constantly 
looking over its shoulder," it will tend to lapse into a laissez-faire attitude 
and to be content with things as they are. If those who feel they have been 
the victims of injustices are powerless to do anything about it, there is an 
ever-present danger that complaints with administration will be shrugged 
off and that there will be no exercise of imagination to the end that 
improvements will be made. 34 
However, the Smallwood administration may have had mixed reasons for introducing the 
statutory review process in 1959. A questioning attitude concerning WCB operations had 
in fact developed. Clearly the 1958 effort to gain greater influence in hiring senior 
managers of the WCB demonstrated Smallwood's desire for more control over the 
agency. Furthermore, as Minister Ballam indicated that by 1959 the WCB was handling 
approximately two million dollars in employer contributions annually, providing an 
additional reason to introduce a process of checks and balances over the WCB.35 As well, 
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various concerns with the WCB reflect the general experience of the other Canadian 
provinces at about that time. In this regard, there was the readily available example of a 
statutory review process in Saskatchewan. It is not known why the government opted for 
the Statutory Review model and not the Royal Commission approach as followed in all 
other provinces. One can speculate, however, that the Royal Commission approach may 
have been considered too expensive or intensive for local needs at that time. Finally, it is 
noteworthy that the legislative tightening of WCB controls occurred immediately after 
the IW A strike; while no evidence is found to support such a conclusion, it is interesting 
to speculate that government may have been motivated by threats of loss of political 
power. 
Neary has described Smallwood's premiership in terms of three distinct periods: 1949 to 
1957; 1957 to 1968; and 1968 to 1972.36 The first period is characterized by provincial 
integration within the Canadian system and the solidification of Smallwood's hold on 
power. The stability of the workmen's compensation system during the same period 
substantiates Neary's categorization. The stable, self-controlling WCB left to establish 
itself in the Canadian style meant few, if any, political problems at government's 
doorstep. The second distinct period from 1957 to 1966 period is characterized by the 
threat of lost political power. Generally, Smallwood's move to secure greater control over 
the WCB in 1958 is behavior consistent with Neary's observation that Smallwood acted 
as if threatened. Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the statutory review 
amendment of 1959 was passed in the House less than four months after the IW A strike. 
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To the extent that Smallwood may have viewed the labour oriented leaders overseeing 
the WCB as potential enemies, the implementation of the statutory review mechanism 
would have ensured government influence at regular intervals. The remainder of this 
chapter involves an examination of events leading up to and including the third distinct 
period [1968 to 1972] when Smallwood's hold on political power weakened and was 
eventually lost. 
Against the background of apathetic employer involvement, loss of labour influence, 
more closely checked WCB and generic government suspicion, workers' compensation 
policy evolved somewhat unremarkably beyond 1959 with occasional incremental 
changes only. Following the 1959 statutory review committee amendment, there were six 
more amendments before the departure of Ballam as Minister in 1966.37 These were 
mainly minor housekeeping changes, involving minor adjustments to the scale of 
compensation, entitlement criteria, and internal administrative affairs of the Board. The 
first amendment in 1964 is noteworthy though because it reduced the waiting period for 
compensation following disability from four days to one day. Notwithstanding labour's 
general falling out with the Smallwood regime following the IW A strike here is an 
example of a significant new benefit for injured workers. Significantly, it was the third 
time the waiting period had been reduced since 1951. Overall, as a minor benefit 
improvement, it serves as an excellent example of the type of incremental policy change 
which characterized policy development since 1902. It also marked one of the final 
legislative improvements during the terms of Ballam and Fogwill, both of whom retired 
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in 1966 after turning age 65. 
In fact, notwithstanding the legislative encroachments by government in 1958 and 1959, 
the WCB remained very autonomous throughout the Ballam/Fogwill years (prior to 1959 
and up to 1966). In fact, Minister Ballam specifically refused to interfere in the 
operational matters of the WCB even though he was often prodded to do so by unions. 
Ballam often said, for exan1ple, that the WCB doing a better job with their investments 
than government. The fact that the WCB was consistently financially secure was another 
reason not to interfere (at least, failure in that regard would have provided government 
with an excuse for aggressive intervention if it had so desired). 38 In other words, even 
though the Smallwood government was interested in establishing more control and 
review mechanisms over the WCB, there were no buming political issues associated with 
the system in or immediately after 1959. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
even after the legislation was introduced in 1959 government did not use its power to 
appoint a review committee until five years later. The reality was, however, that 
government had captured significant control over major policy decisions and an 
opportunity to assess WCB operations every five years through a committee of its own 
choosing. 
As the Ballam/Fogwill era ended, the first Statutory Review Committee report was 
delivered in May 1966.39 The 1966 Statutory Review Committee process established the 
general pattern for future statutory review processes regarding the participation of labour 
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and employers. The Committee itself was balanced with equal numbers of employer and 
labour representatives. Although sensitive to the possibility of being seen to operate 
behind closed doors, it opted to avoid holding public hearings even though some written 
submissions expressed an interest in being heard . However, this was the first and last 
Statutory Review Committee process not to include public hearings. In fact, the public 
hearing process has been a major feature of statutory review processes ever since, 
particularly since the 1980s when the level of interest and patiicipation rates rose 
remarkably.40 Substantively, the 1966 report did not reconm1end any major systemic 
change. After 1966 there were a few incremental changes to the Act,41 but no major 
program or benefit changes. 
Although the 1966 Statutory Review Committee report recommended maintaining the 
status quo with respect to "waiting periods" (discussed above), the nature of the 
discussion on this topic characterizes the flavour of typical workers' compensation policy 
debate before the Review Committee. As an isolated example, the waiting period debate -
referred to as this "this vexed question" in the 1966 Tysoe Report in British Columbia, 
likely because of the long history of tinkering with the forrnula42 - illustrates the common 
manner and context in which specific policy matters are often discussed on a recuning 
basis in both Newfotmdland and Canada. In fact, the comparison with other Canadian 
provinces is a constant feature and major influence on the development of workers' 
compensation policy in Newfoundland. In any case, the process before the Committee 
involved: arguments and briefs from the key interest groups; some consideration of 
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history; some ideological discussion; cost-benefit considerations; and national and 
international experience. Each of these considerations is referenced in this excerpt from 
the 1966 Statutory Review Committee report dealing with waiting periods: 
... the briefs we have received reflect the differences of opinion to be 
found not merely between management and labour but between the 
jurisdictions. In the beginning the English standard of a seven day 
(waiting) period seems to have been followed nearly everywhere, but there 
has been a gradual and steady shortening over the years. Whatever length 
of "waiting" is chosen, there will always be cases in which it works some 
hardship, encourages malingering or exhibits some disadvantage ... The 
present situation across Canada is this. In Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick the period is four days; in British Columbia, Ontario and 
Quebec, three days; in Alberta, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, one day.43 
A notable interest group - the Law Society of Newfoundland - made a special 
presentation before the 1966 Committee. It disagreed that the WCB should have 
exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters coming before it. The Newfoundland Act, based 
on the Canadian model, contained a provision known as a privative clause which prevents 
court review, except in special circumstances (typically, where there is an error on a 
question of jurisdiction or law). The provision advocated by the Law Society was 
interesting because it chipped away at this original principle of the Canadian system. In 
addition to a right of appeal to the courts on questions of jurisdiction or Jaw, the Society 
advocated a right to appeal to court on questions of mixed law and fact. The phrase 
"mixed law and fact" potentially opened up new avenues of attack against WCB 
decisions. As a result of the submission by the Law Society to the Statutory Review 
Committee, government went on to confer this broadened avenue of appeal against WCB 
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decisions to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland. The theoretical effect of the Law 
Society provision was to expand the set of special circumstances for which WCB 
decisions could be reviewed by the court.44 That result may have interested lawyers and 
others who may have viewed the privative clause as a philosophical irritant, contrary to 
the rule of law. There also may have been those who resisted the rise of quasi-judicial 
bodies generally, or the WCB specifically. By 1966, for example, active members of the 
Law Society may have recalled the pre-1949 laws which clearly called for court action 
without interference from such government agencies. 
It is worth noting that the Smallwood government may have been predisposed to 
initiatives which acted to curtail WCB authority. The amendments of 1958 and 1959 
demonstrated government's bias against a powerful WCB. It is also interesting to 
speculate that if Smallwood was at all uncertain about who might replace the retiring 
Fogwill and Ballam, he may have been further biased toward measures which clamped 
down on WCB authority. By 1966 recall, Smallwood was, as Neary describes, deep into 
the phase where there were threats of loss of political power. 
Uncharacteristically, in fact, the amendment was out of step with the Canadian norm. 
This is best illustrated through reference to that section of the 1966 British Columbia 
(Tysoe) Royal Commission in which the possibility of expanding the right of appeal 
against WCB decisions to the court on questions of law, or mixed law and fact, was 
roundly denounced. Tysoe concludes that all industrial parties, especially the unions, in 
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British Columbia strongly believed that would be a step in the wrong direction (the Law 
Society of the British Columbia, or its equivalent, did not appear before the Tysoe 
Commission).45 Tysoe writes: 
... while complaining of alleged injustices perpetrated by the Board, (the 
unions) feel that a remedy for them that involves the introduction of rights 
of appeal on questions of fact to the Courts or to some other outside body 
or person would be worse than the disease ... Some of them advocated a 
right of appeal to the Courts on questions of law, including questions of 
interpretation of the Act. I cannot help feeling that thjs was based on a 
lack of appreciation of what is a "question of law" as distinct from a 
"question of fact" and of how few claims involve the forn1er alone. The 
truth is that practically every claim depends for its validity on matters of 
fact or mixed law and fact, and, so long as there be any evidence to 
support the factual finding of the Board, a right of appeal on a question of 
law would be of value (rarely) . ... such a right could become the cause of 
even more dissatisfaction ... It is very difficult to explain to a layman the 
difference between a question of law, a question of fact, and a ~uestion of 
mixed fact and law as it applies in his particular circumstances.4 
It is important to also note that in British Colwnbia (and Ontario, as noted by Tysoe) 
there was no interest in diminishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Boards. The Ontario 
view was reinforced the following year when the McGillvary Royal Commission noted 
that the "matter of appeal of WCB decisions (was) long debated (in Ontario), but (there 
is) strong resistance against formality or the emergence of an adversarial system."47 That 
said, it is also clear that by 1966, in British Columbia and Ontario, elaborate internal 
review processes were developing as safeguards against the absolute decision making 
authority of the WCBs.48 There were no such elaborate internal review systems at the 
Newfoundland WCB in 1966, and the final authority on all major decisions rested with 
the small group of Commissioners through very informal mechanisms.49 Other than the 
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Law Society push for the expanded appeal provision, there were no demands for alternate 
internal review systems in Newfoundland in 1966. [Different approaches to the same 
problem in these provinces at this time may be attributed to the fact that the Canadian 
model had been established in British Columbia and Ontario for about 50 years, but only 
15 years in Newfoundland.) By way of a concluding note on this topic, it is noteworthy to 
recall how the statutory review process was used to further special interest legislation. 
St. Lawrence Tragedy 
But, without doubt, the most significant contribution of the 1966 Statutory Review 
Committee report was the fact that it squarely addressed the tragedy experienced by the 
miners and famihes from St. Lawrence. St. Lawrence ranks, without equal, as the single 
largest (though slowest moving) industrial disaster in Newfoundland history. From the 
mid-1940s onward hundreds of miners died prematurely as a direct result of harmful 
exposures in the local flourspar mines. The 1966 statutory review report devoted ten 
often poignant pages to St. Lawrence and is an important milestone regarding the 
development of unique workers' compensation policy regarding the affected workers and 
their families. Ultimately, the review committee recommended the formation of a Royal 
Commission to study and make reconm1endations for legislative and other improvements 
for those suffering industrial disease because of harmful exposures to silica dust and 
radioactive gases at the mine. 50 
The first mine commenced flourspar extraction in March 1933 and operations continued 
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and expanded over the subsequent decades. 51 In 1933 the concept of workplace safety or 
safe working conditions was basically unknown. Instead of laws, regulations and policies 
governing workplace safety, miners (and all other workers for that matter) were governed 
by the laws of self-preservation. The first regulatory initiative governing mine safety - a 
regulation known as Safety of Workmen in the Mines of Newfoundland - did not come 
into effect until June 22, 1951.52 
Unfortunately, by the mid-1940s the community noticed a high, premature death rate 
among the miners. By the late 1940s an unusually large number of miners were afflicted 
with poorly diagnosed respiratory conditions. The first diagnoses of silicosis - a lung 
disease caused by prolonged inhalation of silica dust - were made in 1950, but the St. 
Lawrence workers did not respond to traditional treatments. They all died . In 1950 the 
provincial and federal government conducted a preliminary dust study noting that 
detailed environmental and medical would be necessary. However, the recommended 
detailed studies were not commenced until 1956 when reports of a high incidence of lung 
cancer - with the same deadly outcome for the workers - raised the necessity to include 
radiation measurements in the environmental studies.53 
During these years there were persistent complaints from the miners that something was 
very wrong. As a young officer of the Department of Labour, Ted Blanchard recalls 
visiting the community many times beginning in 1952. It was during the 1950s that he 
first met what he described as seriously concerned and committed union officials. In 
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particular, and as an example of the kind of leadership which brought the miners' 
concerns into governmental circles in that era, Blanchard remembers a Mr. Aloyisius 
Turpin. Turpin is described as a strong and determined president of the local miner's 
union who made it his full-time business to try and understand what was happening at the 
mine. Blanchard recalls that the first time he personally ever heard the word "radiation" 
was from Turpin. Through the 1950s and 1960s Turpin and the union adamantly argued 
that radiation in the mines was responsible for killing the unusually high number of local 
men. Blanchard credits the union and leaders like Turpin with consistently pushing the 
matter to the forefront through sheer determination. 54 
Frustrations mounted during the 1950s as senous shortcomings associated with 
entitlement to benefits under the Workmens' Compensation Act were realized. The 
Newfoundland Act simply did not recognize lung cancer and many other respiratory 
ailments experienced by the St. Lawrence miners, such as tuberculosis and chronic 
obstructive lung disease, as being occupationally related.55 As a result the WCB rejected 
many claims. In effect, the WCB was obliged to carry out a legislated benefit system ill-
designed to compensate for permanent chronic disability of the nature suffered in St. 
Lawrence. Adding to the troubles, there was no entitlement whatsoever for the families of 
those who died before the new Act came into effect in 1951. The miners and their 
families felt slighted and were decidedly uncomfortable with the bureaucratic and quasi-
judicial WCB environment in which many were increasingly involved as they appealed 
for compensation. When compensation was payable the amount of disability pensions 
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payable under the Act did not adequately compensate for their financial and other losses. 
Not surprisingly, the reputation of the WCB among these fam ilies was seriously 
damaged.56 
Workers' compensation policy development regarding the recognition of certain diseases 
as being occupationally related is an inherently incremental process. In the realm of 
occupational epidemiology scientific knowledge emerges slowly - dependent upon a 
range of factors- and often presents ambiguous results. 57 Commenting on why the WCB 
had not compensated the lung cancer claims of St. Lawrence workers through the 1950s, 
Fogwill said: "Why wasn't (lung cancer) included (under the Act)? Because medical 
science had not caught up with the developing situation!"58 The Royal Commission 
produced evidence to show that Newfoundland was not unique (or "behind the times", so 
to speak) in the range of industrial diseases it covered through the 1950s. 59 These 
succinct observations highlight the fact that govemment/WCB policy making regarding 
the coverage of certain occupational diseases was highly incremental in nature, being 
heavily reliant upon scientific proof of association. 
Following the investigations in the late 1950s which the confirmed presence and 
significance of deadly radon gas in the mines (secondary to a large, low-grade uranium 
deposit abutting the mines), the first major policy decision regarding entitlement for St. 
Lawrence workers occuned in 1960. At that time government amended the regulated 
schedule of industrial diseases, retroactive to April 1, 1951, to include "carcinoma or 
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malignant disease ansmg from radiation as a disease associated with any process, 
employment or occupation wherein radiation, x-rays or radioactive materials or 
substances are involved."60 While that was a big step forward, there were many 
outstanding issues and concerns left for argument and review through the 1960s. 
Primarily, not all aberrant lung diseases, such as tuberculosis and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, would be readily acceptable by the WCB under the schedule of 
industrial diseases. Another major concern related to the legislative requirement that the 
dependants of a deceased worker had to prove that the worker died within a period of 
twelve months from the time he last worked in the mines. That statutory requirement 
caused great difficulties for the families - and the WCB - associated with proof of claim. 
As an effective example of the incremental nature of policy development regarding St. 
Lawrence, it remained in the legislation until amended on July 1, 1967.61 The timing of 
tills legislative improvement (just after the Royal Commission conm1enced) suggests that 
it was a direct outcome of the May 1966 Statutory Review report. This indicates the 
concerns of the workers and their representatives were heard and understood, and that 
they gained new benefits via the statutory review process. 
Given the incremental approach to a difficult, but major problem, it is relevant to ask 
whether the St. Lawrence workers were adequately represented.62 Perhaps, it is 
speculated, the St. Lawrence membership might have been represented more effectively 
and forcefully if there had been better local linkages (with the Federation of Labour, for 
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example) rather than depending upon support from a national mainland body.63 This line 
of speculation presupposes that more concentrated political pressure upon government 
might have moved important issues up government's policy agenda more quickly. 
Effective representation from the provincial Federation of Labour in the early 1950s 
might have promoted resolution of the federal/provincial bureaucratic log jam and sped 
up the requested studies, especially considering the evidence from the early to mid-1950s 
which indicates that the Smallwood government had a highly favourable relationship 
with labour. Whether the slack federal/provincial response was the product of basic, 
bureaucratic irresponsibility or a result of poor understanding of federal/provincial 
relations (possible perhaps, considering the Newfoundland bureaucrats were new to the 
federation) is moot. The failure to initiate investigative processes and formal studies 
sooner likely slowed the overall government/WCB policy response (which in the case of 
industrial disease is shown to be sensitive to the accumulation of scientific evidence). 
As for more effective representation before government, it is unlikely, given the nature of 
the falling out between Smallwood and labour generally following IW A strike, that the 
St. Lawrence workers were disadvantaged in any way because they lacked association 
with the Federation of Labour after 1959. As demonstrated, their issues were 
meaningfully communicated through the 1966 Statutory Review process without local 
union affiliation or support. Furthem1ore, through the 1960s organized labour in 
Newfoundland had not received satisfactory support or action from the Smallwood 
government or the WCB in the general area of occupational health and safety. Although 
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the WCB had carried a mandate for safety and prevention since its inception in 1950, 
safety initiatives did not receive a high profile. The concept of safety and prevention 
grew very slowly from the hiring of one "safety" man for three months in 1953, to the 
eventual formation of a modest division with a couple of safety officers or inspectors 
involved in education and enforcement throughout the 1960s.64 During those years the 
unions were pressuring government to provide improved health and safety standards. 
They were driven by growing awareness of issues related to industrial disease learned 
mainly from their mainland affiliates, but also based on the acute local experience at St. 
Lawrence.65 The industrial unions were berund this push and, the Steelworkers union in 
particular, was among the leaders advocating improved health and safety laws and 
administration in Newfoundland.66 Their general concerns were complicated by the fact 
that the administration of health and safety laws was highly fragmented involving not 
only the WCB, but also numerous other depa1tments such as mines and health. Through 
the late 1960s, however, the unions' request for improved services fell on deaf ears with 
Smallwood and WCB executives.67 
A factor which may be raised as contributing to delayed reactions regarding the St. 
Lawrence dilemma is the fact that the losses occurred slowly and privately over of many 
years in a small community, geographically isolated from St. John's decision makers. The 
drawn-out burden of an unfamiliar and silent industrial killer- with rates of death spaced 
as latency periods varied from individual to individual - may not have been powerful 
enough to evoke the kind of political and social reactions that would have flooded them if 
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all miners somehow died suddenly in a single catastrophic accident.68 Nothing has been 
found to support this, but it is interesting to consider how sudden disasters often receive 
dramatic and quick fixes (though this may simply be explained because cause and effect 
relationships are more evident in sudden events). 
In retrospect, 1966 Smallwood's political dominance was unquestionable - he won 39 of 
42 seats in the general election that year. But by 1968 there were mounting pressures on 
him to resign. Smallwood was, as in Neary's analysis, into the third phase of his 
premiership and his grip on power was slipping. For example, by the late 1960s 
organized labour across the island had regrouped and become more vocal against 
Smallwood in what was an "age of activism" and militancy.69 Labour's concerns varied, 
but in part their dispute with Smallwood was an overdue reaction to his treatment of the 
labour movement during the 1959 IW A strike. Gillespie explains that the story of 
unionism in Newfoundland at this time, particularly as a factor leading to the downfall of 
Smallwood, is the story of the rise of public sector w1ions, the Fishermen's Union and 
women.70 With respect to showing concern with or attempting to exert influence upon the 
workers' compensation system at that time, however, these unions were not a factor. In 
1970, for example, workers' compensation coverage was not in place for independent 
fishem1en and would not be a major concern for the fishermens' union for another 10 
years. There was no specific entity or lobby group representing the interests of women in 
the workers' compensation system (interestingly, the system was still referred to as 
'Workmen's' in 1970). Additionally, the public sector unions were less interested m 
Page 127, Chapter 5 
workmen's compensation issues because their employments were generally less risky and 
they generally suffered fewer reportable injuries. Furthermore, negotiated "top up" 
provisions in the collective agreements of public sector unions ensured no loss of income 
in the event of having to file a workmen's compensation claim (the employer agreed to 
"top up" the 75 percent of gross compensation benefit with a 25 percent supplement). 
Even though certain labour groups expressed their general concern and discontent,71 
workers' compensation (and health and safety) policy continued to evolve slowly 
throughout the 1960s with only occasional legislative changes, including some beneficial 
St. Lawrence sections.72 But the changes were decidedly incremental with no 
fundamental systemic change. 
By 1969 there is evidence that the Smallwood government was either avoiding important 
workers' compensation policy decisions, or reluctant or unable to carry them out. 
Smallwood's reaction to the St. Lawrence Royal Commission report is a clear example. 
The Royal Commission report was presented to government in July 1969 and it 
recommended sweeping changes to extend very broad coverage, including disability 
pension and death benefits, to the occupational disease victims and families of St 
Lawrence.73 There was, however, no immediate response from government. 
Coincidentally, by the summer of 1969 political pressure building against Smallwood 
was intensifying and the events of that swnmer and fall drove Smallwood into a fight for 
political survival. Not least among the threats was direct pressure from discontented 
young government members from within the Liberal party including John Crosbie and 
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Clyde Wells. In fact, in October 1969 Crosbie unsuccessfully challenged Smallwood in a 
hotly contested leadership convention. In retrospect Smallwood's decision to delay 
decision on the Royal Commission may have been highly poli6cal, perhaps because he 
would have preferred to avoid the difficult subject matter, or merely because it was not a 
priority, when he was otherwise fighting for political survival. Generally, it may be 
concluded this was not a period conducive to radical policy development.74 
In any event, government delayed the release of the St. Lawrence Royal Commission 
until March 1970. Arguably, the July 1969 to March 1970 delay was necessary to allow 
government to carefully fonnulate a response. But that argument is not convincing. Not 
only did the Smallwood govenu11ent not implement the recommended legislative changes 
when the report was finally released in March 1970, Smallwood's only reaction was to 
appoint another (the provinces second) Statutory Review Committee. The St. Lawrence 
workers would have to endure another review process before any significant 
governmental policy decisions were made affecting their workers' compensation 
entitlement. Ultimately, it appears delayed response to the St. Lawrence Royal 
Commission recommendations was mainly for political reasons (if only indirectly due to 
Smallwood's preoccupation with defending the party leadership). 
As for the 1970 Statutory Review Committee appointed by Smallwood, it was a three-
man committee which promptly held four, low keyed public meetings in June and July 
1970 in Grand Falls, Comer Brook, St. John's and St. Lawrence.75 The Grand Falls and 
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Comer Brook hearings featured presentations from three unions from the paper mills 
while the St. John's sitting heard from the Newfoundland Branch of the Canadian 
Manufacturers Association only. Notably, a separate meeting was held in St. Lawrence 
where the Committee heard from a large and representative group and entered into a 
general discussion with respect to the predicament of the St. Lawrence miners. The St. 
Lawrence group was led by T. Alex Hickman, the local MHA. He presented a submission 
on behalf of the St. Lawrence Town Council and the St. Lawrence Worker's Protective 
Union. Ironically, Hickman had entered provincial politics in July 1966, just months after 
the 1966 Statutory Review Committee report was released, at Smallwood's request. 
Before entering politics Hickman served as a Bencher of the Law Society of 
Newfoundland from 1957 to 1966, and as Honorary Secretary of the society from 1958 to 
1966. Previously Hickman was called to the Bar of Nova Scotia in 1947 and to the Bar of 
Newfoundland in 1948. 76 Under Smallwood he entered cabinet as Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General before being elected as the Liberal member for Burin district 
(encompassing St. Lawrence) in the September 1966 election. His responsibilities 
increased in 1968 when he took on the additional portfolio of Health. To the surprise of 
many Hickman emerged as a last minute leadership "compromise candidate" less than a 
month prior to the October 1969 Liberal leadership race which featured Smallwood and 
Crosbie as the front runners. By 1970 major political upheaval was at hand and factors 
destined to significantly influence the history of workers' compensation policy, 
particularly related to the St. Lawrence workers, were set in motion. In fact, prior to 
representing the St. Lawrence workers at the 1970 Statutory Review Committee hearings, 
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Hickman - like other dissatisfied Liberals, including Crosbie - had left Smallwood's 
Liberal Party to join the energized Conservative Party and its newly elected and dynamic 
leader, Frank D. Moores.77 
Smallwood's final political defeat began with the October 1971 election in which no clear 
winner emerged; Moores' Conservatives held 21 seats, the Smallwood Liberals' 20, and 
there was one independent member from Labrador. Stalemate resulted when neither the 
Conservatives nor Liberals could win over the independent member, but (as was his 
right) Smallwood refused to resign since no party was able to demonstrate it could hold a 
majority in the House of Assembly. Smallwood did resign, however, in January 1972 
after the indecisive general election result was resolved when the Supreme Court 
confim1ed political newcomer Ed Maynard as Conservative member in the disputed 
district of St. Barbe (Maynard would go on to play critical roles in workers' compensation 
policy development) . A second general election was called in March 1972 and the 
Moores' Conservatives swept 33 of the 42 seats, conclusively ending Smallwood's 23 
year regime. The Progressive Conservative's march to power was marked by significant 
disenchantment with the long-lived Smallwood administration, popularly captured in the 
Conservative party slogan The Time Has Come. Among the victorious Progressive 
Conservative candidates was none other than T. Alex Hickman as the member for Burin 
district. As when he entered the Smallwood cabinet in 1966, Hickman went on to become 
Minister of Justice and Attorney General following the 1972 election. 
It was only after this political upheaval that the time arrived for very deliberate action 
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regarding the outstanding 1969 Royal Commission Report and 1970 Statutory Review 
Committee process. Early in July 1972, just months into the Moores' mandate, long 
overdue and highly favourable amendments regarding St. Lawrence workers were made 
to the Workmen's Compensation Act, as recommended by the Royal Commission.78 The 
new clauses provided automatic presumptions of entitlement for former St. Lawrence 
mine workers covering a broad range of any and all respiratory ailments, including 
tuberculosis and disabilities arising from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. This 
unilateral legislation eliminated the requirement for WCB adjudication processes, thereby 
providing swift relief from frustrations experienced by many. It is both historically 
interesting and revealing to note that the 1972 amendments were championed by 
Hickman. Generally, the July 1972 changes have been referred to as the "Hickman" 
amendments because he was the driving force behind the government effort to rectify 
matters as soon as they took power in March 1972.79 
Here is a unique example where individual interests and timing combine to contribute to 
significant policy change. Hickman was unable to bring about such dramatic change for 
his constituents when he held three powerful portfolios under the Smallwood government 
between 1966 and 1969, yet the change of govemment rendered quick action. While 
swiftly addressed in 1972, the amendments represented the culmination of incremental 
policy changes based on the weight of slowly accumulating deaths, studies, legislative 
changes, two Statutory Review, a Royal Commission, change of political regime, and, 
ultimately, irrefutable evidence that radiation was killing the miners. This policy 
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breakthrough may be best understood in terms of Kingdon's 'policy window' and ' policy 
entrepreneurs' concepts.80 A policy window arises or opens up when new circumstances, 
such as accidents, disasters or change of Government, create the environment and 
platfom1 for a change in policy direction. As with Hickman's opportunity, a policy 
window opened up "because of change in the political stream or . . . because a new 
problem captures the attention of governmental officials and those close to them."81 
While the policy window suggests timing plays an important role as a policy detem1inant 
when various influencing factors synergize to support desired policy outcomes, it is also 
pointed out that key political players - acting as policy entrepreneurs - take advantage of 
the environment to achieve their desired goals. 82 
As for the Statutory Review report it was released at the end of July 1972 (after the 
amendments). In fact, the report actually commented on the new legislation passed earlier 
that month! 83 Of course, that report had very little to do with the decision to expand 
coverage for St. Lawrence workers. The Report merely repeated the well-known history. 
This was two years after the 1970 hearings making it the first and only Statutory Review 
Committee report to date to be ordered by one party in govemment but delivered by 
another. That distinction may have contributed to the fact that it was the least 
consequential in terms of follow-up action by a government of all the Statutory Review 
Committee reports from 1966 to date. The report contained very few specific 
recommendations and where substantive recommendations were made they were rejected 
or ignored.84 For example, government rejected the recommendation that Canada Pension 
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Plan disability benefits (then a relatively new federal benefit)85 should be offset from 
compensation entitlement. In fact, govenunent and public opinion in that era of social 
activism was one of optimism with expectations for growth in social programming, not 
restrictions such as offsetting Canada Pension benefits. As it turned out, the growth and 
optimism regarding social programs in the 1960s and early 1970s was not a beginning, 
rather it was a climax in the history of Canada's social policy development (even though 
it was not recognized by most until the late 1970s and early 1980s).86 The Committee 
report itself testifies to the general mindset or state of expectations: " ... it would seem that 
social legislation, during the years which lie immediately ahead, may change so as to 
provide a more all-embracing coverage of social requirements. If so, it is doubtful that 
compensation law could remain unaffected by these changes. "87 
The positive and overdue changes regarding St. Lawrence allowed the new Tory 
government to side step the actual Statutory Review Committee report of 1970 and to 
avoid negative criticisms for doing so (although considering the passage of time and 
political climate, it is unlikely that was a major concern). On the other hand, one can 
imagine that the fresh, new Moores' government would not have been eager to deal with 
such negative and potentially controversial issues such as offsetting Canada Pension Plan 
benefits from compensation benefits. 88 Indeed, timing the release of the Statutory Review 
report with the St. Lawrence amendments put a feather in government's hat, so to speak, 
and created momentum for the new government by being seen to act quickly on a well-
known and troubling issue that the Smallwood Liberals had failed to adequately address. 
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Chapter Summary 
In review, Confederation with Canada was a remarkable path divergent event for the 
Province as a whole. Having shifted national allegiances in 1949, it is not surprising that 
Newfoundland officially adopted the Canadian workers' compensation system in 1951 , 
thus ending 64 years of British style employer liability laws. Viewed in simple tem1s, just 
as British law was emulated in 1887, the Canadian law was emulated in 1951. In fact, as 
the chapter demonstrates and this is a consistent future trait, Newfoundland would look to 
and often copy the practices of other Canadian Provinces. In other tem1s, it is critical to 
remember roles played by key players leading up to 1949. For example, given his 
position of power and long-held interest in the subject matter it is noteworthy that 
Smallwood's was an important contributory influence on the decision to adopt the 
Canadian system. It is also remarkable to recall the high degree of influence organized 
labour enjoyed on governments' workers' compensation policy at that time. One might 
even conclude that labour and the Smallwood government acted as 'policy entrepreneurs ' 
to ensure their desired system outcome was put in place following the 1949 
Confederation 'policy window' . This was an opportune time, especially when compared 
against the history from 1951 to 1972, during which time the fortunes of Smallwood 
(expressed broadly as political strength) and labour (expressed broadly as degree of 
influence upon government policy) would, respectively, rise and fall , and rise and fall and 
rise. And their relationship would tum from one of respect and tolerance (at least, if not a 
higher degree of mutual admiration) to hate from 1951-1959 and post-1959, respectively. 
Clearly labour lost a large degree of influence upon workers' compensation policy after 
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the 1950s. 
Also, as discussed at the end of the last Chapter, new, powerful institutions emerged after 
1951 , particularly the new legislation itself and the new WCB. As seen, and as will be 
discussed in subsequent Chapters, these two new institutions play a highly influential role 
in shaping policy question and answers. Even though Smallwood characterized the 
system a purely rational and functional policy choice, i.e., "All the employer has to do 
with the Workmen's Compensation is pay the costs, and nothing else", this will 
eventually be seen as wishful thinking.89 
Interestingly, the fortunes of the new WCB (expressed as degree of policy control and 
external respect) seemed to rise (1951-1959) and fall again after 1959 as well, as 
government introduced the Statutory Review audit process and as it faced criticism from 
labour secondary to St. Lawrence policies and a perceived lack of concern for 
occupational health and safety. This combination of interrelated factors and 
counterbalancing rising and falling of fortunes contributed to the fact that the 1951 - 1972 
period is characterized by incremental policy development. Not to be overlooked as a 
basic reason why this period was marked by slow development is that, based on the 
public record (including two Statutory Review processes), there was little in the way of 
strong reaction against what was a still a relatively new, welcomed system. That seems to 
have been especially the case prior to the mid-1960s after which labour did become more 
vocal. It is difficult to measure the true degree of labour's dissatisfaction with workers' 
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compensation policies through the 1960s because of their disjointed relationship with 
government. By the end of the 1960s, a degree of path dependent increasing returns had 
become associated with the new system, including political power imbalances, 
ambiguities, and change-resistant institutions and processes. 
Finally, it may be said that government policy inaction concerrung workers' 
compensation, St. Lawrence, and occupational health and safety stirred certain segments 
of organized labour and political leadership. And, to some degree, the desire for influence 
upon workers' compensation and occupational health and safety policy played a 
contributory role in the rising up and general militancy of the labour movement against 
the Smallwood government. Ultimately, Smallwood's final defeat and the advent of the 
Conservative government in 1972 marked created a policy window for progressive policy 
change. More importantly, as an historic trigger, it led to a series of developments and 
events which would interconnect to create dramatic changes in the workers' 
compensation system over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The next chapter covers 
these turns of fortune. 
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Chapter 6 
From Smallwood to Moores to Maynard (1972-1984) 
This chapter outlines changes in the workers' compensation system m 
Newfoundland from 1972 to 1984 and considers the political, institutional, social, 
economic, and other factors which contributed to those changes. Of cow-se, Smallwood's 
final defeat was a dramatic turning point in Newfoundland's political history, but with 
respect to workers' compensation policy it marked the unfolding of an environment 
which almost guaranteed change. At a governmental level, the new environment was 
mainly characterized by the commitment of the new Moores' govenunent to improve 
organizational efficiency and productivity within the public service. The chapter will 
assess how associated institutional initiatives, such as a new cabinet committee system 
and departmental reorganizations, would eventually influence the workers' compensation 
system. These political developments must also be considered against a background of 
social change in Newfoundland marked by reinvigorated private sector and ideologically 
charged public sector unions detennined to have their concerns known and acted on by 
government. 
Through these years organized labour consistently pursued greater levels of influence, 
fairness and equity in the administration ofthe WCB, its programs and benefits. Based on 
the experience of St. Lawrence and lessons learned from other jurisdictions, 
Newfoundland unions were highly vocal about the need for an improved occupational 
health and safety regime (of which the WCB was a part) by the early 1970s. The unions 
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also strongly believed that workers' compensation benefit levels were too low; those 
concerns were amplified when combined with the hyperinflation of the 1970s - an 
external determinant beyond the scope of provincial control. Workers' compensation 
benefits were improved in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but that contributed to new 
considerations and dynamics, particularly those related to the question of system 
affordability. The cost of the system increased quickly and beginning in the early 1980s 
concerns were raised about the WCB's ability to fund all of its benefit commitments. In 
fact, the concern for financial stability becomes a dominant concern and policy 
determinant throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
In addition to these influencing factors, the chapter also considers the effects of various 
Statutory Review Committee processes and reports of this period. These are institutional 
milestones by which major policy choices can be marked. The degree to which these 
processes are merely vehicles which facilitate inevitable change or whether they 
themselves determine policy direction is assessed. Ultimately, for the first time since 
1951 when the new Canadian model was put in place, the workers' compensation policy 
field in Newfoundland appeared primed for non-incremental systemic changes by the 
early 1980s. In fact, that change process was influenced to a remarkable degree by the 
tragic sinking of the Ocean Ranger oil rig and loss of 84 lives in February 1982. There is 
an assessment of how and why that catastrophic event created a policy window - see 
discussion at end of Chapter 5 - and was a turning point for the Newfoundland WCB. By 
1984, dynamic change occurs including the passage of significant new workers' 
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compensation legislation and the appearance of new administrative processes. The 
magnitude of these fundamental institutional developments is such that they themselves 
would be, increasingly, change-producing mechanisms affecting future policy and policy 
making processes. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of developments 
from 1972 to 1984 and sets the stage for the final chapters which will examine post-1984 
developments. 
Moores Government: Institutional Change & Influence of Organized Labour 
One of the more subtle factors influencing workers' compensation policy development in 
Newfoundland after 1972 was the drive for administrative modemization within 
government. It is critical to realize that before it won power the Moores government 
promised to introduce better planning and a more open, businesslike approach to the 
administration of govemment. 1 Almost immediately after taking office in 1972, Moores 
called for complete government reorganization in order to improve "administration and 
productivity."2 With respect to administrative restructuring there was a complete overhaul 
of governmental decision making. As Channing points out, policy development took on a 
complete new look under the Moores government.3 Specifically, cabinet decision-making 
processes were altered by the introduction of a powerful committee system through 
which the priorities and direction of the government would be more clearly focused and 
controlled. For example, all matters of a fiscal nature would be monitored through the 
Treasury Board committee (usually headed by the Minister of Finance) while the new 
Planning and Priorities committee (usually headed by the Premier) sorted and managed 
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the overall governmental agenda. The introduction of the centralized committee system, 
including the addition of seasoned bureaucratic officials to support it, meant that 
individual departments (the ministers and their officials) had more time to devote to the 
operation of their respective areas. It also resulted in a diffusion of power and authority 
so that the emergence of a dominant premier, such as Smallwood had been, would be less 
likely in the future. 4 
Blanchard cites the additional internal focus and capacity for analysis under the 
committee system as important factors which enabled the labour department to more 
closely examine matters associated with the WCB as they arose.5 With respect to the 
WCB, Blanchard (who by 1973 had been promoted to Deputy Minister of Labour) says 
there were many "glitches" through the 1950s and 1960s which the Ministers did not 
vigorously pursue. But that pattern gradually changed so that by the mid-1970s, and 
definitely by the 1980s, Ministers were more persistent in their requests for information 
about WCB decisions and operations. Also, when Ministers asked him to look into a 
workers' compensation matter as Deputy Minister he was generally reluctant to interfere 
and often recommended to Ministers that they not interfere on the grounds that 
historically the WCB operated independently with respect to decision making on 
individual cases. Furthem1ore, as a Deputy Minister he says he regarded the WCB 
Chairman as an equivalent colleague which would have lessened any inclination he might 
have had to dig into the system. As the Committee system evolved, however, bright, 
young mandarins (whose primary allegiance was to the role of their key central 
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committee, i.e., Treasury Board) appeared on the scene and they generally ensured much 
more follow up and examination of concerns as they arose. Overall this broad 
governmental initiative set in motion processes which would eventually facilitate change 
more readily as problems within the workers' compensation system came to the attention 
of government in a focused way, either through the Minister or directly to cabinet 
through one of its central committees. As it happened, the additional capacity for 
governmental analysis of WCB matters came at a time when complaints about the system 
. . 
were mcreasmg. 
For example, there is no doubt that early in its mandate the Moores ' government was 
challenged by an invigorated labour movement that consistently articulated demands for 
improvements.6 Fortunately for labour, the Moores' administration was willing to listen. 
And, for a generation of new labour leaders who had come of age w1der the Smallwood 
regime after 1959, progress was realized for the first time under Moores.7 Without 
question, labour drove workers' compensation and occupational health and safety matters 
onto the government agenda in the early 1970s.8 Labour had regrouped effectively by 
1972 and entered a remarkable period of growth which would eventually peak with 
provincial union membership of 77,026 by 1981.9 
As for employer participation and influence in 1972, it was low to non-existent. Groups 
such as the St. John's Board of Trade and the Canadian Manufacturers Association 
occasionally represented employer interests but nothing of consequence was 
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accomplished. As if confirming the limited role of employers, the 1972 Review 
Committee report casually commented that since employers funded the system 
government might 'think about' consulting them prior to legislative amendments. 10 By 
1972 employers were no more interested, nor any better organized with respect to, their 
participation in the system than when Liddell visited in 1939. As Smallwood commented 
in 1950, employers were expected to pay the bills, nothing more. In this regard, the bill 
was low and predictable within a range of 1.29 percent and 1.64 percent of assessable 
payroll since 1953 (see Figure 4, p. 115, Chapter 5). As discussed in the conclusions of 
Chapter 4, the low cost of the system may help explain why employers remained silent 
for so many years; that positive experience promoted increasing returns for employers for 
whom systemic status quo remained in their interests. 
As noted in Chapter Five, one of the first moves of the Moores' govenunent when it took 
power in 1972 was to implement sweeping legislation to improve workers' compensation 
entitlement for St. Lawrence miners. That quick and decisive action served as notice that 
the new Progressive Conservative government was predisposed to serious treatment of 
workers' compensation and occupational health and safety policy. Another early sign that 
WCB issues would be taken seriously by Moores occurred when the basic concept of 
safety was identified as a WCB priority. Although the WCB had caiTied a mandate for 
safety and prevention since its inception in 1950, safety was not given a high profile by 
the WCB. When the original Act was approved in 1950, Minister Ballam highlighted the 
important powers given to the WCB regarding prevention and hoped "that the (WCB) 
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will devote a great deal of its attention to this vital subject." 11 Yet the safety concept grew 
very slowly. The Board hired a 'safety man' for three months in 1953 and developed only 
a modest division with a couple of safety officers involved in education and enforcement 
by the 1960s. In 1972, however, the Board gave safety a higher profile by creating a new 
Safety Director position in addition to the existing two officers. 12 
That a sea change had occurred in 1972 was also signaled by the immediate appointment 
of Ed Maynard as Minister of Labour in 1972. Born at Green Island Brook on the Great 
Northern Peninsula, Maynard was 33 years old with a diversified employment history- as 
a teacher, policeman, electronics technician, and union organizer - who offered a unique 
background for the labour position at that time. It is noteworthy to recall that Maynard 
was secretary of the Northern Regional Development Association in 1969 and secretary-
treasurer of the Northern Fishem1ens' Union in 1970. The Northern Fishermen's Union 
was formed as a grassroots protestvmovement against unfair fish pricing and other 
negative practices of dominant fish buying companies. The action of this group 
contributed to the development of the large and powerful Newfoundland Fisherman, 
Food and Allied Workers Union (FFAW). 13 Although Maynard only spent six months as 
Minister of Labour in 1972, the fact that Moores chose him for that post served as 
another sign that labour issues would be taken seriously. 14 The appointment of Maynard, 
someone who had risen to a Cabinet position from the union ranks, was likely viewed as 
a victory of sorts for concerned labour representatives who, increasingly ignored by 
Smallwood and invigorated by the "age of activism", were convinced in 1972 that the 
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time for change had indeed come. It is noteworthy to mark Maynard's first entry into the 
governmental sphere of influence regarding workers' compensation policy because he 
would eventually be awarded leading govemmental and WCB positions from which he 
would play significant roles in shaping policy development. 
In fact, Maynard was moved back to into the labour portfolio in 1974. Due to 
governmental reorganization the name of the department had changed to Manpower and 
Industrial Relations; as a sign of further mandate assessment, the name of the department 
was changed again to Labour and Manpower in 1977. Meanwhile, in 1974 Maynard was 
told by Moores that labour relations and review of the occupational health and safety 
(OHS) system were his top priorities. 15 That government sought more hannonious labour 
relations as a priority is not surprising given the nature of union activism and growth, and 
the immediate past relationship with government. In line with that, any action by 
government in the area of occupational safety would have served as a demonstration of 
goodwill. As part of a continuing commitment to improve in this area the resources of the 
WCB safety division were modestly increased after 1972 so that by 1974 three new 
safety officer positions were added bringing the complement to six officers (including the 
Director). 16 
There are several reasons why OHS would have been treated as a priority under Moores. 
There was the clear history of labour demands to improve health and safety Jaws, and 
their administration. 17 In addition to local concerns and continuing fall -out from the St. 
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Lawrence expenence, Maynard recalls being heavily influenced by a general trend 
throughout North America for more stringent rules regarding the observance of 
workplace safety. In 1970, for example, a powerful piece of federal legislation known as 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was introduced in the United States. 18 
Major regulatory changes were also occurring in other Canadian provinces such as 
Saskatchewan where, in 1972, all OHS services (enforcement and education) were 
consolidated in one division within the Department of Labour. Furthermore, OHS within 
the province was genuinely viewed as an administrative and policy area in need of 
improvement. In fact, Moores initiated a review ofOH&S programs in 1973. 19 By 1974, 
it was the general consensus that the administration of health and safety laws in the 
province was highly fragmented involving not only the WCB, but numerous other 
departments, such as mines and health, who carried distinct mandates for health and 
safety. The disjointed nature of these responsibilities alone made the matter of OHS a 
natural candidate for review under the Moores "administration and productivity" 
initiative. 
While organized labour across the country and in this province were major influences, 
not all employers were in favour of increased government regulation and they lobbied 
against increasing regulations. Employers were not against safety per se, but they 
resented bureaucratic intervention by way of regulation. While many large employers 
were already evolving toward safety promotion and practices, many small to medium 
sized employers did not welcome government intervention. These various concerns were 
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made evident between 1974 and 1976 as government sponsored vanous public 
conferences and open-house discussions regarding these issues. 20 After a long process of 
study and consultation government finally consolidated the administration of OHS 
matters m 1978. As in Saskatchewan, government placed responsibility for all OHS 
matters within a division of the Department Labour and Manpower. This process 
culminated when the WCB safety division was transferred to the department on October 
1, 1978, thus endjng an era ofWCB responsibilitjes for safety.21 
The growing influence of the labour lobby and govemment's willingness to respond 
during the mid-1970s is aptly demonstrated by two workers' compensation legislative 
amendments in 1975.22 The first amendment was necessary because labour and 
employers, but mainly labour, were dissatisfied with the degree of responsiveness 
traditionally received from WCB executive; that level of responsiveness has been 
described as non-existent, secretive or (when given) poorly communicated.23 Labour, for 
example, often met and raised concems with the "political appointees" who comprised 
the WCB executive, but they were not satisfied with results and found it necessary to 
lobby government directly on substantive issues. In response, government amended the 
Act to create two new positions called Board Advisors, one representing the interests of 
workers and the other representing the interests of employers. 24 These part-time advisors 
would sit from time to time with the full-time WCB Commissioners (three "Board" 
members) to alert the WCB officials of the wants and concerns of their respective 
constituencies. The positions were expected to act as intermediaries between the two key 
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interest groups and the WCB with the general goal being to develop better lines of 
communication between the WCB and its main constituents. The amendment did not 
change the role or authority of the WCB or its executive in any way. The evidence 
strongly suggests that this an1endment was intended to placate labour, in particular, who 
had the pronounced feeling that they were shut out from and were unable to provide 
meaningful input into the workmen's compensation system, especially through highly 
insulated WCB Board members. 
In retrospect, the Board Advisor amendment did not satisfy labours' demand for effective 
representation. Even though the Board Advisor system was put in place in 1975, the 
record shows that there were continuing concerns with representation before the Board. 
In 1976, the lack of an "industrial voice" at the WCB, including labour (and employers), 
was noted again in an independent review of the WCB requested by Premier Moores.25 
Furthermore, there were recurrent external complaints about representation in 1977 when 
one of the labour unions called for the creation of a pem1anent, full-time labour Board 
member.26 On review it is not surprising that the Board Advisor system was viewed as 
ineffective and not achieving the previously expected goal of better communications. In 
1975, for example, the plan was for the full Board, including the two Advisors, to meet 
once every two months. In 1976 they met only four times and in 1977 they met only 
once. 
27 The swift decrease in frequency of these meetings helps demonstrate the general 
proposition that the Board Advisor positions were ineffectual. In conclusion, while the 
unsuccessful 1975 Board Advisor amendment indicated government willingness to try 
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new consultative approaches, it was not prepared, or perhaps had no clear alternative, to 
fundamentally alter the governance model at that time. 
The second amendment in 1975 was also beneficial for the interests of labour. It 
broadened the critical definition of "injury" to include disablement arising out of and in 
the course of employment.28 The definition of injury under the Act is vitally important. It 
is the fundamental coverage detern1inant. An ailment or disease is covered under the Act 
if it meets the injury definition; if not, there is no coverage. The effect of the disablement 
amendment was to expand coverage to include injuries that occurred gradually over time, 
such as subtle musculoskeletal sprains and strains secondary to repetitive motions at 
work, as opposed to narrowly defined "accidents" caused by obvious, sudden and 
traumatic events. Prior to this amendment the WCB was limited to accepting obvious 
physical injuries arising out of narrowly defined "accidents" only, e.g., trips, falls, cuts, 
broken bones, etc. 
This amendment was brought forward in Newfoundland at this particular time for several 
reasons. First, by the 1970s labour had successfully promoted a greater awareness of the 
causative relationship between various workplace activities and numerous injuries such 
as strains and sprains secondary repetitive or routine motions.29 In li ght of this, the 
amendment must be viewed as a victory for labour. Second, there was gover11111ent's 
willingness under Moores to embrace progressive policies which responded to the 
concerns of labour. Third, there was the emulation effect. Newfoundland was not alone in 
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this area because the very same type of amendment was introduced in other provinces 
years earlier, including Ontario as early as 1963.30 Provincial policy was being influenced 
by developments elsewhere in Canada. The long-term significance of the expansion of 
coverage which grew out of this amendment cannot be understated. But its effect was 
insidious, not immediate, as new types of injuries were gradually accepted by the system 
(secondary to slowly changing adjudication practices) and as workers became more 
aware of the possibility that their aches and pains could be claimed as work related. This 
is important from a Newfoundland historical perspective because by 1991 the definition 
of injury and the general process of accepting a broad range and increased number of 
claims was questioned on the grounds of possibly being too liberal and a major systemic 
cost driver.31 (Chapter Seven) While the disablement provision broadened the scope of 
coverage, it did not provide benefits to workers already on the system or to those 
experiencing traditional injuries. The latent potential for creeping, wider coverage in the 
future was quite likely not appreciated by many, if any, at the time. 
Labour Demands Fundamental Systemic Change 
Despite the efforts of the Moores' government to provide legislative improvements there 
was growing general dissatisfaction with the system in Newfoundland. Superficial policy 
changes, like ineffective Board Advisors or perceived incremental coverage 
improvements like the disablement provision, were not enough to stop the unrest. While 
beneficial, those kinds of changes did not address the real concerns which were driving 
labours requests for better representation. The fundamental problems were more basic. In 
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short, by the mid-1970s the central problem was the adequacy of benefits being paid to 
injured workers. There were two imp01iant flaws with the benefit system: low benefit 
structure in an inflationary economy and a systemic inability to fairly compensate for 
long-term disability. 
As regards the low benefit structures, in 1975 the compensation benefit for short tem1 
disability was 75 percent of pre-injury gross earnings. In addition, like the other Canadian 
jurisdictions which had traditionally done so, the Newfoundland Act placed a ceiling on 
the amount of earnings which could be compensated. In 1975, for example, the ceiling 
was $9,000.00. In other words, the most an injured worker could receive (on an annual 
basis) was 75 percent of $9,000.00, even if he or she regularly earned more than 
$9,000.00. That was problematic for high-wage earners in industrial umons m 
Newfoundland, and it became especially pronounced as their real wages rose 
significantly through the 1970s.32 Private industry groups, like the Labrador Steelworkers 
for example, were significantly disadvantaged as their workers incurred large loss of 
income in the event of disability. Furthermore, that fundamental problem was severely 
aggravated when workers' compensation benefits did not keep pace with the rapid onset 
of hyperinflation in the 1970s. 33 
The other basic problem with the benefit system was inability to fairly compensate for 
long-term disability. The disability benefit system in place since 1951 did not adequately 
compensate for permanent disability in many cases. Long term benefits were rigidly 
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structured based on a physical rating system which ignored the true financial effects of an 
injury, resulting in cases of over and under compensation.34 For example, if an office 
worker and a carpenter making $25,000 per year lost an am1 they would both receive the 
same monthly benefit for life, even though the office worker could retum to work with no 
loss of income but the carpenter could not with complete loss of income. There was 
general agreement that these kinds of inequitable results in individual cases was not 
acceptable. 
By the late 1970s, organized labour In Newfoundland was leading the fight for 
improvements on behalf of all workers. Organized labour was very dissatisfied with the 
workers' compensation system generally, and, in particular, the system's inability to 
provide adequate compensation to pem1anently disabled workers for economic losses 
associated with their injuries. Consider the following retrospective analysis by the 
Federation ofLabour: 
From the late 1950s to the mid 1970s many jurisdictions tried to 
amel iorate the problem (of under compensating in the case of long-term 
disability) by paying supplements. These supplements would increase the 
amount of benefit to unemployed permanently disabled workers to the 
equivalent of 100 percent benefit while the worker is looking for work or 
on rehabilitation. It soon became apparent that these attempts did not 
remedy the situation. The supplements when paid were only temporary. 
By the mid 1970s pressure for change was growing very strong ... Labour 
and injured workers were pressuring for improvements. We wanted more 
income coverage, i.e., 100 percent wages, better rehabilitation, and 
obligation on employers to hire disabled workers, and full compensation 
for those disabled workers who could not retum to work. We wanted the 
right to appeal our claims to an independent tribunai.35 
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These various issues were all cited as major concerns when another Statutory Review 
Committee was appointed in September 1976. After receiving 15 written briefs and 
hearing 16 oral presentations, the Committee responded with a list of 48. 
recommendations in its June 1977 Report.36 Even though there were many complaints the 
Committee did not recommend any major systemic changes. The recommendations were 
all incremental in nature, but generally favoured the interests of labour. For example, it 
reconm1ended increasing the compensation rate from 75 percent to 80 percent of gross 
for short-tenn disability and to 85 percent for long-term disability (although, ultimately, 
that recommendation was not followed by govemment).37 And by way of terse statements 
the Review Committee registered strong objection to the notion of integrating Canada 
Pension benefits, as had been reconm1ended by the 1972 Review Committee, on the 
grounds that integration with other social programs would "destroy the whole concept of 
Workmen's Compensation."38 Of course, such integration would have Jed to decreased 
benefit levels from the WCB. On the other hand, the Committee rejected the plea from 
unions, particularly the higher than average wage earning Labrador Steelworkers, to 
eliminate the ceiling on compensable earnings. Perhaps recognizing the fact that major 
concerns being expressed about the system related to insufficient benefit levels rather 
than representation, the Conm1ittee found little merit in the suggestion that a pen11anent, 
full-time labour Board member should be appointed. Instead the Committee concluded 
that the status quo - full-time Board members and the two advisory members - was 
sufficient. 39 Maintenance of the Board system, to strengthen their independence as quasi-
judicial decision makers, also meant that workers unhappy with WCB decisions would 
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not see a new system of appeals to an independent body, except to a Court on a question 
of law, or mixed law or fact. 40 
The main outcome of the 1977 Review Committee recommendations, however, was 
government's decision to enact a senes of changes in 1978, mostly mmor, which 
increased and adjusted the scale of compensation.41 Notable among the 1978 
improvements was the removal of the limitation on discretionary expenditures by the 
WCB for vocational rehabilitation which included efforts to return injured workers to the 
worker force or to retrain them. This amendment provided significant new benefits for 
injured workers. There was an immediate uptake in vocational rehabilitation services as 
total expenditures in this category grew steadily: $74,779.00 in 1978; $108,839.00 in 
1979; $178,099 in 1980; and, $294,880 in 1981.42 In this regard the 1977 Statutory 
Review report is a milestone which marks entry into a period of liberalization in which 
there would be increasing demands on the system to provide higher, richer benefits and 
broader coverages. As if foreshadowing a move into new territory, government also 
changed the name of the progran1 from Workmen's to Workers' Compensation in 1978.43 
Frank Moores resigned in 1979. He was replaced as Premier by Brian Peckford who won 
the Progressive Conservative party leadership in March 1979 and a general election in 
June 1979. Peckford is best remembered for personal devotion to resource policy 
throughout his tenure as premier. There is nothing to indicate that Peckford ever had a 
strong personal interest or background in workers' compensation policy. But, like Moores 
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in 1972, when Peckford's electoral mandate commenced in 1979, workers' compensation 
was a troubled policy whose administrative agency, i.e., the WCB, was increasingly 
under general attack. In retrospect, it seems logical to assume that Peckford would have 
wanted solutions or, at least, to find someone with an interest and experience to help 
guide government's management of workers' compensation policy. 
Beginning of the Maynard Years 
As it tumed out Ed Maynard, who Peckford had appointed Industrial Development 
Minister in his first cabinet following the March 1979 Progressive Party leadership 
contest, lost his bid for re-election in June 1979. Actually Maynard had run 
tmsuccessfully against Peckford for the leadership in March 1979, but (wisely, in 
retrospect) backed Peckford on the second ballot at the convention.44 
At the time of the June 1979 election, the 61 year old Chairman of the WCB, W.J. (Bill) 
May, was preparing for semi-retirement. Like Irving Fogwill, May was a former 
Newfoundland Railway worker and Federation of Labour activist who played an 
important role in the development of the WCB system beginning in 1949. Not only did he 
sit on Smallwood's Labour Advisory Board, he also acted as secretary to Fogwill's 1950 
Workmen's Compensation Committee. May retumed to the WCB system in 1975 after a 
distinguished career as a builder of the provincial vocational education system since 
1953. Given that May's career was at a flexible stage, Peckford decided to appoint 
Maynard to the position of WCB Chairman in August 1979. A subtle, but significant 
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initiative was arranged as May was eased into retirement and Maynard was moved from 
his previous political role to Chainnan of the WCB. In light of growing dissatisfaction 
with the system in Newfoundland, May was retained by govemment as a contractual 
consultant to study the various compensation systems across Canada. May was instructed 
to assess possible improvements for the system in order to meet the needs of the 1980s 
and beyond.45 Therefore, while Peckford did not play a personal role in leading workers' 
compensation policy, by August 1979 he had put the leadership resources in place to do 
so. 
Soon after the executive appointments the Peckford government adopted a pragmatic 
approach for responding to demands for benefit increases. In December 1979, the Act 
was amended giving the Lieutenant-Govemor in Council the power to periodically 
increase benefits payable under the Act.46 This meant that cabinet had direct control over 
various workers' compensation benefit increases without having to amend the Act in the 
House. This type of mechanism promoted, one might even say institutionalized, 
incremental policy development. In January 1980, the govemment used this mechanism 
to provide minor increases in the scale of compensation payable on a range of 
compensation benefits.47 
Meanwhile when Maynard arrived at the WCB in 1979 the system in Newfoundland was 
under pressure to expand its responsibilities from another angle. Led by the FFA W, 
independent inshore fishermen had been actively lobbying govenm1ent and the WCB for 
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coverage under the Act since 1978. This certainly reflected Maynard's earlier career as an 
organizer for Northern Fishem1en's Union. Up to 1979 the only fishermen covered under 
the Act were those employed on boats with crews of three or more. Numerous meetings 
took place involving government, WCB, fishem1en's union, and fishing industry 
representatives regarding the possibility and mechanics of extending the requested 
coverage.48 The negotiation process was limited to private meetings involving the 
interested parties only. From the WCB perspective, the effect of coverage sought was 
dramatic because it would insure the wages of 10,000 or more geographically dispersed 
seasonal workers with no readily identifiable employer. To ensure that coverage was 
provided equitably across the province it was decided that fish processors (fish buyers) 
would be given the responsibility for collecting premiums on fish sales by the 
independent fishermen. That was the same method used in British Columbia, the only 
other province to provide coverage to individual fishennen . While that workable solution 
was eventually hammered out in terms acceptable for government, union and the WCB, 
the fish processors were never satisfied with the arrangement which saw them fulfilling 
the extremely odd role of "employer" for completely independent workers. In fact, the 
proxy arrangement was established over the objections of the industry buyers which 
shows the dominant influence and determination of the union, as well the willingness of 
government and WCB to oblige union interests. 
Ultimately, the negotiation process Jed to the extension of coverage for all inshore 
fishermen via the first amendment of the decade in May 1980.49 The record very clearly 
Page 164, Chapter 6 
shows that Maynard was instrumental in bringing about this development. Not only did 
he initiate a strongly worded letter advocating a "final policy by Government" ... in this 
"most urgent matter" to his Minister (with a copy to the Premier) during his first month as 
WCB Chairman, he followed up with a November 1979 letter to the Minister/Premier 
explaining he had visited British Columbia to gain first hand knowledge of their system 
(which Newfoundland emulated with its 1980 decision).50 This would not be Maynard's 
last significant contribution concerning the direction of workers' compensation policy 
development in Newfoundland. 
Even though minor improvements had been granted, by 1980 there was deep discontent 
with the workers' compensation system in Newfoundland. The varied concerns which had 
been brewing through the 1970s continued to gather and fuelled a process of change that, 
for the first time since 1950, would lead to fundamental changes in the system. It is 
neither too strong nor inaccurate to say that the process of change launched in this era 
would be tumultuous and long-lasting; in fact, it is a process not yet complete. Not 
surprisingly, given that this was the Canadian system, the discontent registered in 
Newfoundland was common throughout the country at that time as well.51 
In September 1980, government appointed another Statutory Review Committee. Given 
that the last Statutory Report had been released just three years prior (June 1977), the 
government was apparently eager to embark upon another large scale review of the 
system. Bill May, who spent the prior year examining alternative compensation 
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programs, was appointed Committee Chairman.52 In particular, May had closely studied 
the major developments in Saskatchewan arising out of the 1978 Statutory Review 
Report in that province. In 1979, Saskatchewan was the first province to introduce a 
significantly revised system for compensating worker in the event of permanent 
disability. Saskatchewan's so-called wage-loss system was not based on physical 
disability, instead it sought to gauge the effect of an injury on a worker's earning capacity 
and replace wages accordingly. In fact, the wage-loss system was not new, it was the 
original Meredith concept (Chapter Three) which had been abandoned fairly quickly 
because of administrative difficulties.53 Maynard had also relied on a Saskatchewan 
model when establishing the Occupational Health and Safety changes in 1978. He says 
Saskatchewan was considered a leader in social policy because although its policies were 
always a little left of centre they managed to strike a balance; usually other provinces 
went too far one way or the other. 54 
The May Committee received 24 presentations (21 oral and 3 written briefs) and 
conducted a series of interviews with WCB officials before rendering its final report. The 
Committee Report was released in December 1981 and recommended massive change to 
the compensation system based directly on the Saskatchewan wage-loss model.55 
Altogether the 1981 Committee Report offered up 67 recommendations with a bias 
toward program expansion and benefit enrichment. But without question the key 
recommendation - to adopt the wage-loss system - was significant and comprehensive in 
scope. Closely tied to the recommendation to move to a wage-loss system was 
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Committee advice to increase funding and staffing to allow for "more vigilant and 
intense" vocational rehabilitation programming. This was reconunended because the 
opportunity for injured workers to maximize their earning potential following an injury is 
described as integral component of the wage-loss system. Notably, the Committee also 
recommended that the WCB must have the authority to deem workers capable of working 
in a particular occupation, particularly if they choose not to avail of the new and 
improved vocational rehabilitation services.56 [The implications of this recommendation 
were dramatic. Annual vocational rehabilitation expenditures in 1981 were $294,880.00; 
as will be shown in the next Chapter, by 1989 ammal costs in this category skyrocketed 
to $19.9 million.] 
Like other Review Committees smce 1966, the 1981 Committee also addressed the 
matter of integrating compensation with other social program benefits, primarily Canada 
Pension Plan disability benefits. It was noted that employers argued that the stacking of 
workers' compensation and other social insurance benefits caused workers to be in a 
better financial position while disabled than while working, resulting in disincentive for 
early return to work.57 In other words, an individual could take home more money while 
disabled (from various social insurance program sources) than he or she could earn by 
working. The 1981 Review Committee framed an interesting argument in historical 
terms: 
One commencing to judge the performance of Workers' Compensation in 
light of its co-existence with many social programs such as 
Unemployment Insurance, Canada Pension Plan, the Guaranteed Income 
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Supplement, Family Allowance, etc., cannot help but be struck by the fact 
that at its inception none of these other plans were in existence. The 
Canada Pension Plan for example has been with us since only 1966. One 
is compelled to ask have there been any corresponding changes in 
Workers' Compensation, if not there should have been, and if so have they 
been adequate and proper. 58 
The Committee went on to point out that other provinces had not changed their workers' 
compensation legislation to prevent overcompensation which often resulted when various 
social insurance program benefits were payable to the same individual: 
The fact that change did not take place in Workers' Compensation legislation 
over the years and the undoubted awareness of the possible need for it on the 
part of the various legislatures forces one to conclude that it cannot be 
abundantly clear that change is necessary and desirable ... The Committee 
reiterates that these (other social) programs arose after Workers' 
Compensation ... Perhaps they can be forced to accommodate Compensation 
rather than the reverse.59 
It was probably na1ve to suggest that the vanous federal social programs might 
accommodate the nuances of twelve provincial and territorial workers' compensation 
programs. But the main point to be drawn from this is that the political will did not exist 
in 1981 to significantly reduce workers' compensation entitlements. The 1981 Committee 
did, however, recommend changing the basic compensation rate from 75 percent of gross 
earnings to 90 percent of net earnings to prevent some workers from receiving more 
income while disabled than while working (secondary to the nature of the progressive 
income tax system and the fact that workers' compensation benefits are non-taxable under 
Canadian Jaw). In this matter the Review Committee merely copied the direction adopted 
or recommended elsewhere in Canada.60 The Committee noted "this is a vexing issue 
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which most jurisdictions in Canada have faced and dealt with, are facing now or will be 
forced to face in the very near future." 61 On yet another familiar matter (under review 
since before 1952) the Committee recommended total elimination of the waiting period 
which by 1981 was down to one day.62 
The Committee also recommended expansion of the Act by eliminating the numerical 
exclusion which stated that employers with three or less employees in covered industries 
were not automatically subject to the Act.63 The effect would be that all employers and 
workers in covered industries would be covered automatically. On the other hand, the 
Committee did not recommend what is known as universal coverage, i.e., granting 
automatic coverage to all workers in all industries. The Committee fe lt the Act should 
only cover those industries with inherent risk of injury, thus excluding industries such as 
banks, law firms, insurance agencies, etc.64 But, as it had done for independent fishermen 
a year previously, the Newfoundland government expanded the program during 1981 
with amendments to extend coverage to two additional groups, namely workers involved 
in work training programs and volunteer firemen .65 
Seminal Institutional Recommendations (1981 Statutory Review Committee) 
The 1981 Statutory Review Committee made two other far-reaching, seminal 
recommendations. First, the Committee called for an independent external appeal system, 
other than the Courts,66 to review WCB decisions. The recommendation was modeled 
directly on the expert medical and independent external appeal mechanisms in place in 
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British Columbia.67 The British Columbia model appeared to address two common 
complaints heard about insular WCB decision making: that the WCB decision makers 
lacked medical expertise in matters they decided and, in any event, the WCB was 
answerable to nobody. This was the first time in Newfow1dland such a recommendation 
had been seriously entertained; its appearance in 1981 signaled the arrival of a new era in 
which the WCB would be subject to greater scrutiny and in which injured workers and 
employers would eventually have more opportunities to test the merits of WCB 
decisions. While the pleas for such an independent system of review had been in the air 
for many years this was the first official articulation for such a policy. None of the WCB 
annual reports from 1951 to 1983, for example, even mention the word "appeal" let alone 
external appeal. 68 While the Newfoundland government did not act on this 
recommendation immediately, it was an idea that would persist and eventually become a 
reality. 
The second recommendation relates to system governance. The 1981 Committee Report 
advocated greater autonomy and control of policy development for the WCB. In other 
words, that government should rely to a much greater degree on the advice and direction 
supplied by WCB administrators. Among the reasons cited for this recommendation were 
the distinct nature and mandate of WCB operations compared to government departments 
and agencies, and the growing level of sophistication and complexity within the system.69 
The Committee recommended maintaining the three government-appointed 
Commissioners as overseers of the system and giving them greater control over policy 
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development. This was an endorsement of the governance status quo with one major 
difference. The difference was that it also endorsed the concept of greater autonomy for 
the WCB, a concept that would be operationalized by 1982 giving the WCB more 
influence over policy direction than ever before. Precisely how and why this matter was 
operationalized is explored in greater detail later in this Chapter. 
In addition to the Statutory Review Committee recommendations, another critical 
development occurred in 1980-1981 that cannot be overlooked. For the first time since 
1951 when Joey Smallwood told employers that their only involvement in the system 
would be to simply pay their premiums, the matter of system financing was put under a 
microscope and the findings were troubling. The record shows that the WCB was 
becoming concerned that the amounts being shown for future liabilities did not reflect the 
actual liabilities incurred to that point. Even though the annual reports between 1975 and 
1980 indicated there were enough funds to cover all future liabilities- the reports actually 
showed a surplus - actuarial review indicated that the WCB liabilities were seriously 
underestimated.70 It was shown that this underestimation would not have occurred if the 
WCB had used a proper actuarial formula since 1975.71 
Moreover, because of the illusory surplus in its annual reports the WCB actually 
decreased the average assessment rates paid by employers by 17 percent between 1975 
and 1980. As a consequence of these findings the WCB increased the average assessment 
rates charged to employers by 20 percent for the year 1981. This signaled the arrival of a 
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new and powerful factor which would eventually become the major policy determinant; 
namely, system affordability. 
There was one immediate effect caused by the realization that rates had been erroneously 
reduced and now, unexpectedly, increased by 20 percent- employers woke up. For the 
ftrst time since 1951 employers were shaken by unexpected cost increases in their 
workers' compensation premiums. Employers were accustomed to stable rates since 1952 
and even experienced declining rates in 1979 and 1980. That, more than anything, 
explains why employers were simply not tuned into workers' compensation prior to 
1981.72 
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In addition to increasing premiums, employers also sensed significant legislative changes 
were occutring, largely if not exclusively favouring workers, but that no person or group 
was effectively representing the interests of employers. As a result, the Employers' 
Labour Relations Council, an offshoot of the St. Jolm's Board of Trade, was formed in 
1981. The name of this organization was later shortened to Employers' Council to reflect 
a broader role of representing employers before government on a variety of matters. The 
Employers' Council, a small organization but one with full-time, professional staff, was 
promoted by the larger employers because they knew that although they could effectively 
manage their workers' compensation and labour relations issues, many small to medium 
sized employers did not have the resources or interest to do so and would require 
education and assistance if system wide, i. e., province wide, cost management and 
control was to be achieved. Generally, coming out of the 1970s in Newfoundland there 
was a significant across-the-board requirement for education and training among 
employers (and unions) on all issues governing workplace relationships.73 That 
recognition led to training and awareness which would breed greater policy learning and, 
eventually, countervailing demands on the workers' compensation system. 
In 1981 employers realized that, to their credit, the labour movement had achieved 
various legislative victories through organized and persistent lobby over a period of 
years. And, that employers were highly unorganized and underrepresented when it came 
to labour relations matters generally and workers' compensation in particular. Although 
employer organizations such as the St. John's Board of Trade rallied to represent 
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employers interests before government from time to time they were generally more 
preoccupied with larger scale matters such as trade and economic development and did 
not have the time or expertise to adequately deal with matters such as labour relations, 
labour standards, occupational health and safety, and workers' compensation.74 Given 
rising workers' compensation costs beginning in 1981 , the Employers' Council quickly 
assumed a leading role in representing employer interests on workers' compensation 
matters before government and the WCB.75 
One of the Employers' Council pivotal roles was to make govemment aware of the fact 
that employers were not pleased with the increasing premiums and to point out what it 
considered other red flags such as expanding programs and growing future liabilities.76 
Critically, the collective liability system from which an employer's workers' 
compensation premium was based could prevent employers with good claims experience, 
i.e., low injuries/low costs, from getting a lower rate if other employers in their category 
had bad records. In terms of active employer involvement and advocacy in the workers' 
compensation system, the creation of the Employers' Council is the first real sign of 
progress since the 1939 Liddell study. 
There is no doubt that significant legislative and institutional changes associated with the 
Statutory Review Committee report, and the emergence of new interest group dynamics 
driven by key factors such as system affordability, marks 1981 as a turning point for the 
Newfoundland system. After years of incremental policy development the 1981 Statutory 
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Review Committee Report set the stage for a dramatic shift in program policy. For labour 
and injured workers this represented a major victory after many years of advocacy for 
substantial improvements. For Peckford's Progressive Conservative government and 
individuals such as Maynard and May, the environment leading up to 1981 may have 
represented a window of opportunity for the continuation and further implementation of 
policy direction begun in 1972. At very least, they would have viewed developments as 
an opportune time for the culmination of their efforts since 1979. On the other hand, 
increased premiums in 1981 were a cold, tmwelcomed shower for employers. For the first 
time ever employers organized a professional lobby group - the Employers' Council -
once they realized that a threatening policy environment was evolving. Finally, the WCB 
entered the decade on a cautious tone with a growing sensitivity toward the issue of 
system costs and sustainability. 
Ocean Ranger Disaster and its Implications for Change 
But, before the 1981 Statutory Review Committee recommendations could be acted upon 
the Ocean Ranger oil rig sank off the coast of Newfound land on February 14, 1982 
claiming 84 lives.77 The fallout from the disaster had significant implications for the 
workers' compensation system and the WCB; this is a remarkable example of 
catastrophic events acting as policy determinant. Immediate reactions to the sinking of 
the Ocean Ranger were varied and intense.78 Notably, within two days separate federal 
and provincial Royal Commissions were announced79 and a provincial Day ofMouming 
was proclaimed for February 19, 1982.80 In addition, questions of corporate culpability 
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arose very quickly as numerous stories emerged concerning safety practices aboard the 
rig. Among the article titles in the February 16, 1982 edition of the St. John's Evening 
Telegram are "Safety procedures on rig criticized", "Rig was nicknamed the Ocean 
Danger", "Rig inspection was two months overdue", and "Mobil claims safety procedures 
aboard dtill rig were adequate."81 Eventually it would be learned that the disaster could 
have been easily prevented if the senior ballast control room operator and his staff had 
been properly trained. 82 
It was in the midst of this atmosphere that the Hon. Gerald R. Ottenheimer, Minister of 
Justice and Attorney General for the province, issued a public statement to the surviving 
family members on February 17, 1982. Ottenheimer suggested that the families ought to 
retain Newfoundland lawyers to ensure best possible legal outcomes against parties who 
may approach them to waive or settle claims. The families were advised that their right to 
financial protection lay against the employer(s) for the loss of their loved ones. In 
essence, they were being advised to sue the employers. The Justice Minister's advisory 
caught the WCB off guard; it had not been consulted prior to the announcement. In fact, 
the Justice Minister's statement lacked critical information concerning the legal rights of 
the survivors (to the point of being wrong and misleading) and it was clear that this was 
something the Justice Department officials did not realize.83 To clarify matters the WCB 
issued a press release which was carried in the February 19, 1982 edition of the Evening 
Telegram under the following banner: Compensation Board says Employers Can't be 
Sued in Ocean Ranger Disaster. The article went on to say, correctly, that the Workers' 
Page 176, Chapter 6 
Compensation Act prevents a worker or his or her dependants from taking legal action 
against an employer covered by the Act, i.e., the Act prevents them from suing an 
employer, but may allow an action against third parties not covered by the Act such as an 
out-of-Province rig manufacturer. It also suggested that it was ironic to consider these 
implications in light of the previous advisory supplied by the Minister of Justice. 
The immensity of loss forced the entire weight of the Newfoundland government and 
legal community through an exhaustive and focused review of the implications of the 
workers' compensation act. Two patiicular items were at issue. First, there was the fact 
that at the time of the sinking, in the event there may be a right of action against a third 
patiy not covered by the Act, the workers' compensation act required injured workers or 
(as in this case) their dependants to either claim compensation from the WCB or opt to 
sue the third party not covered by the Act - but they were not allowed to do both. Second, 
there were questions regarding the adequacy and structure of dependency benefits. To 
summarize events as they unfolded, less than six months after the calamity two major 
legislative initiatives were ushered through the House of Assembly in the form of 
statutory and regulatory change. 84 At once government changed the Act to allow 
dependants the right to claim compensation at1d bring a court action against third parties 
not covered by the Act, and it improved the scale and structure of dependency benefits. 
Furthermore, these chat1ges were given retroactive e(fect from January 1. 1982 to give 
the families of the Ocean Ranger victims more and improved choices and stability in their 
bid for maximum compensation. 
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Several observations anse out of the Ocean Ranger tragedy. From a public policy 
perspective it shows the effects of catastrophic events as a policy determinant. There is 
no doubting that the motivation of government with respect to the Ocean Ranger 
amendments was to improve benefits for the families, but the gripping nature of the 
accident made it even more pressing. In terms of impetus, it must be noted that the local 
legal community played a large role in advocating the sweeping changes on behalf on the 
dependants.85 Politically, the provincial government had nothing (or little) to lose by 
changing the right to sue provisions because the negative effects of any successful legal 
actions would be felt by employers or manufacturers from outside ofNewfoundland who 
would not have been immune from legal action. Although the scale and structure of 
workers' compensation benefits had been problematic through the 1970s and into the 
1980s, politicians quickly intervened in the face of a crisis. Like the Marine Disaster 
funds established in the early 1900s (Chapter 2), however, government response followed 
catastrophe or disaster. It must be recalled, however, that the December 1981 Statutory 
Review Committee Report had actually recommended improvements in the scale and 
structure of dependency benefits; major portions of those recommendations were 
included in the July 1982 amendment.86 The fortuitous timing of the December 1981 
recommendations aside, the fact remains that a benefit of the Statutory Review 
Committee process is that it may act as a vehicle for keeping the Act current. One 
imagines that the WCB administrators were thankful during the aftermath of the tragedy 
that a recent study and solid recommendations were available. 
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Finally, the Minister's faux pas regarding the intricacies of workers' compensation 
legislation, and his failure to consult with the WCB before issuing his public statement on 
February 17, 1982, were not mere oversights at a time of crisis. It was simple ignorance 
regarding the significant ramifications of the workers' compensation act. Maynard, WCB 
Chairman at the time, recalls immediately contacting the Minister of Justice who quickly 
acknowledged the miscommunication.87 Maynard also suggests that the failure of a 
govenunent department to consult with the WCB at that time was not surprising because 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, it was an agency that simply did "not get noticed 
much" by govenunent officials. Maynard suggests (and there is no reason to discount his 
views in this regard) that when he arrived at the WCB in 1979 it was a stagnant 
organization that had not changed very much since 1951. The WCB opinion would not 
have been highly regarded or its involvement seen as a necessary prelude to action by 
government officials.88 In the aftermath of the sinking, however, a close working 
relationship was quickly established between the Department of Justice and the WCB as 
the various amendments went through the Cabinet system. 
During this process the very significant legal implications which flowed from the 
Workers' Compensation Act were recognized by many politicians and govermnent 
officials for the first time causing the profile of WCB and its issues to be raised in 
govermnent circles. This episode likely reinforced the call of the 1981 Review 
Committee to increase the level of WCB autonomy. Of course, another explanation for 
the improved communication and greater awareness was the fact that Maynard, as a 
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former Minister and colleague of the current government members, had a natural 
affiliation with, and understanding of, the current government. As a result of the greater 
levels of awareness and respect toward the WCB and its issues it became easier to have 
key government officials, departments and committees consider WCB-generated 
submissions and papers. From the perspective of gaining intergovernmental credibility, 
Maynard says the Ocean Ranger was a "turning point" for the WCB.89 
In fact, the WCB had been improving its internal operations and management capabilities 
beginning with an organizational overhaul in 1981.90 It quickly followed up on the 
December 1981 Review Committee report with a very comprehensive response to 
government concerning the various recommendations dated February 16, 1982.91 
Fortunately for the WCB it had undertaken its analysis before the sinking of the Ocean 
Ranger; presumably, it might have been difficult to provide such a focused review in the 
wake of the tragedy. The WCB response was decisive, offering its agreement on the 
majority of recommendations put forward by the Committee, but forcefully and 
persuasively disagreeing on several key points. For example, the WCB strongly disagreed 
with the 1981 Review Committee call for an independent external appeal system. Instead, 
the WCB proposed a less elaborate internal review system culminating in a review by the 
appointed Board members.92 
The WCB bolstered its argument for a scaled-down appeal system through reference to 
one of the cornerstones of the Canadian workers' compensation system which is that the 
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administration of the system is placed in the hands of a quasi-judicial administrative 
agency known as the WCB. The WCB reminded Government that an underly1ng 
objective of the system was to achieve speedy, informal decision making and to reduce 
complicated court-like processes. The WCB scrutinized the local environment and 
concluded that there had not been a high demand for formalized review procedures in the 
province, as there had been over many years in British Columbia and some other 
provinces. It was strongly agreed, however, that the existing infom1al approach to 
internal reviews had to be fonnalized. WCB agreement on the general point that change 
was necessary was most likely based on the apparent dissatisfaction of the major interest 
groups, mainly labour, with the Jack of appeal mechanisms and a general appreciation of 
changing public expectations. As a matter of fact, the WCB recommendation regarding a 
modified appeal system was mirrored in the Federation of Labour's response to the 
Statutory Review Committee which report was filed in May 1982.93 While the Federation 
agreed that an appeal system was necessary it did not support adoption of the elaborate 
British Columbia model because there was no accountability to the Board.94 That is an 
intriguing opinion which suggests they felt the WCB played an important governance 
role which should not be jeopardized by a rogue external tribunal. In fact, the Federation 
of Labour confirmed its general support for the continuation of the WCB system 
involving goverrunent-appointed Commissioners. Noting that "for many years these 
appointments have been political in nature rather than any other" and that such practice 
would likely continue, the only concession sought by the Federation was that one of the 
Commissioners should be a "worker" representative.95 
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Related to the proposed internal appeal system, the WCB also recommended changing 
the name of the organization to Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) in its 
February 1982 response to government. The purpose was to eliminate confusion between 
the corporate Board and general operations. The corporate Board, i.e., the three 
government-appointed Commissioners, would act as final decision and policy makers 
under the proposed new internal appeal process. That recommendation was accepted by 
government with the wee name taking effect in 1983. 
Throughout 1982 it was demonstrated that WCC credibility with government was on the 
increase. The best example of this is the WCB recommendation to government that the 
Workers' Compensation Act should be rewritten (it had not been rewritten since 1951). 
The WCB proposed this major action in its February 1982 response to the 1981 Review 
Committee report, even though that matter was not mentioned as a concern or 
recommendation by the Review Committee. 96 Government not only agreed that the Act 
would be rewritten, it further agreed that the WCB would have prime responsibility for 
the rewrite. This was a highly unusual approach because the primary responsibility for 
drafting new legislation was normally assumed by the Office of the Legislative Counsel 
with assistance from the WCB (or other sponsoring departments). Noting the aberrance, 
the Clerk of the Executive Council provided the assistance of a legal draftsperson to the 
WCB in August 1982 as it undertook to rewrite the Act.97 
Based on its newfound credibility, the WCB influenced other key decisions beginning in 
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1982. For example, the WCB disagreed with the 1981 Review Committee 
recommendation that there should be a ceiling on the amount of earnings which could be 
compensated and that the ceiling should be set at 150 percent of the Industrial Composite 
Wage for the province. In their response to government the WCB countered that there 
should be no earnings ceiling whatsoever, so that all injured workers would receive an 
equitable compensation rate based on their actual gross income.98 In 1982 the ceiling was 
$21,000.00. Primarily as a result of the WCB intervention, government agreed on a 
compromise solution: the ceiling was established at 250 percent of the Industrial 
Composite Wage. The 250 percent ceiling satisfied the WCB argument which suggested 
that if there had to be a ceiling it should be high enough to cover workers in the higher 
paid industrial jobs within the province. When the new ceiling took effect, as of January 
1, 1983, it was $45,500.00.99 At the time, and for many years thereafter, $45,500.00 was 
the highest ceiling in Canada. Aside from the fact that some injured workers wou ld 
benefit by receiving higher compensation rates, more reflective of their pre-injury 
income, an immediate effect was to expand the payroll base on which the employers' 
assessment rate, or premium, would be based. Instead of paying assessments on all 
salaries and wages up to $21,000.00, employers now had to pay assessments on wages 
paid up to $45,500.00. Futihermore, announced as it was in December 1982, that decision 
coincided with yet another WCB increase in the average assessment rate charged to 
employers. 
These were very unpopular developments as far as employers were concerned. In a 
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belated September 1983 brief to the Minister of Labour and Manpower regarding the 
1981 Statutory Review Conunittee recommendations, the Employers' Council stated: "In 
late December 1982, the WCB announced several increases in premium rates as well as 
an increase in the maximum (insurable earnings to $45,500.00) ... Reaction from 
employers was predictable. The (Employers' Council) has received more communications 
from employers on the WCB matter than all others combined in 1983." 100 The predictable 
reaction spoken of here, of course, was strong and fim1 disapproval. The employer group 
asked government to reconsider the decision to increase the ceiling to $45,500.00 in order 
to keep it more in line with other provinces. The brief went on to state the WCB should 
be made more accountable to employers from whom the Board's funds were derived. And 
in response to the recommendation that the WCB should become more autonomous, the 
employers strongly disagreed suggesting that responsibility for "major items required by 
the Act should remain with government or to a certain extent be shifted to employers.'" 01 
In this regard, the employer group felt that the system of appointing Board members 
should be re-exan1ined to give employers more fonnal representation. The Employers' 
Council did not support the existing Board Advisor system and urged government to 
consider the concept of a Board of Directors for the WCB made up of employers who 
would not be "employees" of the WCB. This report also advocated such matters as 
integration of workers' compensation and Canada Pension Plan disability benefits and 
retaining the one-day waiting period because it would add to wee costs. 102 On the main 
proposal - the shift to a wage-loss system - the employer group strongly urged its 
acceptance and implementation. 103 The theory was that more equitable long-tern benefits 
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could be supplied to seriously injured workers and that the system would be affordable 
because effective vocational rehabi litation programming would allow most injured 
workers to return to the workforce in some capacity. In effect this was perceived as a 
possible win-win scenario for workers and employers. 
While employers rallied against the expansion of the program and benefits in September 
1983, the Federation of Labour had already quietly accepted the generally favourable 
recommendations from the 1981 Review Committee in its May 1982 response to 
government. The Federation generally believed that application of the Act should apply 
to as many workers as possible and it basically supported the move to the wage-loss 
system. The Federation did, however, question the Committee statement that the WCB 
must have the authority to deem workers capable of working in a particular occupation. It 
worried that the WCB would become "lord and master" making decisions regarding 
injured workers' ability to return to work which they thought may be better made by the 
worker's treating physician. 104 From a philosophical perspective the Federation also 
disagreed that the recommendation to change the compensation rate fi·om 75 percent of 
gross to 90 percent of net was an important development. It felt that even if an injured 
worker was receiving more income while disabled than while working there is nothing to 
prove that this represents a disincentive to return to work.105 
Finally, the next major legislative event following the Ocean Ranger amendments of July 
1982, occurred in late 1983 with the passage of the new wage-loss Act as proposed by the 
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1981 Statutory Review Conunittee. The new Act came into effect on January 1, 1984.106 
As noted in its 1983 annual report, this was the culmination of three years of work and 
study for the WCC: "Practically all the work in compiling the new Act was done by 
officials of the Board with the expert guidance and assistance of a senior draftsperson 
from the provincial legislative drafting office. II The wee also proudly noted that the Act 
gave the province " ... a system of Workers' Compensation that undoubtedly compares 
favourably with that which can be found in any other jurisdiction in the world."107 
Adoption of the Saskatchewan style wage-loss system was a major shift in compensation 
policy for Newfoundland. The primary change related to the way compensation 
entitlement would be calculated. Under the old system the amount of compensation an 
injured worker received for long term disability was based on the estimated degree of 
physical disability as measured against a pre-established medical disability schedule 
(unaffectionately referred to as the "meat chart" by some). Outcomes were often highly 
inequitable; generally, more than adequate compensation for workers able to return to 
gainful employment, and less than adequate compensation for workers unable to return to 
gainful employment. Striking inequities occurred when dramatically different return-to-
work outcomes resulted for workers with identical injuries, thus identical disability 
ratings and long term compensation. For example, a labourer with a 20 percent disability 
rating for a back injury is unable to return to productive employment, whereas an office 
worker with the same injury and 20 percent rating returns to full employment with no 
loss of earning capacity. Of course, it was inequitable when the 20 percent pension did 
not come close to replacing the loss of earnings for the labourer over a lifetime, whereas 
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the office worker received the same 20 percent pension and continued eaming at work. In 
short, the new system was designed to estimate and replace the actual wage-loss of 
injured workers to age 65. Furthermore, it provided an annuity benefit after age 65 to 
cover pension income which may have been lost because of the injury. 108 
Not only were the various other program and benefit improvements recommended by the 
1981 Review Committee adopted, the WCC had even convinced government to accept 
the principle of universal coverage. This universal coverage idea had been rejected by the 
Review Committee, strongly objected to by the Employers' Council, and given only 
lukewarm support from the Federation of Labour who would have been happy if the idea 
were seriously considered five years later in the next statutory review process. 109 As a 
result of the wee lobby for universal endorsement, effective January 1' 1984, the new 
Act not only extended coverage for employers with one or more employees, it did so for 
all industries outside of a few minor industries specifically excluded by regulation. As a 
result, in 1984 "approximately 4,000 new employer registrations were processed" by the 
WCC. 11 0 In 1984, as will be shown in the next chapter, the system grew richer and larger. 
Chapter Summary 
In summary, the train of events from 1972 indicates a certain inevitable march toward 
program and benefit growth within the context and framework of the Canadian-style Act 
and administrative framework established, and largely unchanged, since 1951. The 
Smallwood-Moores transition created a policy window of opportunity through which 
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labour concerns were given remarkable attention beginning with major overhaul of the 
occupational health and safety regime followed by a series of planned and unexpected 
processes and events which led to implementation of the 1984 Act. These changes were 
certainly driven by the direct complaints of labour covering such factors as the need for 
higher benefits in the face of inflation and for more responsiveness from the WCB itself. 
But it is also important to note that workers' compensation system was influenced by 
institutional factors beginning in 1972 which was marked by Moores' broad policy 
objectives related to governmental organization and effectiveness. Perhaps Ed Maynard's 
evolution from Minister in the Moore's government to trail-blazing Chairman of the 
WCB under Peckford is the best example of how those policy objectives eventually 
influenced the WCB system. Under his tenure as Chairman from 1979 to 1984 the central 
bureaucratic organization went from the obscure WCB to the empowered WCC, 
providing governmental-like leadership and proximate decision making regarding the 
development of 1984 changes. The approach during these years was well-orchestrated 
and it is worth noting that for the first time since the process was used in 1966, the 
Statutory Review Committee headed by Bill May was deliberately used to solve large-
scale systemic problems. That may be contrasted to the first three Review Committees 
(1966, 1972, and 1977) which merely set out as routine sounding boards to assess the 
state of current opinion. Rather than acting as a remote conduit through which a variety 
of issues were channeled for eventual govenu11ental rumination and possible decision, 
May's Committee acted more directly as a deliberate vehicle of policy determination 
related to the core aspects of the system. 
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The significance of the 1981 Statutory Review Committee recommendations - which 
were largely implemented by 1984 - are revealing. The recommendations for dramatic 
change resulted from years of complaint about system performance and specific 
dissatisfaction with the equity of benefits being paid for long-term disability. The 
successful advocacy of organized labour through the 1970s, by effectively impressing 
their concerns upon government, must be considered a major policy detenninant with 
important downstrean1 outcomes: a series of legislative amendments and modest benefit 
improvements in the 1970s; the 1981 Committee process and report; and, the very 
dramatic 1984 legislative and systemic changes. 
Large-scale systemic change does not happen easily in workers' compensation policy 
development and there appears to be a recurring phenomenon in the Newfoundland case 
where governments initially tinker for as long as possible before major policy shifts are 
accommodated. In the first instance, governments appear loathe to strike bold new 
directions (unless forced to) and incrementalism appears to be an appealing, low risk 
political strategy. A simple view with respect to breaking the pattern of insufficient 
incremental changes in 1979 gives the Peckford government much credit for setting the 
agenda and leading the way to the 1984 changes. It may be argued that government 
recognized workers' compensation as a problematic policy issue for which they 
deliberately created and strategically controlled an agenda for change. While the 
availability and appointment of Maynard was a matter of political fate, government 
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certainly did work the Maynard/May transitions for maximum effect. On the other hand, 
rather than concluding that the Peckford administration set the agenda in 1979, another 
view which may be useful to consider is that labour set the agenda years before and that 
government finally bought in because of their determined efforts and persistent 
complaints. If there is a lesson here, it may be (in tern1s of a simplified reduction) that 
major change will neither occur easily nor without strong and continuing advocacy, plus 
structured and continuous advocacy may eventually pay off if events and circumstances 
align to create a policy opening for your cause. There is, for example, the striking 
example of how a catastrophe - the Ocean Ranger sinking - acted to create a powerful set 
of dynamics which set the stage and propelled policy action which supported labour's 
views. 
Of course, policy development is usually more complicated than can be portrayed in 
simple tenns. The provincial environment is altered and influenced by a host of internal 
and external forces. Emulation is a consistent factor that cannot be forgotten in terms of 
the eventual policy choices which were made. Because workers' compensation policy 
was also undergoing change across Canada the policy entrepreneurs and policy makers 
had the example of other provinces, particularly Saskatchewan, to emulate. As will be 
seen more clearly in the next chapter, however, the various benefit improvements won by 
labour and accepted by govemment came at a cost. And there were questions regarding 
the WCC's ability to pay for these new benefits without significantly increasing the levy 
on employers as early as 1980. When the premiums charged to employers were increased 
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beginning in 1981 employers were motivated - for the first time - to seriously monitor the 
workers' compensation system. A new group, known as the Employers' Council, emerged 
to defend and promote employer interests before the WCC and government. Like labour 
in the 1970s, by 1983 this group called for greater levels of influence over workers' 
compensation policy decisions. In fact, in 1983 the Employers' Council recommended 
abolishing the existing governance model and replacing it with a Board of Directors 
comprised of employers. As events unfold after the introduction of the new Act in 1984 
there are few, if any reasons, for employers to change their opinion on these issues. 
Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the legislative, administrative and institutional changes 
made in 1984 irrevocably established new ground for workers' compensation policy 
development and debate. In fact, those changes are the primary determinant of virtually 
all major policy decisions and outcomes for the remainder of the 1980s and 1990s.111 The 
next chapter assesses post-1984 developments. 
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Chapter 7 
The Changing Face of Workers' Compensation (1984-1993) 
This chapter reviews developments in the Newfoundland workers' compensation 
system after January 1, 1984, the date on which the new wage-loss legislation was 
introduced. It outlines how the promise held fo rth by the introduction of that new Act 
quickly gave way to regressive amendments culminating in a significant rollback in 
benefit entitlement by 1993. These are dynamic years during which the system 
expenences new pressures ar1smg out of rapidly changing social, legislative, 
administrative and fiscal circumstances. By the mid-1980s the system is forced to adj ust 
to a new environment in which individuals are more willing than ever to defend their 
individual rights. In that regard, the chapter begins with the story of an important legal 
battle which challenged the constitutionality of critical components of the Newfoundland 
and, by association, Canadian workers' compensation model. While the internal appeal 
system proposed by the wee in 1982 takes shape slowly in 1984, by 1987 an entirely 
new appeal system, including an independent external review tribunal known as the 
Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal, is created; there is an assessment of how and 
why usage of the appeal systems increases significantly during these years. On another 
front, the system of governance is significantly revamped by 1987 involving the creation 
of a Board of Directors system to replace the government-appointed WCB Conm1issioner 
system. Because a corporate-style Board of Directors - comprised of representatives of 
workers, employers and the public - would be responsible for balanced administration of 
the Act it was felt that this new governing structure would be more accountable. The 
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chapter wi 11 also examine how the system faces financial collapse by the end of the 1980s 
and reviews the steps taken to secure the financial position of the wee between 1990 
and 1993. Overall thjs is a unique period during which difficult policy choices are 
encountered with new and compelling sets of policy determinants, particularly dire 
warnings regarding the fiscal stability of the system. It is a period when the range of 
actors in the system is broadened to include new groups such as the Board of Directors, 
the appeal tribunal, and - a new phenomenon for Newfoundland - an interest group 
known as the Injured Workers' Association. Against the diversity of interests and policy 
challenges, by 1993 difficult and unpopular policy choices were unavoidable. The 
chapter concludes with an assessment of those decisions, and of why and how they were 
implemented. 
The WCC experienced a broad and generally changing environment in 1984. In what 
may be considered effective foreshadowing the 1984 Annual Report of the WCC stated: 
"In past years there did not appear to be any great demand from sectors of the public for 
information regarding workers' compensation legislation and programs. That appears to 
be changing." 1 Evidently there was growing awareness and desire for transparency 
regarding workers' compensation operations and programs. Considering the expansion of 
the program - 4,000 new employers and significantly improved benefits - as of and prior 
to January 1, 1984, it is not surprising that the number of interested individuals and 
groups increased. It must also be considered that the population of the province was 
becoming more knowledgeable and aware of their rights, particularly in the wake of the 
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new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enacted in April 1982.2 As well, people 
were more willing to assert their rights. There is no better illustration of this new dynamic 
than the story of Mrs. Samuel Piercey's assertion of her perceived rights. Mr. Samuel 
Piercey was employed in St. John's by General Bakeries Limited on July 20, 1984 when 
he was electrocuted after coming into contact with ungrounded electrical equipment. His 
wife tried to sue the employer, but she was barred from doing so because the employer 
was covered under the Workers' Compensation Act of Newfoundland. Mrs. Piercey was 
not satisfied with that answer and proceeded to Supreme Court of Newfoundland (Trial 
Division) where she won a stwming legal victory. The Trial Judge concluded that the 
statutory bar under the Workers' Compensation Act which prevented Mrs. Piercey from 
suing the employer was "an intolerable blot on the legal landscape of a free and 
democratic country." The Judge believed that Mrs. Piercey was being discriminated 
against - contrary to the intent of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms3 - and he went on to say: 
The undeniable fact is that any Canadian whose rights have been 
adversely affected by the negligence of another may seek redress in the 
Courts against such tort feasor and in the event of liability being 
established may recover his proven damages in accordance with well-
established principles of common law in that regard .4 
The nature of this decision struck at the very heart and questioned the continuing 
existence of the Workers' Compensation system in Newfoundland and, in fact, Canada.5 
For the various Workers' Compensation Boards and Commission's across Canada, such a 
challenge was inevitable in the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms era. The Piercey 
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case was a welcomed opportunity to test the constitutionality of the fundamental 
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Acts once and for all. Given the significance of 
the decision for all provincial statutes it was decided to proceed to the superior Courts by 
way of reference case from the Attorney-General of Newfoundland, instead of an 
ordinary appeal.6 (A further irony may be found in the fact that the Trial Judge who 
declared the Act to be "an intolerable blot on the legal landscape of a free and democratic 
country" was T. Alex Hickman whose direct experience with the Act dated back to at 
least the 1960s when he represented St. Lawrence miners, and to 1972 when he authored 
significant amendments to it- see Chapter 5.) 
As evidence of the significance of this case, leave was granted for 17 interveners, 
including major labour and employer associations,7 to appear before the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal in June 1987. All but Piercey were arguing strongly for the retention of 
the Acts. The author of this paper was a spectator in Court throughout these proceedings 
and it seemed clear where the judges were headed when one commented (somewhat 
lightly) to the effect that it was one of the few times in his experience that labour and 
employers were on the same side of a workers' compensation argument. The 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that the statutory bar was not discriminatory and 
that the legislation was not inconsistent with the Charter. Chief Justice Goodgridge 
wrote: 
The Charter was not designed to interfere with beneficial social programs 
of the legislature. It was not designed to patrol or regulate these programs. 
Only where there is contained in the program something that is unfair or 
Page 202, Chapter 7 
unreasonable will courts interfere. 
The workers' compensation scheme provides a stable system of 
compensation free of the uncertainties that would prevail otherwise 
Judicial deference to the legislative will is required here.8 
The matter was put to rest on April 24, 1989 with a brief ruling from the Supreme Court 
of Canada unanimously upholding the Court of Appeal decision.9 Structured as it was, 
including no right for workers or dependants to sue employers whose negligence may 
have caused or contributed to injury, the Workers' Compensation Act of Newfoundland 
was declared constitutional at the highest level. Like the Ocean Ranger families, the 
remedy for Piercey and all other injured workers or dependants is workers' compensation 
- not the courts. 10 The Piercey case is a legislative milestone in Newfoundland and 
Canadian workers ' compensation history. Not only does the Supreme Court decision 
reinforce the balance and wisdom exercised by Meredith when he recommended the 
Canadian model in 1913, it also ensures that the story of the Canadian model will 
continue for the foreseeable future. 
Yet the Piercey case - a challenge as to whether the system itself was an unconstitutional 
affront on individual rights - would serve as an unmistakable early warning sign of the 
development of a culture of litigiousness. Perhaps partly as by-products of post-Charter 
confidence and curiosity, by 1984 increasing numbers of individuals felt empowered to 
challenge administrative authority and decisions. Growing reference to the administrative 
law principles of natural justice at a time when the concept of individual rights were 
prominent following adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, eventually brought 
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tremendous new pressures into the workers' compensation system. The rules of natural 
justice may be described more simply as rules of "faimess" covering concepts like the 
right to be heard, the right to know the evidence being used against you, the right to be 
represented, and associated notions. In fact, enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in 1982 merely served to reinforce earlier trends in Canadian 
administrative law which would have significant implications for quasi-judicial 
agencies. 11 For example, the 1979 Supreme Court of Canada case of Nicholson v. 
Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners demonstrates the emergence of 
natural justice principles in Canada as a defense against decisions of administrative 
tribunals. 12 Nicholson was an Ontario municipal police officer who successfully 
demanded a right to a full hearing with respect to certain charges laid against him. The 
Court concluded that Nicholson was entitled to present his case before the police Board 
of Commissioners; essentially, that he should be treated fairly, not arbitrarily. 13 The 
Nicholson decision indicated that tribunals, such as WCBs, may have to provide more 
effective opportunities for individuals to "be heard" when a decision against their 
interests is rendered. A direct example of how reliance on the rules of natural justice 
influenced workers' compensation operations is the 1981 British Columbia case of Napoli 
and Workers' Compensation Board. 14 Here the Court concluded that the WCB practice of 
refusing to release medical reports on its file to an injured worker interested in appealing 
his WCB decision was contrary to the tenets of natural justice. In effect, the Court stated 
that Napoli had the right to know the case against him. This decision had implications for 
Newfoundland which up to the early 1980s also did not release such information. The 
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only information an injured worker received from his or her file was a summary of 
medical reports and findings prepared by a WCC official. While the Napoli decision did 
not cause the Newfoundland WCB to alter its approach immediately, it did contribute to 
the tide of change. In fact, it was only after the passage of the provincial Freedom of 
Information Act in 1983 that the Newfoundland WCC began a process of loosening its 
administrative policies regarding release of information. 15 
The ingredients for more litigiousness were in place by 1984, but there was no local 
tradition of challenging WCC decisions. The word "appeal" had never been mentioned in 
a WCC Annual Report prior to 1984. More importantly, prior to 1984 there was no 
mechanism in place to either accommodate or promote appeals. Even though an internal 
appeal system had been proposed by the WCB as early as 1982, it was mobilized very 
slowly. That all changed in 1984 when a detailed, two-level internal appeal process, 
culminating in a review by the full Board of Commissioners, was introduced. 16 The 
number of full Board hearings was relatively low during the first few years: 52 in 1984; 
85 in 1985; 29 in 1986; and 68 in 1987. For various administrative reasons the number of 
hearings that took place, particularly in 1986 and 1987, were artificially low. That is best 
illustrated by the fact that once the administrative concerns were resolved the numbers of 
internal hearing requests per year exceeded 500 by 1991. 17 
By 1984, therefore, there was the beginning of a trend in Newfoundland of injured 
workers increasingly appealing wee decisions in hope of individually tailored decisions 
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and outcomes, as opposed to decisions reflecting "average" justice which had flowed 
from the WCB mass adjudication system for decades. 18 This, in fact, is a central 
weakness of the Canadian model in our modem environment; a German-based collective 
liability system offering average benefits or average justice in a country of British 
heritage in which common laws notions of individual justice is not only inherently 
desirable but fervently promoted since the early 1980s given the advent of the Charier 
and associated developments in administrative law. 
Of course, the tacit premise underlying the introduction of the 1984 Act was that the new 
system would significantly reduce the complaints from workers and organized labour 
regarding the failure of the old system to provide adequate benefits. Labour originally 
went along with the wage-loss system proposal guardedly. Although the Federation of 
Labour response to government was vague concerning whether in fact it actually 
supported the move to the wage-loss system, it clearly registered direct concerns that the 
wee could begin to act like "lord and master" when it came to use of its deeming 
authority. 19 Martin Saunders, a long-time union activist with the Steelworkers' union, 
was a member of the 1981 Review Committee and suggests that although Dr. May and 
others were sold on the 1979 Saskatchewan model, he (Saunders) was concerned that 
there had been so little experience on which to base a decision. Saunders says he had 
serious reservations with the wage-loss proposal, but felt it offered more equitable 
solutions over the old disability system.20 In fact, labour became highly disenchanted 
with the wee practices and decision making under the wage-loss system very soon after 
Page 206, Chapter 7 
1984. Concems arose regarding the Act's requirement for the WCC to deem a worker 
capable of earning income whether they were employed or not. These concems did not 
abate; in fact they grew. 21 
Cost Increases Cause Employer Concern 
As for employers, by 1984 they were fully alert to the systemic changes which had 
developed around them. It was quickly realized that the benefit improvements under the 
wage-loss system came with cost increases. The WCC Annual Report of 1984 shows a 
substantial negative change in the financial position of the Commission as compared to 
1983 and prior years. The operating deficit had grown to $21,433,420 at the end of 1984, 
from $10,986,406 at the end of 1983. These different amounts do not represent an actual 
decrease in the funds of the Commission, but do show an increase in the estimate of 
future liabilities. In other words, the wee did not have sufficient assets, financial and 
otherwise, to pay for the cost of future benefits promised under the new Act. In simple 
terms, that is what was meant by the actuarial concept of unfunded liability which, by 
1984, was being popularized as an expression or proxy for measuring the relative health 
of the various Canadian WCBs. Essentially, an unfunded liability is the amount by which 
the assets of an insurance or pension plan are less than its liabilities. The estimated level 
of funding for the wee at the end of 1984 was 75 percent. In other words, at that point in 
time the WCB only had assets to cover 75 percent of the cost of future benefits promised 
under the Act, i.e. it had a 25 percent unfunded liability. 
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Because benefits and coverage under the Act had been enriched and expanded, the only 
alternative open to the wee to cover increasing system costs was to increase the amount 
of money or, in insurance terms, 'premiums' it collected from employers. The premium 
paid by employers to fund the workers' compensation system is known as their 
assessment rate (calculated with reference to total employee payroll). Given that 
assessment rates increased steadily after 1980, it is not surprising that the employer 
interest level in the system quickly rose to all-time highs. Overall the amount of 
assessments collected from Newfoundland employers increased as follows: 1980, $14.5 
million; 1981, $20.9 million; 1982, $22 million; 1983, $27.4 million; 1984, $33.4 
million; 1985, $36 million. By 1988 it would be $61.3 million? 2 The end result, quite 
simply, was that the same employers were being asked to pay more each year. 
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Considering how these numbers accrued so quickly it is reasonable to ask the most basic 
question. Could the province afford the new, growing system? While the new wage-loss 
system was thoroughly researched theoretically, very little cost analysis was available 
and virtually none undertaken prior to implementation in 1984. By 1984, two provinces -
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick - had adopted the wage-loss system, but due to the 
nature of slowly accumulating cost experience it would be years before credible data was 
available. Nevertheless, the system was implemented because there was a strong 
perception that change had to occur and the wage-loss advocates contented themselves 
with the belief (and, perhaps, hope) that long-term liability costs would be greatly 
lessened through increased and intensive vocational rehabilitation efforts. Even though 
the cost implications of the wage-loss may have represented a future risk, it is argued that 
the decision to adopt it was rational to the extent that it appeared to be the best political 
alternative given all competing interests.23 Meanwhile, these events may also reflect an 
aspect of path dependency theory which heightens increasing returns and makes it very 
difficult to reverse or significantly alter course once a program is put in place. Pierson 
points to the short time horizons of political actors and how political decision makers, 
i.e., politicians, are often more concemed about short-tem1 rather than long-term 
consequences of their decisions. 24 This analysis may aptly apply to the decision to 
implement the wage loss system in 1984, e.g., implement now and let unknown costs be 
an issue for others at some future point. 
But costs were a new and important policy determinant by the end of 1984. To the extent 
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that the legislative pendulum had been weighted toward the interests of labour for 
successive years, an amendment in 1985 signaled a reversal of that trend. 25 After many 
years of debate on the issue, the 1985 amendment reduced the amount of money an 
injured worker could receive in compensation benefits if he or she was receiving Canada 
Pension Plan disability benefits at the same time. Basically the amount of Canada 
Pension Plan disability benefit entitlement was offset from compensation entitlement, a 
general concept sometimes referred to as the "integration" of Canada Pension Plan and 
workers' compensation benefits. First proposed by the 1972 Statutory Review 
Committee, but rejected by government in 1972 (see Chapter 5), the concept was raised 
and rejected again by the 1977 and 1981 Statutory Review Comm ittees. Basically what 
changed in 1985 to generate the political will to move on this matter was the fact that 
employers began complaining about the increased costs and were advocating tighter 
controls on benefits. The Employers' Council was actively "throwing up flares" for 
government through those years with complaints against high rates and arguments 
regarding the negative effect they were having on the competitiveness of the provincial 
economy.26 In 1983 the Council advocated the need to integrate CPP disabi lity and 
workers' compensation benefits as a means to reduce the disincentive to return to work 
which may exist if a worker receives more pay while disabled than when working.27 As 
for labour, the specter of benefit roll backs was a startling new development against a 
long history of incremental benefit improvements capped off with the dramatic 
improvements of 198311984. Additionally, that legislative development added to the 
frustrations of labour representatives who were already dissatisfied with deeming 
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decisions and an ineffective internal appeal system. 
In retrospect, this amendment marked the beginning of a process of streamlining benefits 
which would eventually culminate in full scale decremental policy initiated by 
govemment and the wee in the early 1990s. It is compelling (if only from an historical 
perspective) to note that the provincial government continued to expand this social 
insurance program through the 1970s, and dramatically in the early 1980s, even though 
the federal govemment had applied the brakes to social spending as early as 1974 when 
the Family Allowance increase (to $20.00 per child) was "the last major (federal) social 
program expansion financed with significant "new" money ... " .28 The fact that the WCC's 
financial house was typically in order (or at least had appeared to be) may have been one 
reason why governments did not aggressively intervene prior to 1985,29 but by the mid-
1980s it was clear that that factor had changed dramatically so govemment was 
compelled to curtail benefits payable. At the most basic level it must also be considered 
that the govemment was likely not immediately measuring the financial ramifications of 
the system since they were not paying the costs. It seems that govemment did not really 
pay attention until employer complaints surfaced. 
In April 1985, Ted Blanchard made the somewhat unusual transition from recently retired 
Deputy Minister of Labour to Minister of Labour in the Peckford government as the 
newly elected member for the Bay of Islands district. Foremost among the various issues 
he faced as new Minister were varied complaints from all directions conceming the 
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workers' compensation system.30 Primarily there had developed an unfavourable 
perception that the WCC was acting unilaterally as judge and jury. There was an 
overriding general impression that justice was not being seen to be done because WCB 
decisions were not open to review. The government-appointed WCB Commissioner 
system in place since 1951 had gained a solid reputation of being inflexible and deaf to 
constituent concerns, especially labour. By 1985 the Board of Commissioners system was 
anachronistic and, as a group of political appointees, they basically represented nobody.31 
Growing demands from external groups to participate in policy making processes, and for 
an appeal system that provided individual rather than average justice, put additional 
strains upon the system. The Meredith principle (endorsed by Smallwood in 1950) that 
the WCC's correct role was that of exclusive, independent arbiter had been seriously 
eroded, possibly due to the wee executives being political appointees or simply as a by-
product of the social environment, or more likely both. The main interest groups felt they 
were not being listened to by the WCC and that new mechanisms must be found to ensure 
that their concerns were addressed.32 
When these various forces and complaints manifested themselves in discussion arow1d 
the Cabinet table it was not long before talk of systemic reforn1 emerged. Blanchard 
suggests there was an accountability issue and general feeling that the wee had too 
much control, much of it wrapped up in Maynard.33 For example, employers felt the 1984 
benefit improvements were too dramatic, that the system administrators were out of 
control and that something had to be done about what employers viewed as a lack of 
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accountability by the WCC. While respectful of Maynard's abilities and intentions, the 
Employers' Council felt Maynard had advocated the development of a system which was 
overly ambitious and too rich for the province.34 Blanchard specifically recalls two other 
Cabinet members strongly urging WCC reform, as well as Premier Peckford's initial 
reluctance but final personal approval for significant changes within the system. 
Meanwhile, aware of its poor public relations profile, the WCC had been exploring 
alternative approaches and ultimately backed a proposal for major program overhaul 
which had been originally recommended in the 1980 Weiler Report in Ontario. Maynard 
recalls meeting with Professor Weiler on at least two occasions for detailed discussions 
regarding his recommendations. Blanchard, on the other hand, recalled that the driving 
force for some of the new changes was Vince Withers from the Employers' Council. 
Withers does not deny that the Employers' Council heavily promoted change; in fact, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it did so directly in its September 1983 brief to 
government. 35 
Significant Institutional Change: Corporate Governance 
Government acted decisively in 1986 when it passed a major legislative amendment with 
the principal objective being to separate the corporate and quasi-judicial functions of the 
workers' compensation system. The amendment abolished the roles of the WCC 
Commissioners, i.e., the political appointees, and created a corporate Board of Directors 
and a separate independent, i.e., external, appeals tribuna1.36 The corporate-style Board of 
Directors would be responsible for the administration of the Act, the approval of budgets, 
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policies and programs, and, eventually, the hiring of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
Under the amendment the Board of Directors was comprised of no less than seven but up 
to eleven representatives of workers, employers and the public with an assurance that the 
number workers' and employers' representatives was equal.37 Although not explicitly 
stated, the notion of public, or at large, representation on the corporate Board had its roots 
in the 1980 Weiler Report where it is argued that system costs and outcomes are shared 
by the public and that the widest possible cross section of involvement might be 
beneficia1.38 It was absolutely clear, however, that the Board of Directors wou ld not hear 
or rule on individual cases - a task it perfom1ed since 1951. Instead, government created a 
new tribunal known as the Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal (WCAT) whose 
role it was to provide independent review of WCC decisions. The government-appointed 
WCAT was tripartite in nature with its decision-making panels comprised of a labour and 
employer representative, chaired by an independent Chair. Outside of ex-officio 
membership by the WCAT Chair, the WCAT members were distinct from the Board of 
Directors. The WCAT had authority to review WCC decisions and to judge cases 
according to their individual merits, but it did not have policy making authority. 
This amendment ended the 35 year-old practice of relatively isolated leadership and 
concentrated power within the wee. It represented government's response to the long-
held desires of the two main interest groups for more say in the running and management 
of the system. As well, it created the possibility of greater decision-making independence 
in the form of the WCAT. The Board Advisor system was finally scrapped which really 
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did not matter since it hadn't functioned since the 1970s and when it did function it was a 
rather lame process. Although the old structures were abolished, old political ties and 
allegiances remained strong, as Maynard was retained as the WCC's first CEO when a 
provision was added to the Act allowing him to continue during "good behaviour. "39 In 
other words, he was not hired by the Board of Directors, he was put in place by 
govemment and his tenure dependent upon the will of the govemment. Maynard kept his 
position until the Progressive Conservative party was defeated by Clyde Wells and the 
Liberal party in April 1989 following the March 1989 resignation of Brian Peckford. 
The first corporate Board was barely in place when govemment appointed 
Newfoundland's fifth Review Committee in November 1986. It had been five years since 
the December 1981 report and govemment was compelled to do so. Whether it made 
sense at that time or not is a moot point. Since dramatic governance changes had just 
occurred and the wage-loss system had only been in place for three years, it may not have 
been an ideal time for a review. Those facts probably indicate that this Review 
Committee would not be expected to make overly significant recommendations. In fact, it 
did not. But it did make no fewer than 116 recommendations when the report was finally 
released in February 1988. It is difficult to capture the breadth of issues covered but, 
generally, it may be stated that the majority of recommendations were biased toward the 
interests of workers. Generally, there were many minor, incremental recommendations 
with no one alone having a significant influence on overall system design or 
administration, but the recommendations did call for additional spending through 
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improved entitlements and processes for workers, ranging from higher meal allowances 
to enhanced vocational rehabilitation progranu11ing to more assistance providing 
assistance for workers experiencing chronic pain.40 Somewhat ironically, given the 
Committee's bias to liberalize benefits and processes, contained along side these varied 
recommendations was the suggestion that the wee should arrange for a comprehensive 
actuarial study to determine the financial impact of previous decisions to include pre-
1984 Act claimants under the post-1984 Act. 41 Arguably, it may have been more prudent 
to answer that question first before proceeding with their series of recommendations 
which called for additional spending. 
But this Review Committee process is most noteworthy for the relative explosion of 
participation compared to all previous review committees. Twenty six hearings were held 
around the province involving 114 presentations and 24 written submissions were sent to 
the committee. These are very large numbers compared to the previous statutory review 
processes and, perhaps, as well as any other indicator serve to show the level of growing 
interest in and dissatisfaction with the workers' compensation system at that time. Over 
85 percent of the presentations came from disgruntled injured workers or their 
representatives. The final report lists the names of the individuals, groups and 
corporations which participated in the review; clearly this was the most diversified cross 
section ofNewfoundland society ever to participate in a workers' compensation review.42 
Though it may be only partly coincidental, in the wake of this activity a new interest 
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group known as the Injured Workers' Association was fom1ed in 1988. As implied by the 
name, the Association was created to promote the interests and concems of injured 
workers before govemment and the wee. It developed because many injured workers 
shared similar same concems with wee decision making and believed that their views 
would be more readily heard and appreciated if they presented them if a more organized 
and forceful manner. This group was of particular interest to non-unionized injured 
workers who did not have the advantage of any other representation.43 Even though the 
compensation system was perceived as being fundamentally unfair many times prior to 
1987/88, there is no history of injured workers themselves joining together to fight for 
improvements in Newfoundland. It is worth pointing out that in 1974 a group of injured 
workers in Ontario formed the Union of Injured Workers which acted to apply pressure 
upon govemment to improve the benefit programs, mainly long-term disability pensions 
in that province.44 The development and existence of those groups in Ontario and other 
provinces before 1988 influenced the formation of the Newfoundland group.45 
In retrospect, the public consultation process leading up to the 1988 Review Committee 
report was likely a necessary outlet for widespread complaints regarding the workers' 
compensation system. That argument might support the requirement for the Review 
Process at that time, even though there had been major changes in 1984. It appears that 
Review Committee aired as many concerns as possible and tried to offer improvements 
for the many injured workers who appeared before it. But the Committee Report did not 
fix the fundamental issue which was that many injured workers felt they were not being 
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adequately compensated for their real or perceived long-term losses. In particular they 
were not happy with the wee deeming decisions. In retrospect, the 1984 wage-loss 
system merely replaced an old set of problems and complaints with new ones.46 It is 
speculative, but the depth of dislike for the wage-loss system was probably as intense in 
1988 as it was for the disability system in 1977 or 1981. One major difference is that 
there were numerically more parties involved in the 1988 Review Conm1ittee process 
than there were previously. And unlike previously, by 1988 new, diverse groups vied for 
equal attention and influence, including employers who opposed they general wishes of 
labour for a more liberal, e.g., more expensive, wage loss system. The new participation 
dynamics caused inevitable tensions as various interests sought to influence policy 
direction. As for system governance up to 1988, the WCB/WCC organization was a 
specialized, somewhat isolated group more accustomed to functioning as an independent, 
quasi-judicial agency rather than as an effective assessor and arbiter of diverse, often 
competing views from interests as diverse as Boards of Directors and strong-wi lied 
interest groups with divergent interests. 
The End of the Maynard Years 
Penelope Rowe's first encounter with the workers' compensation system occurred in 
1988. She is a well-known social policy advocate and perhaps best known as the 
Executive Director of the Community Services Council of Newfoundland and Labrador. 
In 1988 she had been asked by Minister Ted Blanchard to attend a press conference 
regarding a review of provincial Building Accessibility legislation on which he had asked 
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for her assistance. Rowe was surprised when Blanchard was overwhelmed at the press 
conference with a ban-age of questions focused strictly on workers' compensation 
concerns. Essentially there were no questions concerning Building Accessibility and the 
only thing the press appeared interested in was grilling the Minister on workers' 
compensation. This introduction to the intensity and strength of convictions often 
associated with workers' compensation policy issues was perhaps fitting for Rowe who 
was appointed Chair of the WCC Board of Directors in August 1989.47 
It is useful to place the timing of Rowe's appointment as Chair in political context. By 
the end of 1988, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Maynard had been in office as 
Chaim1an and CEO of the WCB/WCC for nearly 10 years, having been appointed by 
Progressive Conservative Premier Brian Peckford in 1979. He had overseen all 
significant changes through the 1980s and, as a result, was increasingly the object of 
concern in some quarters, especially employers, for what might be best described for the 
purposes of thjs paper as his very successful policy entrepreneurship in the expansion of 
the workers' compensation system. However, Maynard's influence came to a sudden halt 
when he was relieved of his duties by Clyde Wells very shortly after the Liberal election 
victory in April 1989.48 As for Peckford, who had resigned in March 1989, the record 
throughout ills tenure as Premier does not show very much personal involvement in 
workers' compensation matters. Peckford is best remembered for his detern1ined political 
and legal fights against Ottawa regarding ownership of offshore oil and gas. Clyde Wells, 
on the other hand, is best remembered as a strong federalist who insisted on the equality 
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of provinces in the Meech Lake constitutional debate. Wells is also well-remembered 
within the Province for taking on the role of Premier at a time of serious economic 
difficulties, not the least of which was collapse of the cod fishery. Although Well's 
government implemented austere fiscal measures in its initial years, especially targeting 
public sector wages, he and his Liberal Party were retumed to power with an increased 
majority in the May 1993 election. 
Therefore, it was at the beginning of the Wells era in 1989, and on the heels of the 
complaint-filled 1988 Statutory Review Committee process and report, that Penny Rowe 
and her new Board of Directors inherited a number of major problems and challenges.49 
Not the least of these was how to respond to the many and varied complaints about the 
system which had not dissipated since the 1988 Review Committee process. Responding 
to those problems was complicated by the fact that the wee suffered a major image 
problem by 1989. For example, Rowe commonly heard the WCC referred to as "the 
bunker on the hill" because of its reluctance to answer questions put to it by the media 
and others. Indicative of this was the fact that when she asked about the possibility of 
having a press conference in early 1990 she was told "we don't do that." Unlike the 
situation faced by the old WCB, and even the first Board of Directors, the operating 
environment in 1989 was more complex and tense given the array of interests, competing 
viewpoints, and new institutional processes. Initially, in 1989, Rowe and her Board of 
Directors were not well-equipped to cope as effectively as possible with the emerging 
demands. The Board of Directors system had not evolved significantly during its first 
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couple of years of existence and, in particular, there was not an effective relationship 
between senior WCC personnel and the Board itself. The relationship lacked levels of 
comfort and sophistication which might have allowed for more open exchanges between 
them, although this improved quickly after 1989.50 
Looming over and above these environmental and organizational challenges, however, 
was a significant issue which the Board and WCC senior officials were forced to address 
immediately. That issue was upwardly spiraling costs. In fact, costs - and related 
questions of system affordability - became the most important policy determinant of the 
1990s. In 1989, for the first time since 1984, sufficient injury, disability and cost 
experience was available for the wee to request a detailed actuarial study to confidently 
assess and project the financial costs of the wage-loss system. 51 The findings not only 
confim1ed that the system was very costly, it also showed that costs were escalating so 
dramatically that "if serious measures are not taken immediately the system will simply 
fall apart. "52 
By the end of 1989 the system was very much under financial pressure. 53 Evidence was 
mounting that an important belief/hope of the pre-1984 wage-loss advocates was not 
materializing: long-term liability costs were not being lessened through increased and 
intensive vocational rehabilitation efforts. Long-term liabilities were sky rocketing and 
there was no end in sight to the amount of money spent on current claim costs. For 
example, total WCC expenditures on vocational rehabilitation in 1985 were $2.2 million. 
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These costs covered items such as tuition for various levels of academic or vocational 
training, retraining or upgrading, books and other materials, provided to assist injured 
workers re-enter the workforce. By 1989, the total costs associated with vocational 
rehabilitation had ballooned to $19.9 million. Unfortunately, even though these large 
amounts were being spent on retraining injured workers, there was no offsetting decrease 
in long-term liabilities. The WCC ordered a second actuarial assessment in 1990 which 
confirmed a gloomy financial picture. Board Chairperson, Ms. Rowe, wrote: 
The unfunded portion of the liability at the end of 1990 ... is $112, 759, 
398. This figure is not a statement of a current account deficit but 
represents the additional funds required to pay the future costs of injuries 
which have occurred to date assuming annual indexation in line with 
increases in the average industrial wage. Nonetheless, the figure IS 
startling and is a matter which requires immediate remedial action. 54 
In very simple policy choice terms, to address a rising cost problem in the workers 
compensation system one either increases assessment rates paid by employers or lowers 
benefits paid to injured workers. Or both. The history shows that employers were 
gradually asked to pay more since the early 1980s. Between 1986 and 1989 the average 
assessment rate paid by employers increased to $2.31 from $1.79. In 1990, the average 
rate was increased to $2.51, and in 1991 it increased again to $2.92. By 1994 the average 
rate charged to Newfoundland employers would be $3.18. (See Figure 5 on next page.) 
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These increases were required because the WCC's annual revenue requirements steadily 
increased based on growing claims cost experience and on independent actuarial advice 
with respect to anticipated future liabilities. By 1990 employers were becoming much 
more vocal regarding increasing workers' compensation costs. James Pitcher, president of 
the Employers' Council, was quoted in the February 5, 1990 edition of the Evening 
Telegram: 
.. . increased Workers' Compensation assessments will result in lost jobs .. .. 
employers in this province are supportive of ... no-fault insurance ... but 
the existing economic conditions make payment of heavy assessments 
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difficult. The increasing cost to fund this program is presenting serious 
problems for employers. Employers do not have a bottomless pit of 
money, and they feel it is about time government took a leadership role to 
review its present legislation while the objective of developing a more 
realistic program. 
At the same time labour was sensitive to the prospect of government being forced to 
make critical policy choices with respect to the program. Labour risked erosion in the 
improved benefits and processes it had gained since the 1970s and 1980s. The views of 
labour and employers were highly polarized, as vividly demonstrated in the response to 
Mr. Pitcher in the very next issue of the Evening Telegram (February 6, 1990) by the 
president of the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation ofLabour, Bill Parsons: 
... employers should stop bellyaching about the workers' compensation 
and be more supportive of the no-fault insurance system. (Reacting to 
conm1ents that questioned why WCAT appeal decisions were so highly 
favourable to workers, Parsons said) We now have a quasi-judicial system 
whereby the workers can get a fair hearing rather than a kangaroo court as 
was here in the past. 
These exchanges, as much as any, illustrate the essential ideological nature of the 
struggle between the labour and employers when difficult workers' compensation policy 
choices must be made. When the system becomes unbalanced, however, it is difficult to 
redirect it without one side or the other - or both - paying a price. It was in light of dire 
financial predictions and growing friction between labour and employers that the Wells 
Government appointed a Statutory Review Committee in December, 1990. A long-time 
provincial government official, with little or no background in workers' compensation, 
was named Chairperson of the three-person Committee (with the other two being named 
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as representatives of labour and employers). Twenty (20) public hearings were conducted 
with a total of38 oral presentations and 51 written submissions. 
To put it mildly, the 1990 Statutory Review Committee members differed in their 
conclusions. The majority report was that of the Chair and employer representative who 
concluded that dramatic cuts in benefits payable to injured workers were imperative. 
Among their recommendations were legislative amendments to cut the amount of 
compensation payable to injured workers, including reduction of the basic benefit 
payable to 75 percent from 90 percent of net earnings, and reduction of annuity benefits 
payable after age 65. It is perhaps not surprising that benefits payable to workers were 
targeted because these they were identified as key cost drivers. Likely the most influential 
document considered by the majority members was the WCC Board of Director's April 
1991 , Financial Strategy policy paper which outlined the factors it thought responsible 
for significantly increased costs.55 The Board indicated in this report that legislative 
intervention from Government was required to stop rising costs because tightening WCC 
administrative procedures (already in place) would not bring about sufficient cost 
savmgs. 
At the polar opposite, the labour representative on the Statutory Review Committee 
produced a minority report entitled Betrayal. He strongly disagreed that benefits payable 
to injured workers should be rolled back. Furthermore, comments contained in that report 
reveal a belief that the Review Committee process was seriously flawed because of a 
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tight time frame for the production of the report, part-time Committee members, and no 
independent staff or financial advice. The ultimate speculation was "one also wonders if 
the recommendations of my colleagues, i.e., the majority report, is nothing more than an 
extension of the draconian fiscal policies of the provincial government. Slash, slash, 
slash, with little concern for the human element."56 
The reaction of labour groups was predictable when the Review Committee report was 
tabled in the House of Assembly on November 6, 1991. They felt deprived of an 
adequate hearing on the various matters. This prompted the responsible Minister to 
commence a long series of special meetings with all major groups such as The 
Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour, the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Employers' Council, the St. John's Board of Trade and the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Nurses' Union during the early months of 1992. 
Government was not convinced by the eleventh-hour meetings with the concerned labour 
groups, but it waited until July 1992 to announce its final intentions.57 Not only did 
government announce that it accepted the recommendations from the majority Report 
regarding reduction of benefits payable to injured workers, it also pointed toward a 
decremental approach regarding the parameters of coverage. The Minister questioned the 
acceptance of claims having a remote connection to employment and the application of 
various legislative provisions which were considered responsible for liberalized 
entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. The Board of Directors was instructed to 
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conduct a comparative study of adjudicative practices of other Canadian jurisdictions to 
determine if further operational or legislative changes were required. Government's 
intentions to reduce benefits payable to injured workers, as recommended in the majority 
report, were realized through a set of legislative amendments which went into effect 
January 1, 1993.58 
There is no doubt that concern for the financial stability of the system was the oveiTiding 
policy determinant in the early 1990s. Costs and affordability trumped all other concerns 
and drove the entire policy agenda. In retrospect, it is clear that government knew going 
into the 1991 statutory review process that there would have to be major cutbacks 
(decremental policy movement). In that regard, Rowe' s Board of Directors delineated the 
issues and laid groundwork for government through effective analysis and study. The 
Wells government tightly managed the 1991 statutory review process accordingly; for 
exan1ple, by the selection of the senior provincial government bureaucrat as Chairperson, 
post-report consultations, and announced legislative cut-backs, including specific 
directions to the Board of Directors regarding adjudication practices. It is interesting to 
compare Wells careful approach to managing the 1991 statutory review process with that 
of Peckford's in 1981. In 1981 , when complaints were rampant and the requirement for 
major program improvements seemed inevitable, the Peckford administration carefully 
managed the statutory review process to achieve certain desired outcomes (Chapter 6). 
Like Wells, Peckford also benefited from the issue delineation, analysis and study 
provided through Maynard. In 1981 and 1991 , therefore, governments carefully 
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controlled the agenda to ensure that the predominant recommendations from the statutory 
review committees were reasonable, workable, and acceptable alternatives. By exerting 
influence and control over policy development consultation processes, and generating 
acceptable alternatives, government minimizes the difficulties it will eventually face 
when it imposes final policy choices. 
Chapter Summary 
To recap, the 1984 to 1993 era is one characterized by a senes of legislative, 
organizational, and attitudinal changes: new WCC; new wage-loss system; new Board of 
Directors; new appeal systems; Charter of Rights and Freedoms; invigorated employers 
groups; injured workers' association; and serious financial difficulties followed by 
legislative cutbacks. Each of these change factors contributed - if only subtly, but some 
more than others - to an increasingly complex policy environmental. Of special note is 
the addition of new institutional bodies, such as Board of Directors and external appeal 
structures, to the policy environment. 
Although this paper has examined the implications of path dependency in a general 
manner only (see Chapter 4 Summary), it is worth recapping the associated theory which 
suggests the addition of new institutions usually produces increasing returns. 59 In other 
words, the likelihood that a law, institution, or process will be changed decreases as new 
institutions are introduced. It is suggested that "massive increasing returns" are produced 
because established institutions tend to reinforce their own stability and, at a macro level, 
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the stability of institutions with which they interact.60 Given the layering of 
organizational changes witnessed between 1984 and 1993, therefore, it may be predicted 
that systemic change in the fundamental nature of the law and surrounding organizational 
institutions will not occur very easily. It may be anticipated that path dependence will 
apply with substantive divergences at critical and defining moments only. 
Ultimately, however, 1984 to 1993 was an era of dashed expectations. Expectations were 
very high in 1984 and, encouraged by various social, political and economic factors, 
injured workers fought for their rights more often and more vigorously. That general 
spirit was captured most effectively by the Piercey case in wruch one person challenged 
the legitimacy of the entire system. Of course, the Piercey case also allows an exploration 
of the basic tenets of the Canadian workers' compensation system and will remain an 
interesting legal footnote to the extent that it was the Newfoundland Act which proved 
the constitutionality of the Canadian system under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
This era is also significant because employers' expectations for a balanced and affordable 
system were destroyed and, as a result, they became much more engaged as committed 
and important policy actors. 
While the range of political actors, institutions and interest groups broadened during the 
1984 to 1993 period, and spirits were optimistic, there is one inescapable conclusion: 
very shortly following introduction of the 1984 Act the system faced financial collapse. 
The generous benefits and programs of 1984 proved more costly than could be easily 
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afforded. Consequently, system costs became the predominant policy determinant. Faced 
with the prospect of financial collapse of its workers' compensation system, Government 
was forced to take control of the policy agenda and execute firm measures to restore 
fiscal stability in 1993. 
In 2001 , the workers' compensation system m Newfoundland underwent another 
government-appointed statutory review process, except this time the appointees to the 
review committee (now called a Task Force) are all members of the WCC's Board of 
Directors. Of course, it is no longer the WCC- the name of the organization was changed 
to Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission (WHSCC) in 1998. This is 
the second statutory review committee since 1991; recommendations from a 1997 
statutory report resulted in benefit improvements for injured workers (mainly as a 
reaction to 1993 cutbacks), but since then financial concerns have re-emerged to become 
a major policy determinant once again. Commission bureaucrats had little or no 
involvement in 1997, but appeared to be playing a greater role in 2001. Perhaps non-
political Board members and advisory bureaucrats can offer long-term policy balance to 
avoid abrupt systemic failures as happened from 1984 to 1993? It will be for future 
writers to assess the relative effectiveness of these institutional developments, though 
history predicts an incremental, path dependent result within the context and framework 
of the Canadian-style system in place since 1951. 
Meanwhile, a thought-provoking and perhaps instructive analysis is supplied by March 
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and Olsen regarding the very important role that institutions, particularly the newly-
named Workplace, Health, Safety and Compensation Commission in this case, play in 
responding to and shaping their environment: 
... every democratic system faces a difficult problem of balancing the 
undoubted advantages, even necessity, of institutional autonomy with the 
risks that such autonomy will make popular control difficult or impossible. 
Ultimately, the system works only because of institutional limits and trust. 
Institutional actors refuse to exploit opportunities for autonomous action 
that might compromise the system. Interest groups grant a reasonable 
range of independence to political institutions. Sustaining the limits and 
encouraging the trust, therefore, become an essential part of institution 
building.61 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
This paper reviews the evolution of workers' compensation laws in Newfoundland 
since the late 1800s and determines which factors have influenced their development. As 
with any set of laws examined over 100 years, the nature and degree of policy 
determinants in Newfoundland has changed along with - because of, or in reaction to -
the ebb and flow of mixed and interrelated factors including: historical, ideological, legal, 
institutional , economic, social, and political responses to industrialization, modernization, 
and major events such as industrial disasters. That said, the review indicates that core 
aspects of the laws have been remarkably stable over time, subject mainly to incremental 
change. The Newfoundland laws were based squarely on the laws of England prior to 
1949 and of Canada after 1949. While there are occasional major policy shifts within the 
context of these national frameworks, once introduced the laws and systems surrounding 
them have proven highly durable. 
Having made these observations the paper also introduced (Chapter Two) the theoretical 
concepts of path dependency and increasing returns as an approach for understanding this 
degree of system durability and associated incrementalism. The history and documented 
influencing factors reflect the basic increasing returns prediction that the likelihood that a 
law, institution, or process will be changed steadily decreases the longer it remains in 
place. To the extent that workers' compensation policy in Newfoundland can and does 
change, however, the main influences uncovered in this paper include: historical context 
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and tradition; emulation of policy models in other counties and provmces; economic 
development and diversification; social and political responses to industrialization and 
modernization; ideological biases and preferences; strength and persistence of labour 
activism; Canadian Confederation; interest group activism (including eventual emergence 
of employer and injured worker lobby groups); institutions, especially the WCB and its 
associated structures and processes; major events (wars and industrial disasters); change 
of Government and associated pohcy windows/policy entrepreneurs (Chapter Five); 
individuals (especially as policy entrepreneurs); benefit equity complaints, e.g., 1970s 
inflation and inefficient means to compensate for long term disability; and, finally, 
system costs and affordability. The remaining paragraphs merely highlight and 
summarize key policy determinants, events, issues, individuals and organizations 
discussed in the paper. 
In what was an otherwise an underdeveloped, predominantly non-wage-based economy 
in the 1880s, economic policy appears to have been an initial determinant for the 
emergence of a law in Newfoundland. Interested in attracting labour to its shores to 
support its economic development goals, particularly completion of the railways, 
Newfoundland legislators adopted the English Employer Liability Act in 1887 to ensure it 
offered similar standards of protection as was available to workers in England. The 
readily available example of the English law passed a few years earlier made emulation 
the straightforward option. 
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Reliance upon British law remained a potent form of policy detennination within 
Newfoundland. Major amendments in 1902 and 1908, for example, were copied directly 
from earlier English amendments. Newfoundland continued to rely on English 
experience, tradition and culture as it modified its version of their Employer Liability Act 
beyond 1908. Practically that may not be too surprising, but the continuing trust in 
external British authority contradicts other evidence which indicates that through the late 
1800s and into the 1900s Newfoundland struggled to develop a separate identity and 
colonial independence. While this may suggest it was difficult for Newfoundland 
politicians to develop alternate solutions other than those predicated upon British rules, it 
more likely became impractical to do anything other than adhere to the established model 
thus illustrating the potent nature of increasing returns in path dependency theory 
(Chapter Two). As discussed, once the English (and eventually Canadian) law was 
established it heavily influenced and in many ways limited future policy options. A 
simple pattern was followed up to 1949 - when Newfoundland conditions wan·anted 
legislative change there was strict reliance on the English experience for solutions. 
The initial legislative amendments in Newfoundland were required due to emergmg 
labour relations conflict in a developing economy. For example, the first modifications to 
the 1887 Act were required after 1900 secondary to economic growth and new demands 
from an increasingly diversified workforce and growing trade unions (Chapter 2) . 
Specifically, there was an ideological rift between employers who believed workers 
should be able to "opt out" of coverage under the legislation and those who insisted that 
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workers ' rights be fully protected. It is also interesting to mark the emergence of 
organized labour in this era as the beginning of its continuing efforts to influence the 
direction of the law. Organized labour has been highly influential at various points in the 
history, not the least ofwhich occurred in 1949 when it- the Newfoundland Federation of 
Labour and individual labour leaders - played a central role in the growth and 
development of the new Canadian workers' compensation system (Chapter Five). 
But the Newfoundland envirom11ent was always not conducive to major change in the 
law, particularly prior to 1949. Incremental policy changes predominated when, for 
example, Newfoundland of the 1920s and 1930s was saddled with miserable economic 
performance, increasing public debt and eventual bankruptcy (Chapter Three). 
Government preoccupation with economic crises meant that the concems and influence 
of labour leaders were greatly diminished. Although labour advocacy was a policy 
determinant, to the extent that some positive changes occurred, other factors often 
outweighed goverm11ent's ability or willingness to meet their desire for sweeping change. 
As witnessed (Chapter Three), Smallwood's and Browne's bold bid for the Newfoundland 
goverru11ent to adopt the progressive new Canadian model was side-stepped in 1926 in 
favour of a series of incremental changes. That episode illustrates how incremental policy 
results when the competing interests of capital and workers vie for policy influence. 
Incrementalism, as stated at the end of Chapter Three, reduces the stakes in political 
controversy and encourages losers to accept their losses without disrupting the political 
system. 
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During the initial decades the system and its institutions were not complex. For example, 
outside of one or two keen government members, such as the young Edward Morris, 
there were few (if any) others interested in policy development after the original Act was 
passed in 1887. Matters were obviously restricted to individual cases and courts. But by 
1900, policy choices were made in the context of government, industrialists, and trade 
union viewpoints. The policy development landscape eventually included the likes of 
Coaker's elected unionist party. And, whether it was Morris and Sir Robert Bond's 
associated battles of one-upmanship, or Bond's apparently self-serving reasons for 
introducing various legislative amendments, or Cashin's favourable 1919 amendments 
catering to the interests of the Returning Soldiers' Association, the complexity of 
interplay was often heightened by ulterior motivations (Chapter Two). While such 
examples highlight how the policy development environment grew somewhat 
complicated after 1900 in line with industrial development and the growth of class 
interests, it was a relatively straightforward political and institutional environment. 
The policy development environment showed ini tial signs that it would become more 
complex following the advent of Commission of Government and rebirth of organized 
labour in the 1930s. The communication breakdown between the Commission of 
Government and local labour leaders created a stalemate situation in which policy 
development was drastically impeded in the 1930s and 1940s (Chapter Four). Subsequent 
activities in the newly created Labour Relations Office (1942), such as public 
consultation as part of legislative review in 1947, demonstrate the requirement for 
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improved govenm1ental responsiveness regarding policy development. In 1948 and 1949, 
organized labour interacted so effectively in the political sphere that many of its leaders 
became members of Smallwood's Liberal government (Chapter Five). That helped set the 
stage for the post-1949 policy window which saw the adoption of the Canadian model 
and now included the WCB and its specialized bureaucrats. By the 1960s, definitive 
interest groups, such as unions, St. Lawrence miners, and the Law Society, were vying 
for greater influence upon workers' compensation and occupational health and safety 
policy (Chapter Five). The terrain was further complicated by the St. Lawrence Royal 
Commission in the late 1960s, an unmistakably important policy detem1inant which, in 
part, helped set the stage for another policy window of opportunity in the dynamic 
Moores-Maynard years (Chapter Six). The advocacy of organized labour for improved 
benefits during the 1970s was a clearly identifiable policy determinant leading to a series 
of progressive legislative amendments and benefit improvements. 
After 1980 - for essentially for the first time ever - Newfoundland employers became 
motivated to defend and promote their interests in the workers' compensation system 
because of increasing costs. In 1983, a new employer advocacy group - known as the 
Employers' Council - called for greater levels of employer influence over the workers' 
compensation policy decisions. Then, on the heels of a new wage-loss system in 1984, a 
new corporate Board of Directors' and an external appeal tribunal were created in 1986. 
Also, by 1988 an Injured Workers' Association was formed to represent their own 
interests in the system. In short, the policy development landscape was changing 
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dramatically with the emergence of new systems and institutions, new actors, and more 
articulate expression of ideological viewpoints. In particular, the history reveals 
increasing interplay with and heightening importance of the wee and its associated 
institutional structures and processes. 
As a measure of the growing complexity of the system, when the first statutory review 
process occurred in 1966, only 15 written briefs were submitted and there were no public 
hearings. But the 1988 statutory review process involved 24 written briefs and 26 public 
hearings (with 114 oral presentations). Since 1959 there have been six Statutory Review 
Committee reports: May 1966, July 1972, June 1977, December 1981 , February 1988, 
November 1991, and May 1997. Statutory review processes themselves are interesting 
mechanisms for tracking the growing complexity of interactions and preferences of 
actors. By nature, the role of these processes is to assist in the identification and 
fornmlation of policy alternatives. They open up the system for close scrutiny, at the call 
and on behalf of government, on a regular basis. From government's perspective, the 
process is a vehicle from which to gauge private and public reactions to the current state 
of affairs. An analogy might be that the process allows government to sit pond-side and 
unobtrusively peer through the reeds as the various interests stake their positions. 
Government can shape its own views depending upon the relative directions and strength 
of private and public opinions. Viewed in this light, the statutory review processes are an 
example of a mechanism which operates to articulate and shape the range of acceptable 
alternatives for final decision making. Alternatively, they may be viewed as political 
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liabilities at times when the system - which is inherently biased toward incremental 
change - does not require major change but the spectacle of the review process draws out 
negative complaints and raises expectations that cannot be easily met. 
On this matter, however, it must be understood that major workers' compensation policy 
choices in Newfoundland are and have always been decided by the government of the 
day. In other words, the final call regarding policy, i.e., legislative, choice remains with 
the government. Therefore, to affect substantive change groups or individuals had to have 
the ear of a sympathetic government, even to affect modest changes such as the FPU 
logger coverage amendment in 1914 (Chapter Two) or Smallwood' s marginal reform 
efforts in 1926 (Chapter Three). Organized labour, for example, realized all of its goals as 
soon as it aligned itself with the Smallwood government in 1949, but very few of its 
objectives were met prior to 1949 when it did not enjoy close relations with government 
(Chapter Five). The question of who was the final decision maker related to the workers' 
compensation system became somewhat more complex after 1949. Following the 
introduction of the new WCB in 1951 , govemment allowed the WCB policy experts to 
take the lead on certain policy matters (Chapter Five). While government necessarily 
retained final authority for legislative changes, there was a sense of WCB autonomy and 
shared decision-making authority between the WCB and government. In that 
environment, therefore, those interested in influencing policy outcomes could appeal to 
either the WCB or government leaders in hopes of having their concems addressed. In 
1959, however, the Smallwood government reasserted pre-eminence as final decision 
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maker within the system warning that "up to now, (they, the WCB) have been a little 
municipality, a little kingdom of their own." Smallwood instituted the statutory review 
process to oversee management of the system and report back to government at least once 
every five years. After 1959, government controlled final decision making exclusively 
with absolutely no sense of shared authority until after Smallwood's departure in 1972. 
Perhaps as a result of Smallwood's influence and control measures, the WCB through the 
1970s did not play a leadership role. In fact, it has been described as a stagnant 
bureaucracy up to the end ofthe 1970s (Chapter Six). By 1984, however, it went from the 
obscure WCB to the empowered WCC, providing governmental-like leadership and final 
decision making proxy such as control over a complete rewrite of the legislation. For the 
second time since 1951, the credibility of wee bureaucrats rose so that they gained more 
influence on policy decisions at the highest level. However, the factors driving this new 
found credibility with government were different than in 1951. The first period (1951 -
1959) occurred during honeymoon years when the WCB was new and government was 
otherwise preoccupied with matters associated with building a new province (Chapter 
Five). The second period (1981- 1984), on the other hand, arose for a number of reasons: 
policy bias of the Moores' administration favouring stronger administrative capabilities 
within government agencies; Peckford's willingness to empower the WCB and very 
closely follow the direction of its bureaucrats Jed by a former, influential political 
colleague (Maynard); recommendations for greater WCB influence in the 1981 Statutory 
Review Committee report; general unrest within the system with few obvious solutions; 
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and, the sinking of the Ocean Ranger which was a turning point for the WCB in this 
regard (Chapter Six). 
As an interesting aside, the history provides striking exan1ples of how catastrophes, such 
as the Ocean Ranger sinking and St. Lawrence, create potent policy windows of 
opportunity which precipitate policy significant action. But other less obvious factors 
influence the policy development as well. In the liberating Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms era of the 1980s, the system adjusts to demands from individuals more willing 
than ever to appeal workers' compensation decisions in defense of their individual rights. 
From wars to inflation, from Smallwood's fall ing out with labour after 1959 to Moore's 
commitment for change in the 1970s, the paper consistently demonstrates that local 
workers' compensation policy choices are often affected by factors influencing the 
broader social, political and economic environment. 
Partly as a reaction to the new found authority of the WCC in the 1980s, but primarily as 
a reaction to escalating costs and general expansion of workers' compensation benefits 
and programs and benefits, employers encouraged government to change the governance 
model. As early as 1983, the Employers' Council recommended abolishing the old 
Commissioner system (headed by the influential Maynard) and replacing it replacing it 
with a Board of Directors. In fact, a Board of Directors system replaced the government-
appointed WCB Commissioners in 1987 (Chapter Seven). Between 1987 and 1993, the 
Board of Directors did not have the same level of direct influence in final decision 
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making as did the Maynard-led WCC of the early 1980s. There were various reasons why 
that was so, but the primary factor was that government was forced to take control of the 
system because of financial difficulties. In retrospect, the cost implications of the 1984 
changes irrevocably altered the course of workers' compensation policy development and 
may be viewed, in isolation, as the primary determinant of events for the remainder of the 
1980s and 1990s (Chapter Seven). The 1984 to 1993 period shows that dramatic benefit 
gains can be quickly eroded and may even suggest that workers' compensation is a 
system which is more stable when incremental policy processes are pursued (although 
that is speculative and discount the possibility that large scale changes can be effectively 
managed with thoughtful planning, research and cost analysis). 
Indeed, in 1990 financial concerns were unquestioningly the dominant, overriding policy 
determinant. While the Board of Directors was unable to control costs, or otherwise limit 
benefits and programs, without significant legislative direction from government, it 
played a vital advisory role by effectively communicating key financial information to 
government and the 1991 Statutory Review Committee. In this light, the Boards of 
Directors helped define the agenda and refine the range of alternatives for final decision 
making by government. Whether future Boards of Directors are able or will be called 
upon to exercise more than incremental guidance may simply depend upon changing 
times, circumstances and personnel. Or perhaps, given the diverse backgrounds of their 
memberships, Boards of Directors may be especially prone to incremental decision 
making - opting to reduce the stakes in controversy and encourage graceful losses -
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leaving tough policy decisions to government. 
To conclude, the main intention of this paper has been to document the major policy 
determinants which have affected the development of workers' compensation laws in 
Newfow1dland from colonial to modem times. It reveals an increasingly complex and 
costly environment, especially since 1981, characterized by ongoing struggle for 
mutually incompatible preferred outcomes by labour and employers through an evolving 
network of institutions (WHSCC, Board of Directors, appeal tribunals, statutory review 
processes, etc.) with Government as final referee. Intuitive judgment suggests these 
dynamics are conducive to incremental policy development and political theories touched 
upon in the paper, such as path dependency, increasing returns and policy windows, 
suggest the system fundamentals will remain stable subject to occasional policy shifts. As 
for how, when, and why policy shifts occur, the history provides insights based on past 
experience and, as path dependent theorists would agree, the past can be an effective 
predictor for the future. 
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